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OWEN L. ANDERSON

Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty
Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or
Realistically?*
Part 2
Should Courts Contemplate the Forest or Dissect Each Tree?
Part 2 addresses whether oil and gas lessees must pay
royalty on gas values attributable to so-called "post-production"
activities.Modern oil and gas royalty cases, that hold that royalty
valuation is to be made at the wellhead and cases that hold that
royalty valuationoccurs at some point dowmstream of the wellhead,
are critically discussed. This portion concludes that, absent an
express lease provision to the contrary, lessees should not have to
pay royalty on any value added to productionby reason of incurred
"post-production"activities.However, "production" should not be
regardedas having been completed until a first-marketableproduct
has been obtained. Thus, the basic royalty obligation should be to
pay royalty based upon the price that the lessee obtained, or could
have obtained upon the sale of gas as afirst-marketableproduct in
the vicinity of the well.
I. A LOOK AT MODERN ROYALTY CASE LAW
The express terms of most gas royalty clauses are neither precise
nor detailed and, notwithstanding harsh criticism, these clauses have
changed little over the years. Moreover, the oil and gas lease offered by
lessees is seldom negotiated with a lessor engaged in the oil and gas
business who could be regarded as a "merchant" knowledgeable about oil
and gas production and marketing practices. Typically, the lessor is a
farmer or a laborer, someone engaged in an unrelated business or
* Eugene Kunz Professor of Oil, Gas, & Natual Resources, The University of Oklahoma
College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 0 Owen L Anderson. Preparation of this essay was
supported by a grant from the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section of the State Bar of Texas.
Professor Anderson acknowledges the able research assistance of Jeffrey Anderson, Paige Bass,
Melody Huckaby, and Randolph Marsh.
1. See generally, George Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee With Respect to the Sale of Gas
and as to Gas Royalty Provisions,4 INST. ON On. &GAS L. & TAx'N 181, 216 (1953); Joseph T.
Sneed, Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced,25 TEx. L.
REV. 641, 656- 57 (1948). Joseph T. Sneed is currently Senior Judge for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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profession, or a retired person.2 Regarding the lease royalty clause, about3
the only item negotiated may be the fraction or percentage of royalty.
Often, the party who actually develops the leased premises and is liable for
the royalty payment is not the initial lessee, but an assignee.4 The initial
lessee may be little more than a knowledgeable speculator, who hopes to
put together a "prospect" that will be of interest to developers. The chosen
lease form may be one purchased at a local print shop with little attention
given to the form's detail. Even where a major company is involved in lease
acquisition, the lease may be taken by an "independent" on a print-shop
form to hide the fact that a major company is making acquisitions in a
particular area.
For these reasons, I submit that many of the modem gas royalty
clauses encountered in printed lease forms offered by prospective lessees
are best viewed as expressing practically identical obligations even though
the words used may vary. In other words, many modem gas royalty clauses
should be viewed as a forest of clauses expressing similar anticipatory
obligations that must be sufficiently general to function fairly and efficiently
for what may be decades of production regardless of the specific
circumstances. These clauses should be viewed as having a similar
objective: to remit to the lessor the major consideration for having executed
what becomes a productive oil and gas lease. In the absence of express
language to the contrary, that consideration should be a share in the value
of gas as a first-marketable product.
Professor Maurice Merrill warned courts against putting too much
emphasis on the precise words used in a printed lease form when deciding
a dispute involving the payment of royalty:
Too much dependence is placed upon the language of a
printed form, in the preparation of which at least one party
has had no part and to the selection of which the other
frequently has given no consideration, if upon a variance of

2. Today, prospective lessors who are knowledgeable about oil and gas practices and
who have valuable prospect property would most likely insist on using a more lessororiented form.
3. As I have previously pointed out, other parts of the royalty clause are often more
important than the fraction or percentage of production. Indeed, it is readily possible that
a 1/8 royalty clause in one lease form may generate more royalty than a 1/6 clause in
another form regarding similar production. Owen L Anderson, David v. Goliath:Negotiating
the "Lessors 88" and Representing Lessors and Surface Owners in Oil and Gas Lease Plays, 28B
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1029,1104-36 (1982).

4. Under all lease forms commonly encountered, upon assignment of the lease, the
initial lessor and any subsequent assignors are relieved of liabilities for the breach of lease
covenants, other than those that accrued prior to the assignment.
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that language a difference is established in a duty not
specifically referred to."
In Maloney v. Love,' the court emphasized that royalty rights "must be
determined, not by isolating certain words from the connection in which
they occur, and putting an interpretation upon them without regard to their
relative situation, but by considering all the language of which the words
form a part."7 These are sound principles of construction which have been
ignored in several modem cases.
Judge Wisdom seemed to recognize these sound principles of
construction when he wrote his opinion in Piney Woods Country Life School
v. Shell Oil Co.8 In fact, he began his discussion of the royalty obligations by
noting that "[r]esort to grammatical parsing is less instructive ...than is a
consideration of the purpose of the gas royalty clause, taken as a whole."9
Regrettably, as I will discuss below, he did not heed his own advice. Indeed,
today, some courts tend to view royalty clauses as a forest of clauses best
construed in conformity with the property law principle that oil and gas are
real property in the ground and personal property at the surface." At the
same time, they tend to construe the particular royalty clause at issue as a
tree that requires careful dissection into separate phrases, but seldom
requires construction as a whole in light of its reasonable and plain
meaning.
A.

From Vela to Piney Woods: Seeing the Trees But Not the Forest

The most troublesome examples of unfortunate royalty cases are
those that ignore the fundamental principle that royalty is a "share."" While
parties are free to define this share in any manner they choose, several
courts have construed general royalty language as specifically departing
from this fundamental concept despite a lack of evidence that the parties
intended such a departure. For example, several courts have treated the
royalty obligation differently depending upon whether the payment of
royalty is due on the basis of "market value," "market price," "proceeds,"

5. MAURICE MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 85 (2d ed. 1940).
6. 52 P. 1029 (Colo. Ct. App. 1898).
7. Id.
8. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 230.
10. Demonstrating the error of this property approach was the focus of Part 1, Section
III of this essay.
11. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Marias River
Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 38 P.2d 599,601 (Mont. 1934)).
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or "amount realized." Several courts have held12 (or suggested in dicta) 3
that these terms have significantly different meanings despite a lack of
evidence indicating that the parties specifically negotiated for the use of one
of these terms in lieu of the others, or that they regarded these terms to have
different meanings. These distinctions have resulted in the creation of
unrealistic and unintended contract obligations that have unfortunate longterm consequences for the parties to the subject lease, their successors, and
other lessors and lessees who are parties to leases with similar royalty
provisions. This error is compounded by the fact that leases govern the
rights of the parties for what could be decades of production. And because
these distinctions have not been uniformly recognized among oil and gas
producing jurisdictions, 14 they have seriously eroded uniformity of law and
caused needless confusion and complexity in calculating royalties.
Moreover, these distinctions have made the respective fractional shares of
the lessor and lessee of comparatively minor importance, even though the
fraction of royalty may have been the only portion actually negotiated.
Although not the first case to do so, and not a bad decision by itself,
the court in Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Coffee' wrongly defined and
distinguished certain commonly used words in royalty clauses, and in so
doing, inadvertently led other courts to misinterpret royalty clauses. In
Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished, for evidentiary
purposes, the terms "market value" and "market price." In a dispute over
royalty payable on a "representative market price," one party sought to
offer expert testimony on market value, but the court found that this
testimony was inadmissible. In so ruling, the court commented that market
price is not necessarily the same as market value in that market value may
be established by expert opinion. The court reasoned that, in the absence of
collusion, combination, or conspiracy, "market price" could be conclusively
established by a contract price or sales price actually paid by a buyer for the
same commodity in the same market. In other words, market price refers to
the price paid in an actual transaction. 6
A close reading of Shamrock reveals that the court was not setting
forth a substantive distinction between market price and market value.

12. See, e.g., Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 233-38 (distinguishing "market value" from
"proceeds).
13. See, e.g., Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, No. 76,848 (Okla. 1996)
(suggesting a possible distinction between 'amount realized" and "proceeds"). Cf. Upham
v. Ladd, 95 S.W.2d 365,366 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936) (stating that "Webster defines the term
'proceeds' as 'the amount realized from the sale of property ..... ).
14. Compare Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968), with Tara
Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
15. 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944).
16. Id. at 410.
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Rather, the court was making an evidentiary distinction concerning the best
proof of market price- preferring actual transactional evidence over expert
testimony on market value. In Shamrock, there was direct evidence of the
value of the gas at issue because the gas had been sold in an arm's length
transaction for a specific price. Thus, the court properly ruled that this
actual transaction established the market price for the gas at issue and
properly rejected expert testimony on market value.
Other than this evidentiary distinction, market price and market
value are really synonyms and should be treated as such in royalty
clauses. 7 Both terms refer to the price a willing buyer, not forced to buy,
would pay a8 willing seller, not forced to sell, for a product in the
marketplace.'
The Shamrock court also stated that a "representative market price"
could be calculated by determining a weighted average price based upon
a comparison of various contract prices, including both old, long-term
contracts, and current spot sales. In contrast, under more recent cases,
market price (or market value) is often regarded as the current value of gas
at the time of its extraction, not its value as determined under the governing
long-term contract." Although not the first to do so, one such case is the 5to-4 decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela."o
Vela is the case most commonly cited for the proposition that what
the lessee receives in payment for production under a long-term contract
has no legal relation to what the lessee must pay the lessor under a "market
price" or "market value" royalty clause. Vela and its progeny complicate
what should ordinarily be a simple royalty calculation by setting aside the
fundamental principle that royalty is a share,either in kind or value, of what
a lessee produces (or receives for production) on behalf of itself and its
lessor.
In Vela, the gas royalty clause provided that the lessee was "to pay
to lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where gas only is found, while the
same is being sold or used off the premises, one-eighth of the market price at the
wells of the amount so sold or used." ' The subject lease was executed in 1933

17. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122-23 (4th ed. 1968). In a later case that
same year, the Fifth Circuit treated market price and market value as synonyms. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138,141 (5th Cir. 1944). In commenting on Shamrock and
related cases, one commentator has persuasively argued that the market price and market
value are synonyms. Sneed, supra note 1, at 652-54; see also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v.
Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th. Cir. 1935) (stating that "the term 'market price' is
interchangeable with the term 'market value'").
18. See generally BLAcK'S LAW DICIONARY 1122-23 (4th ed. 1971).
19. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240,246 (rex. 1981).
20. 429 S.W.2d 866 (rex. 1968).
21. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
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and covered 1500 acres. Low pressure, dry gas was discovered on the
leasehold in the following year in the Upper Queen City Sand of the Lopena
Field.' In November of 1934, partial assignees of the working interest in the
lease, some of whom also owned non-participating royalty interests
covering lands in the same field, contracted to sell this Upper Queen City
gas ("Vela gas") for delivery at the wellhead for 2.3c per Mcf.' The term of
this gas contract was for the life of the lease, 4 and the contract appears to
have been made in good faith. Initially, there was no actual production
because the purchaser was not willing to pay compression costs of 3C per
Mcf. However, at the time of trial in the 1960s, six wells were producing
Vela gas which was being marketed under the terms of the 1934 contract.'
In the early 1960s, additional gas ("new gas") was discovered in
other formations in the Lopena Field. This new gas was sold at contract
prices ranging from 13€ to over 17€ per Mcf.2' Expert testimony offered by
the plaintiffs established an average price for this new gas of 16€ per Mcf
during the four-year period at issue, February 1960 through January 1964.'
The plaintiffs' expert further concluded that the average current market
price of the Vela gas for this period was 13€ per Mcf, after deducting 3C per
Mcf for compression.' The plaintiffs sued for the difference between this
13€ average price, which they contended was the "market price," and the
2.3C contract price. Defendants argued that the 2.3c contract price was
entered into in good faith and at arm's length, pursuant to their implied
obligation to market the gas from what had been a shut-in gas well, and that
this contract price was the "market price" for the Vela gas.29
Although the court of appeals recognized that the implied covenant
to market gas might require a lessee to enter into a long-term gas contract

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.
All parties conceded that the dispute was governed by a four-year statute of

limitations. Tax. RaV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (West 1964).
28. 429 S.W.2d at 872. The Vela gas was sold at the wellhead and the purchaser
furnished all physical facilities to handle the gas. Because the "comparable" gas did not
require compression, the expert concluded that the Vela gas was not worth the same as the
gas that did not require compression. Nevertheless, the Vela gas was clearly marketable
because it had actually been sold prior to compression.
29. Id. at 869. Two of the defendants, sued in their capacity as working interest or
former working interest owners, were also non-participating royalty interest owners. They
argued that they were entitled to additional royalty in the event that the court should rule
for the plaintiffs on the valuation issue. Id. at 868. The Supreme Court held that these
defendants were not estopped (either in law or equity) from claiming additional royalty. Id.
at 876.
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that conflicted with express royalty obligations, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the express royalty provisions nevertheless governed the royalty
payment obligation. Specifically, the court held that the duty to pay royalty
on the "market price [of gas] ... sold or used" required that royalty be paid
based upon the market value of the new gas (i.e., 13€ per Mcf) at the time
the Vela gas was actually extracted and delivered to the purchaser.' ° Simply
put, the royalty value of the Vela gas must be determined by prices paid for
new gas under recent contracts, rather than by the price established in the
Vintage gas contract for the delivery and sale of the Vela gas.31
The four dissenting justices reached the proper conclusion. In the
absence of proof that the contract price failed to represent the market price
for similar gas at the time the contract was executed 2 the dissenters would
have held that royalty was properly paid based upon the contract price of
the Vela gas (i.e., 2.3c per Mcf).33 The dissenters correctly argued that it
takes more than delivery to establish a sales or market price. A contract is
also required.3 I agree, and a sale also requires a saleable or marketable
product.
The dissenters distinguished Fosterv. Atlantic Refining Co.,3 a case
cited by the majority, on the ground that the royalty clause in Foster
required the royalty gas to "be delivered to the credit of the Lessor into the
pipe line and to be sold at the market price therefor prevailingfor the field where
produced when run."' The dissenters argued that this clause expressly
required that royalty be calculated at the market price for gas prevailing at
the time of delivery, whereas the Vela royalty clause required royalty to be
calculated at the market price for which the gas was sold, i.e., the contract
price.37 Although not mentioned by the dissenters, all of the gas belonged
to the lessees in Vela, and they sold the gas pursuant to the gas sales
contract. The royalty clause in Foster was essentially an in-kind clause

Id. at 871 (citing Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431 (rex. Comm'n App. 1926)).
31. See id. In reaching its decision, the court was influenced by several decisions of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and by one Louisiana case: J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155
F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946); and Wall v United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
32. 429 S.W.2d at 878 (citing Bynum, 155 F.2d 196).
33. Id. (citing Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (rex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hemler v. Union Producing Co., 40 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. La. 1941); Clear
Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924)).
34. Id. (citing Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926)).
35. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. 429 S.W.2d at 880.
30.
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whereby the lessee was expressly authorized to deliver and sell the lessor's
share of gas to the pipeline on the lessor's behalf.
Although the Vela dissenters attempted to distinguish rather than
reject Foster,I respectfully submit that Fosterwas also wrongly decided. A
reasonable interpretation of the royalty clause in Fosteris that the lessee was
authorized to sell the royalty gas on the lessor's behalf in the best available
market for that gas. In that case, the best available market was one that
necessitated committing the gas to a long-term, fixed price contract. That
contract established the market price prevailing for that specific gas -the
same price which the lessors would have undoubtedly received under a
long-term contract of their own making given that the lessors would have
sold their gas into the same market.
Instead, Fosterstands for the dubious proposition that the lessee is
obligated to sell gas on behalf of its lessor in a nonexistent spot market for
a fictitious spot price, even though the lessor could not have done so if it
had marketed its own share of the gas. In other words, the court held the
parties to an unrealistic commercial bargain by means of an unreasonable
construction of the lease language. If the lessor had knowingly proposed
such a royalty clause, no lessee would have knowingly agreed to it because
1/8th of the spot value of the gas could eventually exceed the total price
that the lessee received for 8/8ths of the gas sold pursuant to a long-term
gas sales contract. Based upon a 2.3c contract price, if current prices rose to
18.4c, the lessee's entire revenues derived from a sale of 8/8ths of the gas
would be consumed by its royalty obligation. Given that lease obligations
run for the life of production, this circumstance could very easily arise.
The dissenting justices in Vela also correctly pointed out that it was
universal custom and practice, at the time the lease was executed, to sell gas
pursuant to the terms of a long-term contract. Thus, because the lease was
essentially silent as to the time when the royalty was to be calculated,
custom and practice should have been used to supply this missing term.39
Although this latter argument ignores the fact that the lessors (albeit not the
royalty interest owners who were also working interest signatories to the
gas sales contract) were probably ignorant of and therefore not bound by
industry custom and practice, the lessors should have been subject to the
realities of the marketplace and to the basic principle that royalty is
inherently a share of what the working-interest lessee produces in kind or

38. 329 F.2d at 488. Another commentator has also noted that the oil industry viewed
the royalty clause in Foster as distinguishable from most royalty clauses commonly
encountered in other leases. Stuart C. Hollimon, Exxon Corporation v. Middleton: Some
Answers but Additional Confusion in the Volatile Area ofMarket Value Gas Royalty Litigation, 13
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 9 n.24 (1981).

39.

429 S.W.2d at 879.
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receives in value. In other words, unlike the dissenters in Vela, I would not
split hairs to distinguish the meaning and effect of the royalty clauses in
Vela and Foster. Both royalty clauses should have been construed as
requiring that royalty be paid on the basis of the contract price- a share of
what the lessee received for the gas.
In essence, both Vela and Fosterheld that the express royalty clause
governs, notwithstanding the fact that the lessee's implied duty to market,
which could only be fulfilled in light of market realities (e.g., the historical
necessity to sell gas under long-term contracts) may cause the lessee
ultimately to receive far less than its numerical fractional working interest
indicates -even to the point of suffering a financial loss. 4 Both the Vela and
Fosterholdings fail to recognize that the market value or market price of the
gas at issue was the contract price. Indeed, because the particular gas at
issue had been dedicated, in good faith, to a long-term contract, that
particular gas could not have been legally sold on the spot market even if
such a market had existed at the time of production.' And even if
physically similar new gas had been produced and sold at the same time
and in the same vicinity for a higher price, that price was simply
unobtainable for gas already dedicated to an existing contract.
Both the Vela and Fostercourts should have recognized that similar
gas, produced from similar fields, can have dissimilar values. Federal
courts, construing Texas law, have previously recognized that gas from the
very same reservoir and field can have different values due to market
realities. For example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 2 the court
recognized that gas used or marketed for the gasoline extraction market did
not have the same value as identical gas marketed to pipelines. 43 In Bynum,

40. Note that in Vela, the lessee owes a lease royalty of 1.6259 for each Mcf of gas (1/8
times 13C per Mcfd-the average "current" price) but the lessee only received a total of 2.3f

per Mcf of gas. The lessee's royalty burden exceeds 70% of the what the lessee received per
Mcf. In other words, the lessors 1/8 share was transformed into more than a 7/10 share.

41. The royalty owners in Vela conceded as much in that they had willingly accepted
royalty based upon a 2.3C per Mcf value for many years. Indeed, the timing of the Vela suit
suggests that it was filed as a result of the ruling in Foster.
42. 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946); see also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochener, 146 P.2d 138

(5th Cir. 1944).
43. 155 F.2d at 199.
The royalty clause in question provided:
'The royalties reserved by lessor, and which shall be paid by lessee are

(b) on gas produced from said land and sold or used off the land or in the
manufacture of gasoline, including casinghead gas, the market price at the
well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that if and when
lessee shall sell gas at the wells, lessor's royalty theron shall be one-eighth
of the amount realized from such sale.'
Id. at 197, n. 1.
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gas pipeline companies produced and marketed their own gas reserves and
some reserves of third-party producers. However, the only steady demand
for defendant producers was to use the gas for gasoline extraction or in
carbon black plants. The defendants contended that the gas was worth
much less for these purposes than the value of gas in the pipeline market.
The Bynum court held that producers using the gas in gasoline and carbon
black markets could account to royalty owners on the basis of the market
price of gas as established in these markets." In other words, these
producers did not have to pay royalty based upon the more lucrative
pipeline market, except when they were actually able to sell gas to a
pipeline. 45 Similarly, gas committed in good faith to an arm's length
equivalent long-term contract should be regarded as having a market value
equal to the contract price, even though gas produced from the same field
and first sold at a later time may have a different value. This approach
preserves the most fundamental definition of royalty- a share of a product,
income or profit.
Several cases have adopted the Vela view." Perhaps the most
unfortunate is Judge Wisdom's decision in Piney Woods Country Life School
v. Shell Oil Co.47 Piney Woods is the most unfortunate decision because it is
well written and, at first, may seem technically and legally sound.
Therefore, other courts may follow its reasoning because contrary
decisions 8 are not as well written and do not contain the detailed analysis
offered by Judge Wisdom.
Although three different royalty provisions were at issue in Piney
Woods, two contained variations of the commonly encountered bifurcated
royalty clause providing that royalty is payable on 1/8 of the "market
value" of gas "at the well" when gas is sold or used "off the premises," but

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life Sch.v. Sheli Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984);
Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 1983); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586
P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978); Ughtcap v. Mobil Oil Co., 562 P.2d I (Kan. 1977). For earlier cases that
are consistent with Vela, see, for example, JI.M. Huber Corp.v.Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.
1966); Weymouth v.ColoradoInterstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v.Atlantic
Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Wall v. UnitedGas PublicService Co., 152 So. 561 (La.
1934).
47. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984). There are several issues in this case; however, I will
confine my comments to the court's analysis of the meanings of "market value" and of "at
the well."
48. See, e.g., Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981); Hillard v.
Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. 1982); Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La.
1982).
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For example, if gas from several leases is delivered at a single
point in the fields some lessors may be entitled to market value
royalty while others receive proceeds royalty; similarly, gas
produced from one lease through a directional well drilled on
another lease would be sold 'off the lease' even if delivered at
the wellhead itself.... If the place of delivery is controlling,
it makes 'the happenstance of the point of delivery.., very
significant.'
Of course, these "strange results" occur only if "market value" and
"proceeds" are given different meanings.
After concluding that the gas at issue was not sold "at the well,"
Judge Wisdom logically concluded that royalty is payable on the "market
value" portion of the lease clause.' But then, finding that a gas contract is
executory in nature, he adopted the Vela view that royalty is owed on the
current or spot market value of gas when it is actually produced and
delivered, not on its agreed contract price.6' Judge Wisdom justified and
bolstered this view by noting that "market value" royalty was payable on
gas sold or used off the premises. He stated that it "strains language and
credulity to argue that the 'market value' of gas" used would be different
from the market value of gas sold. 2 He then pointed to similar decisions in
other jurisdictions that should have alerted Shell to the meaning of "market
value" and to the maxim that "mineral leases are construed against the
lessee."'
While I concede that, until recently," there is no rational
explanation as to why lessees would intentionally continue to use a "market
value" lease in the face of Vela, it does not strain language and credulity to
conclude that the market value of gas sold might be different from the
market value of gas used. The values could be different, depending upon
the gas sales contract and the market into which the gas is sold as compared
to the place where similar gas is used.' Moreover, the words "used off the

59.

Id. (quoting Leo J. Hoffman, Poolingand Unitization:CurrentStatus and Developments,

33 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L. &TAX'N 245,265 (1982)) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 233.
61.
62.

Id. at 233-35.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added).

63. Id.
64. Today, lessees may be better off in Vela-view jurisdictions, at least where market
value is construed as meaning spot value. In such cases, lessees may argue that premiums
paid over and above spot market values should not be royalty bearing. Of course, this result
is possible because courts that follow the Vela view fail to recognize that royalty is intended
to be a share.
65. See discussion of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum supra text accompanying notes
42-45.
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premises" were inserted to clarify that no royalty was payable on gas used
on the premises in furtherance of lease operations," or on gas that is lost,
vented, or flared. These words, like all words in an oil and gas lease, should
be construed in light of their purpose. 67
Judge Wisdom quickly and properly disposed of Shell's argument
that it was industry custom to pay market value royalties based upon
proceeds received by ruling that "to be legally relevant custom, both parties
to the contract ... must have actual or presumed knowledge of the
practice."' He then, however, unwisely rejected the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's reasoning in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey," that lessees are
necessarily subject to marketing realities, by concluding that "the Tara rule
is unfair to lessors."7" Judge Wisdom reasoned:
A landowner may decide to accept a royalty based on a
smaller fractional share of market value, rather than to hold
out for a larger share of proceeds, because of an expectation
that the market value will rise. If the courts then intervene
and declare that the "market value" is the same as proceeds,
this expectation is destroyed. Moreover, the lessor has no
means with which to persuade the lessee to renegotiate the
lease to reflect the changed legal rule. This is illustrated by the
following hypothetical. A landowner is offered leases by two
producers. The first offers a 1/8 market value royalty; the
second offers a 1/6 proceeds royalty. The landowner decides
to lease to the first operator, because he thinks the market
value of gas will rise enough to compensate for the lower
fractional share. This is a business risk: if the price does not
rise enough, the lessor loses money. If, however, the price
rises as the lessor thought, the lessor has won his bet, just as
the lessee has lost his gamble that the price would not rise;
and the lessor ought to profit. But if the Tara rule intervenes,

66. In addition, most leases provide that the lessee shall have the free use of gas for
lease operations.
67. Generally, early courts understood the need to construe such phrases in light of their
purpose. For example, in Mussellem v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 231 P. 526 (Okla. 1924), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, in construing a royalty clause requiring that royalty be paid on
gas "used off the premises," properly held that royalty was owed on gas used on the leased
premises in a gasoline extraction plant. The court correctly reasoned that the phrase clarified
the lessee's right to the free use of gas for developing the leased premises for oil and gas
production. "Off the premises" did not refer to the physical place where the gas was used;
rather, it referred to a use that was "foreign to the development of the premises." Id. at 531.
68. 726 F.2d at 236.
69. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
70.- 726 F.2d at 237.
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determine the wellhead valuation of gas by subtracting post-wellhead costs
from the lessee's actual sales price, ifthe fact finder is persuaded that this
"least desirable method" of royalty valuation is appropriate under the
particular circumstances.
In other words, the specific method of royalty valuation remains
unsettled until the trial judge decides on the appropriate method. Until the
trial judge is persuadedO the lessee does not know what value to use, does
not know what costs are deductible, and does not know how to calculate the
costs that are deductible-all to the end of determining what is really a
"fictional" market value. Furthermore, neither the lessee nor the lessor
knows whether this fictional value will pass judicial scrutiny.' Surely this
cannot reflect the true intent of the parties.
There is no evidence that Shell or the lessors considered the details
of how current "market value at the well" would be determined in the
absence of an actual market. Although not the first to do so, Judge Wisdom
judicially inserted a work-back clause into the lease. Earlier, Judge Wisdom
stated that "[t]he fact that the ascertainment of future market price may be
troublesome or that the royalty provisions are improvident and result in a
financial loss to [the lessee] 'is not a web of the court's weaving.'' While this
is true in the abstract, Judge Wisdom's strained and unrealistic construction
of the royalty clauses at issue is "aweb of the court's weaving."
Judge Wisdom readily admits that the gas in question was
"extremely sour" and that it was "an expensive proposition to convert the
raw gas into marketable sweet gas."8 Yet, he persisted that the sour gas must
be valued at the well in its native unmarketable condition even though
royalty is due on "market value." By noting Shell's characterization of the
district court's holding that "production ends when the gas is extracted
from the earth," he implicitly accepted the property notion that royalty is
due on the value of the product at the point of severance from the earth,

79. 726 F.2d at 239.
80. Given Judge Wisdom's view that the sale did not occur "at the well," there was no
actual market for the gas in question. An actual market requires real buyers ready, willing,
and able to buy a real product at a price governed by a real supply and a real demand, from
real sellers who are ready, willing, and able to sell. At most, only one part of this equation
may have existed; the lessee, Shell, may have been a willing seller of sour gas, but
apparently, there were no buyers. At least the court in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155
F.2d 196,198 (5th Cir. 1946) was candid enough to describe this approach as a determination
of "intrinsic" value.
81. 726 F.2d at 237 (quoting Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485,489-90 (5th Cir.
1964)) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 240. Near the end of this section of his opinion, Judge Wisdom reiterates that
the sour gas was not marketable when he notes that royalty was to be based on "the value
of the sour gas before it is separated into marketable constituents." Id. at 241.
83. Id. at 240.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

where the gas is converted from real into personal property." Then, failing
to appreciate the difficulties in determining current market values and in
calculating the deductible post-production costs, Judge Wisdom stated only
that the deduction must be "reasonable."'
Although many of Judge Wisdom's rulings in Piney Woods may
seem technically and legally correct, the end result is an opinion that fails
to see the forest because it concentrates piecemeal on parts of three trees
(royalty clauses) and never considers each tree in its entirety. Although the
opinion is well written, it is wide of the mark on the most important matter:
the reasonable intentions and expectations of the parties. Judged in light of
how the parties would have specifically addressed these matters with the
benefit of complete foresight regarding the discovery of sour gas and the

84. See also, Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 563 (La. 1934) (regarding
transportation costs). In Part 1, Section III of this essay I establish that royalty has not been
historically defined in this property law sense, notwithstanding modem cases to the
contrary.
At this point in his opinion, Judge Wisdom briefly addresses the third royalty provision,
under which royalty is payable on the "amount realized ... computed at the mouth of the
well.' He holds that royalty must be calculated at the well by subtracting from the price
received by Shell any post-wellhead costs incurred by the lessee. 726 F.2d at 241.
85. 726 F.2d at 241. Calculating "reasonable" post-wellhead costs is difficult and lessees
do so in a variety of ways. See generally Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: "Costs"
Subsequent to Production- 'Figures Don't Lie But ...... 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591 (1994). There
are, however, two constants: Lessees have every incentive to maximize such costs in order
to minimize their royalty obligations. What is reasonable to one judge is not necessarily
reasonable to another. Indeed, in Piney Woods the lessors end up with a hollow "market
value" victory because, on remand, at Judge Wisdom's invitation, the trial court found, in
an unreported opinion, that the contract prices were the best evidence of market value in this
particular case. This was affirmed on appeal. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil
Co., 905 F.2d 840, 850 (5th Cir. 1990). Moreover, in the initial trial, the court ruled that Shell
had properly calculated its post-wellhead costs, which included a 15% rate of return after
taxes on its treating, gathering and transportation facilities. Piney Woods Country Life
School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957,963-65 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
As I discuss in Anderson, supra, allowing a rate of return after taxes on post-wellhead
costs was unprecedented in a royalty case. In Matzen v. Hugoton ProductionCo., 321 P.2d 576,
584 (Kan. 1958), the court specifically rejected the notion that the lessee could deduct income
taxes in calculating wellhead values. Yet, in Piney Woods, the court allowed the deduction
of income taxes and the deduction of a 15% rate of return after taxes. Surely, both of these
divergent calculations cannot be "reasonable."
Moreover, given the risk of exploring and drilling for oil or gas that may not exist, what
is a reasonable rate of return on the drilling of a series of wildcat wells? A series of
development wells? How does this risk compare to the construction and operation of
treating, gathering, and transporting facilities constructed to handle known reserves of
specific sour gas that is sold pursuant to the known terms and prices set forth in long-term
gas contracts? In calculating the fair wellhead value of sour gas for royalty purposes,
shouldn't these factors be considered when a rate of return after taxes is included in the
work-back calculations? They were not in Piney Woods.
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Lessees believed that this objective could be achieved through use
of the "at the well" phrase."l S Although lessees knew how to state their
objective more clearly,"0 ' they did not wish to address post-wellhead costs
directly, such as by stating that the lessor "shall bear a proportionate share
of post-wellhead expenses incurred in marketing the gas." This direct
language was avoided because lessors would be too easily alerted to the
objective and could then amend the clause by inserting the word "not"
between the words "shall bear." 1' 7
3.

The AppropriateJudicialResponse

In light of the lessee's traditional obligation to deliver a marketable
product and in light of the fact that a principle reason that lessors execute
oil and gas leases is because they do not have the ability to explore,
produce, and market oil and gas themselves, the real question is: Should
courts hold that "at the well" is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of
lessees when read in context with the royalty clause as a whole which also
provides that royalty is due on "market price," "market value," "proceeds"
or "amount realized"? My answer is partly yes and partly no.
When a court addresses the meaning of "market price... " or
"market value..." "at the well," a threshold policy issue is whether lessees
should be penalized for trying to be clever about their drafting. In Vela and
Piney Woods, the lessees were penalized when the courts chose to define
"market price" and "market value" as current market value at the time of
extraction, notwithstanding the fact that gas could only be actually
marketed under long-term gas sales contracts. Given this unrealistic bargain
as construed by the courts, the only justification for the Vela-Piney Woods
view was to "get even" with lessees for having cleverly eliminated the
lessors' right to receive royalty on a first-marketable product. This kind of
poetic justice is not an appropriate judicial objective, especially where the
entire royalty clause can be harmonized and given a plain and realistic
meaning.
The flip side of this policy question is whether lessees should be
rewarded for not clearly stating that lessors must bear a proportionate share

105. See generally Siefkin, supra note 1, at 213-17.
106. In Maddox, the court construed a gas royalty clause contained in a lease issued on
October 29,1945. This lease expressly provided that royalties were to be paid on "the current
market price at the wells ... , Lessor's interest shall bear its proportion of any compression,
treating, and other expenses necessary to render the gas marketable." 150 F. Supp. at 179.
107. Siefkin, supra note 1, at 213-17. For another example, in the royalty clause quoted
supra note 106, the lessor could have inserted the word "not" immediately after the word
"shall." In addition, however, as I discuss in Part 1, Section II.D.1, lessees wanted a
somewhat flexible standard to allow them to take maximum advantage of the percentage
depletion allowance while avoiding any obligation to pay royalty on a higher value.
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of post-wellhead costs. I submit that lessees should not be rewarded for
three reasons. First, they could have clearly stated their objective." s Second,
their chosen language is susceptible to a construction that is more in
harmony with the royalty clause as a whole. Third, an oil and gas lease
offered by a lessee should be construed against the lessee." 9 If "at the well"
is reasonably construed and harmonized with the rest of the royalty clause,
which calls for payment on the basis of "proceeds," "amount realized,"
"market price" or "market value," the gas royalty clause is capable of a
more rational and plain meaning- albeit. a meaning that is not fully in
accord with the objective of the lessees who drafted this language.
A court should begin its analysis of royalty clauses by recognizing
three fundamental principles. First, a royalty clause should be construed in
its entirety and against the party who offered it, and in light of the fact that
the royalty clause is the means by which the lessor receives the primary
consideration for a productive lease. Second, in light of legal history"0 and
absent an express lease provision, a lessee that discovers oil or gas in paying
108. See, e.g., Maddox, 150 F. Supp. at 179 (construing a lease date October 29, 1945,
which expressly provided that royalties were to be paid on "the current market price at the
wells... [and] Lessor's interest shall bear its proportion of any compression, treating, and
other expenses necessary to render the gas merchantable." Cf.Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 705,707-08 (rex. 1987) (requiring a party seeking indemnification against
its own negligence to "express that intent in specific terms").
109. In Ladd v. Upham, 58 S.W.2d 1037,1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1933) off'd, Upham
v. Ladd, 95 S.W.2d 365 (rex. Comm'n App. 1933) (dealing with whether a lessee is liable for
gas royalty payable upon "proceeds" where the lessee marketed the gas after transporting
it to a town in another county), the court quoted favorably from W.W. Thornton:
These contracts [oil and gas leases] are looked upon somewhat in the same
light as contracts of insurance. By long experience insurance companies
have been enabled to draw a policy which is often difficult to determine
just what their liability may be. They have their attorneys who have spent
years in studying contracts of insurance and the decisions of the courts,
until they have become thoroughly versed in all phases of such contracts.
On the other hand, the insured is usually without advice when entering
into a contract of insurance, and he is almost universally ignorant of the
rules of law applicable to such obligations. To such an extent is this true
that the courts have adopted a construction, in cases of doubt or obscurity,
favorable to the insured. What is true of insurance contracts may be said to
be true of oil or gas leases (if not of mining leases). The lessor usually
knows nothing of the law applicable to. such instruments; while the
operator is usually well informed. Years of experience have shown the
operator how to draw a lease giving him many advantages, of which the
lessor has not even thought. For this reason the courts have adopted a rule
to the effect to construe an oil or gas lease most favorably to the lessor,
where its terms can be so construed without doing violence to the language
used.
1 W.W. THORNTON, THE LAW RELATING TO OIL AND GAs § 251 (1925)
110. See my discussion in Part 1, Section III of this essay.
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on 1/8 of the "amount realized" when gas is sold "at the well."49 Shell, the
lessee, discovered sour gas on the leaseholds in question and agreed to sell
the gas in 1970 pursuant to long-term contracts on the intrastate market.
Although the contracts contained price escalation provisions, the contract
prices failed to keep pace with spot market values due to the rapidly rising
energy prices of the 1970s.
Under the terms of the gas sales contracts, the buyers took title to
the gas in the field, but they did not take physical control or actual delivery
of the gas until it was sweetened. Treating the gas as having been sold "at
the wells," Shell paid royalty, under all three royalty clauses, based upon
the sales price received, less the costs of gathering and sweetening the gas.
Royalty owners contended that they were entitled to (1)royalty based upon
the current market value of the gas at the time the gas was actually
produced (2) without any deduction for sweetening. Judge Wisdom, in
writing for the Fifth Circuit panel, reversed and remanded the district
court's ruling in favor of Shell on the first point, but affirmed the court's
ruling in favor of Shell on the second point, thereby reaching the opposite
of the appropriate result. Judge Wisdom should have affirmed the district
court's ruling on the first issue, and reversed and remanded the second
issue.
Judge Wisdom began his discussion of the royalty obligations by
noting that "[r]esort to grammatical parsing is less instructive... than is a
consideration of the purpose of the gas royalty clause, taken as a whole."'
Having correctly stated his task as one of considering the royalty clause as
a whole, he regrettably proceeded to dissect the royalty clause into several

49. Specifically, the three distinct royalty clauses at issue provided as follows:
I ..... on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance[s],
produced from said land and sold or used, the market value at the well of
one-eighth (1/8) of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the
wells, royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale[s]
2.... o.% gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance,
produced irom said land and sold or used off the premises or in the
manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value at
the well of one-eighth (1/8) of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas
sold at the wells, royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from
such sale....
3.... to pay lessor on gas and casinghead gas produced from said land (1)
sold by lessee, one eighth of the amount realized by lessee, computed at the
mouth of the well or (2) when used by lessee off said land or in the
manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market value at the mouth
of the well, of one-eighth of such gas and casinghead gas....
726 F.2d at 228. The lessee, Shell, computed the royalty on the same basis for all three clauses
and contended that each of the three clauses had the same legal effect. Id.
50. Id. at 230.
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parts, analyzed it piecemeal a few words at a time, and never considered its
meaning as a whole.
Judge Wisdom first concentrated on the meaning of "at the well."
He reasoned that its purpose is to make clear that the lessor is entitled to
royalty for "the value of the gas at the well: that is, the value of the gas after
the lessee fulfills its obligation under the lease to produce the gas at the
surface, but before the lessee adds to the value of this gas by processing or
transporting it."5' Accordingly, he concludes that "'[a]t the well' therefore
describes not only the location of the gas for royalty valuation purposes, but
its quality as well." 52
At this point in his opinion, Judge Wisdom did not reach this
particular conclusion based upon a "property-law" notion that royalty is
inherently payable the instant the gas is severed from the real estate and
becomes personal property.' Rather, he based his conclusion on the lessee's
use of the phrase "market value at the well." While I have no quarrel with
his conclusion that the lessee should not pay royalty on value added by
transportation, I do not accept the notion that raw gas at the well has a
"market value" regardless of its physical condition or "quality" at that
point.'
Next Judge Wisdom concludes that the gas was not sold "at the
well" within the meaning of the gas royalty clauses, despite the fact that the
sales contract specified that title to the gas passed to the buyer at the
wellhead.5 He based this conclusion on the facts: that the buyer had no
physical control of the gas until it was processed and transported to a
distant location; that Shell retained the risk of loss up to the time that the
gas was physically delivered to the buyer; and that Shell added value to the
gas by processing and transporting the gas.' He reasoned that to hold
otherwise "would place the lessors at the mercy of the lessee" and allow a
lessee to "avoid the payment of market value royalty."'7 He further noted
"the strange results that may occur if the determination of whether gas is
'sold at the well' turns solely on the place where title passes":'

51.

Id. at 231.

52. Id.
53.
essay.

See my discussion of this erroneous property-based idea in Part 1, Section III of this

54. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 74-85 and Section I.B.3. In Piney
Woods, the gas was extremely sour and apparently not marketable in that condition. 726 F.2d
at 229.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. 231.
Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 232.
Id. (emphasis added).
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it takes away the lessor's legitimate expectation of market
value royalties without any compensation at all.'
He then concluded this portion of his opinion by suggesting that the Vela
rule places the parties in a position to negotiate a more suitable lease
amendment reflecting current economic conditions.' In other words, Judge
Wisdom essentially concluded that the parties made a gamblers' contract
regarding the issue of whether royalty will be owed on current market
values or long-term contract prices. The lessee was placed in the position of
"the house" in that it had some control over whether gas would be sold at
the well (triggering a proceeds royalty obligation) or off the premises
(triggering a market value obligation). Judge Wisdom then suggested that
these gamblers should come to their senses and negotiate a logical lease
amendment.
Apart from Judge Wisdom's hyper-technical lease construction and
legal analysis, where is the evidence that the parties mutually intended a
gamblers' agreement? And except for settlements of lawsuits, where is there
any evidence that lessors and lessees have sat down and negotiated rational
amendments to preprinted royalty clauses?"3 This is a strange contracts
doctrine. Rather than determine what the parties reasonably intended from
a reasonable construction of the royalty clause as a whole, Judge Wisdom
unreasonably construed the royalty clause a few words at a time. Even he
seemed to recognize the folly of his own interpretation by suggesting that
the parties could negotiate a lease amendment.
Next, Judge Wisdom discussed the means of proving market value
at the well of the particular gas at issue, i.e., sour gas which he already
determined was actually sold off the premises after being sweetened and
transported. This portion of the opinion sets forth three methods of
calculating wellhead value by reference to either: the wellhead sales price
of comparable sour gas, the sales price of comparable sweetened gas less
processing costs, or "the actual sales price of the gas less costs." 74 Although
he noted that this latter method is the "least desirable," 5 he authorized its

71. Id.
72. Id.Judge Wisdom recognizes that, under the Vela rule, "[a]t some point, the lessee
may find continued operation so unprofitable that it is more economical to cease production.
At this point the lessor has a strong incentive to renegotiate the lease.... ." Id.
73. The idea that the parties will negotiate a lease amendment may seem logical in
theory, but it is fraught with practical problems. Indeed, when one considers the fact that,
in any given field, there are often a large number of lessors, many of whom may own only
very small undivided fractional interests, the notion that the parties will negotiate a lease
amendment is absurd. The large number of lessors, coupled with strategic behavior, would
make the transactions costs of such an amendment prohibitive.
74. 726 F.2d. at 239.
75. Id. (quoting Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298, 303-04 (Mont. 1978)).
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potential use. He does so even though its use is inconsistent with his view
that "market value" refers to current value at the time of extraction and
would defeat what he believed was the lessor's primary objective in
securing a market-value royalty provision in the first place.76
In light of Judge Wisdom's conclusion that lessors knowingly
negotiate for market value royalty clauses,' how is evidence of Shell's
actual contract price, less post wellhead costs, relevant to current market
value? Current market value is what willing buyers, who are not forced to
buy, pay willing sellers, who are not forced to sell, on a given day for a
particular product. Given that the facts indicate that the long-term contract
price had failed to keep pace with current market values, consideration of
this price seems wholly irrelevant to current market value. Moreover,
consideration of the contract price places the lessor in the precise position
that Judge Wisdom reasoned that the lessor sought to avoid through the use
of a "market value" clause in the first place. And although consideration of
the lessee's post-wellhead costs and other costs are necessary to determine
whether the lessee will profit from the sale of gas, these costs are not
relevant to what a buyer is willing to pay, and hence are not relevant to a
determination of market value.
Allowing the lessee to unilaterally calculate a fictitious wellhead
value by deducting post-wellhead costs from the lessee's actual sales price
leads to a much worse bargain than the one Judge Wisdom asserted that the
lessor sought to avoid. Judge Wisdom teaches that the lessor did not want
to suffer valuation on the basis of a long-term contract price negotiated by
the lessee and the purchaser of the gas, but desired to be compensated only
on current market value when sales occur off the premises.78 Yet, Judge
Wisdom apparently believed that the. lessor knowingly contracted to
authorize the lessee to defeat this objective by unilaterally negotiating a true
sale "at the well," permitting the lessee to pay royalty on the contract price.
Moreover, in the event of a sale off the premises, Judge Wisdom apparently
believed that the lessor knowingly authorized the lessee to unilaterally

76. Id. at 235-38.
77. Of course, this is pure speculation by Judge Wisdom. There is no evidence that the
lessors did anything other than sign the lease forms offered by the lessee.
78. 726 F.2d at 237-38. Much to the chagrin of the lessors, on remand, the trial court

ruled that the contract price less treating and transportation costs (including a rate of return
on such costs after taxes) was the best available evidence of market value. This was affirmed
on appeal. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 905 P.2d 840, 850 (5th Cir.
1990). As to the calculation of the deductible costs, see Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell
Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957,963-65 (S.D. Miss. 1982). Thus, the end result is a hollow victory
for the lessors as "market value" is determined in the same manner as if it had followed the
Tararule, the rule that Judge Wisdom refused to adopt on the ground that it was "unfair to
lessors." 726 F.2d at 237.
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volatile gas prices of the 1970s (and 80s and 90s), the opinion reaches an
unrealistic and illogical result." An oil and gas lease is primarily a
commercial transaction, not a property conveyance. Thus, parties should be
presumed to contract in light of marketplace realities. While parties are free
to contract regardless of such realities, they should not be viewed as having
done so on the basis of a few general and anticipatory words construed in
isolation, rather than in the context of the royalty clause as a whole.
Apparently, Judge Wisdom believed that, under the first two
bifurcated royalty clauses, 7 the parties intentionally created the following
lease bargain: (1) If gas is truly sold "at the well," royalty is owed on the
sale proceeds (which may be payable pursuant to the terms of a long-term,
fixed-price contract). (2) If gas is not sold at the well, royalty is due on
current market value at the well at the time the gas is extracted. (3) The
lessee controls where the gas is sold (limited only by market realities and
good faith) provided that a sale of gas ostensibly made at the well is really
made at the well. (4) Nevertheless, the "market value" of gas not sold at the
well may be determined by subtracting post-wellhead costs (apparently
including income taxes and a rate of return) from a long-term contract price
(not reflecting current market value), if the trial judge is persuaded that this
"least desirable" alternative is appropriate under the circumstances. I
respectfully submit that neither the lessor nor the lessee would knowingly
agree to this gamblers' bargain.
If the lessor was really concerned about being locked into the
pricing terms of a long-term contract not of his own making, the lessor
would insist on a pure market value royalty clause similar to the one in
Vela. The lessor would not permit royalty to be paid on the contract price,
except perhaps where the contract price exceeded market value. In other
words; the lessor would be unwilling to accept a "proceeds" or "amount
realized" royalty provision for "at the well" gas sales, especially where the
lessor has retained no control over the point of sale. And a lessor who
wanted the best of both worlds would insist on the greater of a proceeds or
market value royalty.
And why would a lessee knowingly accept such a bargain-let
alone draft a lease royalty clause with this intent?" Even if the lessee were

86. To be sure, Piney Woods and other royalty cases are not the only oil and gas cases
that suffer from this same malady. There are a host of Texas oil and gas title cases that
similarly concentrate on the trees instead of the forest. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n'App. 1925).
87. 726 F.2d at 228.
88. Judge Wisdom pointed out that the lessee in Piney Woods must have been aware of
the Vela view at the time it acquired the leases because of the prior decisions in Vela, Foster,
and Wall. Id. at 235. This is a weak justification, when three decisions contemporary with
Piney Woods had already rejected the Vela view: Tara PetroleumCorp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269
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to succeed in making a true "at the well" sale, the lessor might assert that
the lessee was obligated, under its duty of good faith, to seek an "off the
premises" sale. After all, the lessee owes a duty to sell production at the best
price and terms available. s9 And, while the lessee would not knowingly
agree to a pure market value or market price clause, in light of the Vela
view, because of the long-term risk of having to pay royalty that may
eventually exceed total gross income, why would the lessee agree to a

(Okla. 1981); Hillardv. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581 (Ark. 1982); and Henry v. Ballard & Cordell
Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982). Perpetuating bad law on the ground that parties should
have been aware of it and should therefore be stuck with it would mean that contract or
property cases would seldom be distinguished and never overruled.
Vela was decided by the Texas Supreme Court in 1968 and concerned a royalty clause
wherein the lessee was 'to pay to lessor, as royalty for gas. . . , while the same is being sold
or used off the premises, one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amdunt so sold
or used." Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1968). The lessee in Piney
Woods acquired its leases in the mid-1960s; before Vela was decided. The prior Foster decision
concerned a royalty clause that required the lessee to sell the lessor's share of gas at the
"market price therefor prevailing in the field where produced when run." Foster v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485,488 (5th Cir. 1984). Wall concerned a dispute over royalty on gas and
extracted gasoline, and the royalty clause required gas royalties to be paid on "market
price." Wall, 152 So. at 562. The royalty clauses in Vela, Foster,and Wall do not contain the
bifurcated language that calls for royalty to be paid on the "amount realized" when gas is
sold at the well. Considering the general propensity of courts, as demonstrated by Judge
Wisdom, to dissect royalty clauses word-by-word and phrase-by-phrase, these cases do not
signal how a court would or should construe a bifurcated clause under Mississippi law.
Many productive leases in the United States pre-date the 1934 Wall decision. And more
recently acquired leases are often taken by speculating landmen who use old pre-printed
lease forms. Because they intend only to market the leases through assignment, they often
pay little attention to the detailed language of the form. Their primary concerns are: the state
of the lessor's title, the amount of lease bonus, and the fraction or percentage of royalty.
Most often, their objective is to promote the property for development of oil, not gas. The
developing assignee, short of seeking and perhaps paying for a lease amendment, is stuck
with the bargain the original lessee made, although many seek relief through the use of
division orders that permit the lessee to account in a manner that will minimize the royalty
obligation. For a thorough discussion of the interaction of the division order and the lease
royalty clause in Texas, see Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Orderand the Lease
Royalty Clause, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353 (1997).
89. See, e.g., Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188,190 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Harding v.
Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466,570 (W.D. Okla. 1963). Both cases recognize that lessee has a duty
to market gas for the best price and terms available.
I will be the first to concede that the implied covenant to market has grown like Topsy.
Arguably, it should be confined to its original purpose: to require the lessee to diligently
seek a market for gas reserves that are shut-in. See, e.g., Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp.,
225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955). The expansion of this covenant would be largely unnecessary
if the royalty clauses were simply construed in light of their purpose, in light of the lessor's
reasonable expectations, and in light of the lessee's general duty to deal with the lessor
fairly-especially where royalty matters are concerned.
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"compromise" bifurcated royalty formula if there was a reasonable
possibility that only an "off the premises" sale could be made?
In summary, Piney Woods stands for the dubious proposition that
the parties are knowing gamblers regarding royalty valuation over the life
of the lease with the lessee serving as "the house" because it has some
control over whether the gas will be sold at the well or off the premises.
This gamblers' bargain contains three "wild cards": the exercise of the trial
court's discretion concerning (1) the lessee's duty to sell gas at the best price
and terms available, (2) what constitutes the best evidence of market value,
and (3) the calculation of deductions if a work-back approach is decreed.
Surely, this is not a commercial transaction that reasonable and prudent
parties would negotiate and make. Of course, the next question is: What
should Judge Wisdom have held? I will reach this matter shortly, but first
let me briefly discuss the logic of the Vela view in the context of a pure
market value royalty clause, i.e., a clause that does not allow for a proceeds
royalty for sales at the well.
B. Seeing the Forest
1. Vela in Perspective
Solely from the perspective of the lessor, the Vela view is logical. A
sophisticated lessor might insist that royalty be paid on current market
values as protection against a "sweetheart" gas sale that fails to provide a
fair price from the outset. Although the implied covenant to market
probably offers the lessor some protection from the "sweetheart" sale in the
context of a "proceeds" or "amount realized" royalty clause, ° a lessor might
feel more comfortable with a royalty clause that expressly requires payment
on the basis of "market value." Moreover, a sophisticated lessor may insist
that royalty be paid on current market values at the time of extraction based
upon a belief that a long-term contract price would fail to keep pace with
future market values in an escalating market.
It is hard to believe, however, that a sophisticated lessee would
agree to, let alone draft, a market value or market price royalty provision
knowing that it would be given a Vela construction. At the time the lease in
Vela was executed in 1933, long-term contracts were already the norm and
the monopoly-monopsony power of pipelines was already a major public
issue. Although five years later interstate pipelines would face federal

90. See, e.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24,29 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1984, writ granted), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part,31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140 (Tex.
1987), withdrawn, set aside, dism'd as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988) (concluding that in
marketing gas to an affiliate, lessee owes highest duty of good faith).
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regulation," the regulation of wellhead prices for interstate gas would not
occur until 195409 Other Vela-view cases have even held that "market
value" means a "free" market value. Hence, what lessees initially received
for gas in the regulated interstate market was not necessarily a proper basis
for paying royalties due on a free market value." So although a pure
"market value" gas royalty clause, construed in accordance with the Vela
view, is logical from the perspective of a lessor, it is not logical from the
perspective of the lessee. It is not a bargain that the parties would have
knowingly made, and it is not a realistic bargain for a court to decree.
While courts should not rescue parties from their own bargain,
courts should not bind the parties to an unrealistic bargain that the parties
would not have knowingly made, based upon an interpretation of general
contract language that is capable of a more reasonable construction.
Regarding the contract price vs. current market value issue, a realistic
bargain, under a "market price," "market value," "proceeds," "amount
realized," or bifurcated royalty clause, is that the lessee agreed, in light of
its duty of good faith and in light of market realities, to obtain the best price
and terms available for gas and to remit to the lessor the royalty share of the
proceeds it receives pursuant to an arms length equivalent gas sales
contract."
2. The Lessee's Intent
Early fraction- or percentage-based gas royalty clauses' were
patterned after and often included within oil royalty clauses.9 As
previously established, the royalty obligation was not defined in terms of
property law. ' Moreover, a principle reason that lessors executed oil and
gas leases was because of their inability to explore, produce, and market oil

91. Natural Gas Act of 1938,15 U.S.C. § 717.
92. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
93. See, e.g., Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Co., 562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977). But see Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981) (holding that the market value of gas must be
determined in light of the legal and physical quality of the gas).
94. See, e.g., Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). If the lessee
fails in this duty, then the lessee will be liable for the additional royalty that the lessor would
have received had the lessee fulfilled its duty. Cf. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d at 29, with Amoco Prod.
Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
95. The earliest gas royalty clauses tended to be flat-or fixed7rate clauses.
96. For example, in Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926), the lease
royalty clause provided as follows: "To deliver to the credit of the lessors, free of cost, in the
pipeline to which lessee may connect the well or wells, the equal one-eighth part of all oil,
gas, casing-head gas and gasoline, produced, manufactured and saved from the leased
premises, payable monthly as same is sold." Id.
97. See'the discussion in Part 1, Section III of this essay.
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the well" in lieu of the more traditional "free of cost, in the pipeline" phrase
or in lieu of silence. Accordingly, modem gas royalty clauses are generally
of three types: (1) clauses where royalty is payable on the "proceeds" or
"amount realized" "at the well"; (2) clauses where royalty is payable on the
"market price" or "market value" "at the well"; or (3) clauses where royalty
is payable on "proceeds" or "amount realized" for sales made "at the well"
and on "market price" or "market value" "at the well" for sales "off the
premises." Under each of these clauses, lessees wanted the right to deduct
any post-wellhead costs from their royalty payment obligations.
Nevertheless, at the same time, they did not want to owe royalty on a
higher current value if they were locked into a long-term contract. In
essence, lessees expected to calculate royalty starting with the sales price,
but they did not want to pay royalty on value added to gas after the gas had
been extracted at the wellheadrc or, at least, beyond the point where they
could value production for purposes of depletion.1"
While sweet, dry gas is in a marketable condition (but not
necessarily in a marketable location) at the wellhead, sour or watersaturated gas, depending on market realities, may not be in a marketable
condition (or a marketable location) at the wellhead. If the gas is not in a
marketable condition, the lessee may have to dehydrate, treat or otherwise
process the gas to make it marketable. To achieve economies of scale for this
conditioning, the gas may first have to be compressed and gathered from
several wells and leaseholds and sent to a single conditioning facility. If the
gas is not in a marketable location, the lessee may have to compress and
gather the gas and perhaps transport the gas through a pipeline.' ° Lessees
wanted to be able to charge the lessor, through royalty accounting, a
proportionate share of these costs. Moreover, they wanted to avoid paying
royalty on the full value of end products from their own or affiliated
gasoline plants. Accordingly, lessees sought to limit their "production"
obligations to the extraction of gas at the wellhead, whether or not the gas
was in a marketable condition or marketable location at that point.

102. Siefkin, supra note 1, at 215-17.
103. See my discussion in Part 1, Section II.).1. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 374 (1972).
104. Until recently, gas was customarily sold at the well or in the vicinity of the field to
pipelines who acted as merchants of gas. However, wet gas (gas that is saturated with
valuable liquids) has long been sold at the well or in the vicinity of the field to processing
plants for the extraction of gasoline and other by-products. Today, because pipelines are
now regulated as common carriers, gas may be sold at the well, in the vicinity of the field,
or at some distant market. In other words, there are potentially multiple markets for gas
produced from a single field.
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and gas on their own. Accordingly, many early royalty clauses provided
that the lessee was to deliver marketable oil and gas into a pipeline at no
cost (direct or indirect) to the lessor, if a pipeline connection was available
in the vicinity of the well.% Once this was done the lessee had met its
obligation. If the gas was transported to a distant market prior to sale, the
lessee could deduct, through royalty accounting, the lessor's proportionate
share of incurred transportation costs."
As the gas royalty clause evolved, there is little doubt about what
lessees intended when they drafted many of the various gas royalty clauses
commonly encountered over the last 50 plus years. Lessees gradually
refined the gas royalty clause because they wanted to have the right to
charge the lessor, through royalty accounting, for a proportionate share of
any post-wellhead costs incurred prior to sale. In this manner, lessees
sought to avoid any obligation to pay royalty on the enhanced value of gas
resulting from post-wellhead activities such as on the gross value of
gasoline extracted from1wet
gas downstream and on the gross value of the
°°
remaining residue gas.
To accomplish their objective, most lessees did not choose to
directly state that the lessor could be charged, through royalty accounting,
for a proportionate share of post-wellhead costs."' Rather, most lessees
settled on the phrase "at the well," "at the wellhead," or "at the mouth of

98. See text of clause supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Rains v. Kentucky Oil Co, 255 S.W. 121 (Ky. App. 1923); Scott v.
Steinberger, 213 P. 646 (Kan. 1923).
100. See generally, Siefkin, supra note 1, at 215-17; Frank G. Harmon, Gas Royalty - Vela,
Middleton, and Weatherford, 33 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 65 (1982). Harmon offers the
following analysis of the commonly encountered bifurcated royalty clause:
After analyzing earlier lease forms and court decisions, the most logical
conclusion is that the oil and gas industry understood that the term
"market value" in this gas royalty clause would be something less than the
gross proceeds received for the sale of the gas, where the gas was sold and
the delivery point was some distance removed from the field in which the
wells were located. In such circumstances the royalty on gas would be
based on market value- the amount for which the gas could have been sold
in the field, less compression, gathering and treating costs. When the gas
was sold "at the wells," whether the delivery point was on or off the lease,
the 'amount realized" from the sale would be the basis of any royalty
payment.
Id. at 69. For the type of case result that lessees sought to avoid, see Barton v.Laclede Oil &
Mining Co., 112 P. 965 (Okla. 1910). Of course, the issue is whether lessees clearly
accomplished their objective with the "market value.., at the well" phrase.
101. But see, Maddox v. Texas Co., 150 F. Supp. 175,179 (E.D. Tex. 1956) (construing a gas
royalty clause expressly providing that royalties were to be paid on "the current market
price at the wells. . , (but) Lessor's interest shall bear its proportion of any compression,
treating, and other expenses necessary to render the gas marketable").

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

actual sale. And when making an actual sale, the lessee is obligated to
obtain the best price and to otherwise make an arm's length equivalent
sale.115 To have an actual arm's length sale, there must be an actual market.
To have an arm's length equivalent sale, one must make a sale that is
comparable to an actual market sale. And to have an actual sale or a
comparable sale, there must be a "product" that sellers are willing to sell
and that buyers are willing to buy. In other words, the lessee must have gas
for sale that is marketable in fact.
What do the words "market price" and "market value" reasonably
mean? Contrary to the implication of an old case, they are essentially
synonyms.1 6 The market price of a commodity is "[t]he price at which a
seller is ready and willing to sell and a buyer is ready and willing to buy in
the ordinary course of trade."117 Market value is "the price property would
command in the market."1 More specifically, market value is commonly
understood to mean a price at which sellers, who are ready and willing (but
not compelled) to sell, will sell to buyers, who are ready and willing (but
not compelled) to buy in an actual free market.11 9 In short, for there to be a
real market price or market value, there must be a market, a marketable
product, a ready and willing seller, and a ready and willing buyer. Courts
ignore these realities in gas royalty cases when they permit a lessee to work
back to the wellhead by deducting post-wellhead costs. In so doing, they
allow the lessee to work back to a point where only an unmarketable raw
material may exist, and they essentially create a fictional seller, a fictional

115. This is true whether the court looks to traditional oil and gas law or to the Uniform
Commercial Code. Compare Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188,190 (W.D. Okla. 1981)
and Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 470 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (both recognizing that
lessee has a duty to market the gas produced from a well and obtain the best price and terms
available), with U.C.C. § 1-203 (1997) (providing that "every contract or duty... imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement").
116. A comparison of the definitions of "market price" and "market value" illustrates
that these terms are synonyms. BLACK's LAw DICnoNARY 1122-23 (4th ed. 1968). In Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944), the Fifth Circuit said that the terms
Were distinguishable; however, the basis for the distinction was evidentiary. In that case,
direct evidence showed that there was an actual established "market price" at the well for
the gas at issue. Accordingly, the court excluded additional opinion evidence on "market
value." Id. at 411. In a later case that same year, the Fifth Circuit treated market price and
market value as synonyms. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138,141 (5th Cir.
1944). One commentator, in discussing these two cases, has persuasively argued that there
is no distinction between market price and market value. Sneed, supranote 1, at 652-64; see
also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (1935) (stating that "the term
'market price' is interchangeable with the term'market value"); Siefkin, supra note 1, at 212.
117. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 1122 (4th ed. 1968).
118. Id. at 1123.
119. Id. See also OKLAHOMA UN-FORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL No. 4.18 (2d ed.
1993)(defining market value).
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quantities is obliged to "produce" a "marketable product" so that the lessor
can realize royalty income."' Third, the point where a marketable product
is first obtained is the logical point where the exploration and production
segment of the oil and gas industry ends, is the point where the primary
objective of the lease contract is achieved, and therefore is the logical point
for the calculation of royalty." 2 With these points in mind, a court can
properly and reasonably construe most modem royalty clauses.
What do the words "proceeds" and "amount realized" reasonably
mean? Contrary to dicta in a recent Oklahoma case,"13 they are essentially
synonyms and have generally been treated as such."4 These words suggest
an actual sale and hence, that royalty is to be calculated on the basis of an

111. 3 EUGENE KUNTz, LAw OF OIL & GAS § 40.5(b) (1989).
112. In Part 1, Section III of this essay I established that royalty has no inherent propertylaw definition relating to the conversion of minerals from real to personal property upon
severance. Moreover, there is no logical reason to calculate royalty at the point of severance,.
in absence of an express lease provision requiring such a calculation. For example, it would
be just as logical to decide that all costs subsequent to completion of a well, such as lifting
costs incurred when a well is placed "on pump," are deductible. Yet, no court has so
ruled-not even Oklahoma, where a lease may be held beyond its primary term by the
completion of a well that is capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities. See, e.g., Card
v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978).
A lease is a commercial transaction generally between a "merchant" lessee and
nonmerchant" lessor that ought to be construed in light of fundamental commercial
realities, as opposed to mere industry custom and practice, that both parties would have to
recognize in the marketplace. One reality is that there is an exploration and production
segment of the oil and gas industry. This segment should logically be viewed as ending at
the point where extracted oil and gas is first marketed in the actual marketplace. This is the
marketplace of the small independent (nonintegrated) oil company. Without this
marketplace there would be no "independent" oil exploration and production companies.
To stay in business, they would have to integrate downstream into a segment of the industry
where they could market production. In other words, either they would become integrated
companies or they would cease to exist.
113. In justifying its refusal to follow the Louisiana and Arkansas views that royalty is
due on "take-or-pay" settlements, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the Louisiana
and Arkansas cases construed clauses that specified that royalty was payable on the
"amount realized" from the sale of gas, whereas the Oklahoma case construed a clause that
specified that royalty was payable on the "gross proceeds" of sale. Roye Realty &
Developing Inc. v. Watson, No. 76,848, at 16 n.8 (Okla. 1995) (distinguishing Frey v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992); Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
Arkansas law)).
114. See Upham v. Ladd, 95 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936) (stating that
"Webster defines the term 'proceeds' as 'the amount realized from the sale of property'
.... "); see also Cities Serv. Oil & Gas Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that
an "amount realized" royalty clause required the lessee to pay royalty on the maximum
lawful Natural Gas Policy Act price, as provided in the gas sales contract, as well as tax
reimbursements for severance and ad valorem property taxes received by the lessee from
the gas purchaser pursuant to the gas sales contract).
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buyer, a fictional market, a fictional marketable product, and a fictional
market price.' 20
Did the courts have a rational alternative to the creation of these
fictions? Yes. The courts could have followed fundamental contractinterpretation doctrine 2' and construed the phrases "proceeds... at the
well," "amount realized... at the well," "market price... at the well," and
"market value... at the well" as a whole along with the balance of the
royalty clause. By interpreting these phrases as a whole, royalty would be
payable where the exploration and production segment of the oil and gas
industry logically ends-the point where a first-marketable product is

120. Admittedly, there are times when a court must determine damages on the basis of
an intrinsic value. For example, if a farmer's growing crop is destroyed by a drifting
herbicide that was negligently sprayed on nearby land by a crop duster on a windy day, the
farmer would be entitled to damages for the lost crop. These tort damages are generally
calculated by taking the price the farmer would most likely have obtained on sale of the lost
crop after harvest, less the costs saved in not having to harvest and transport the crop to
market. See, e.g., Parks v Atwood Crop Dusters, 257 P.2d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). This
measure of damages is resorted to because, apart from its value as collateral, there is no
established market and thus, no established market value, for the sale of a "growing crop."
This measure should not and does not need to be used to determine a contractual obligation
to pay royalty on "proceeds," "amount realized," "market price," or "market value" for gas
that has actually been produced and marketed. Indeed, one would expect that both parties
to a contract would ordinarily want to avoid such an intrinsic-value royalty calculation
because the very calculation of that royalty is subject to many variables - none of which are
specifically addressed in the typical gas royalty clause. See generally Anderson, supra note 85.
Even contracts that are entered into in anticipation of a possible catastrophic and
incalculable loss are commonly drafted to intentionally avoid a work-back calculation. For
example, crop hail insurance providers sell hail insurance coverage on a fixed-sum-per-acre
basis. Farmers can choose from a wide range of dollar coverage, and the payment does not
depend on the value of the growing crop. Rather, the payment depends upon the amount
of dollar coverage purchased and the percentage of hail loss. If a farmer purchases coverage
for $100 per acre and suffers a 50% hail loss to a growing crop, the hail insurer will pay $50
per acre. The intrinsic value of the growing crop may be more or less, but that value is
irrelevant for purposes of determining the insurance payment.
121. Although his description of the oil and gas lessor/lessee relationship was largely
accurate, there is no need to rely on Professor Harrell's view that an oil and gas lease
constitutes a cooperative venture. See generally Thomas Harrell, Developments in NonRegulatory Oil and Gas Law, 30 INSTr. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 311, 336 (1979). The Harrell
approach was adopted in Frey v. Amoco ProductionCo., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992) and Klein v.
Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992) (both cases holding that royalty is due on take-or-pay
settlements). The question of whether royalty is due on "take-or-pay" payments or
settlements is beyond the scope of this essay. Where gas has actually been extracted, one can
reach a rational interpretation of a gas royalty clause through the traditional "plain
meaning" approach to contract interpretation Without classifying the lease as a cooperative
venture.
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obtained."= Under this approach, the words "proceeds," "amount realized,"
"market price," and "market value" would be construed in accord with
their plain meaning-real sales, real sellers and buyers, a real first market,
a real first-marketable product, and a real price. In other words, all of these
terms should be treated essentially as synonyms."2 If courts were to adopt
this approach for the construction of royalty clauses, lessees could properly
account for royalty on a more uniform basis from lease to lease, as well as
from state to state.
Under this approach, the added phrase "at the well" would permit
the lessee to deduct a proportionate share of "freight," i.e. transportation.
Accordingly, the lessee would pay royalty on the value of gas when it first
becomes marketable, less the reasonable actual cost of transporting the gas
to the actual marketing point beyond the vicinity of the well." The point at
which gas first becomes a marketable product would be established on the

122. Indeed, "independent" (nonintegrated) exploration and production companies
could not exist as a separate and distinct segment of the industry if they had no product to
sell.
123. Cf.Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 679 F. Supp. 1435 (W.D. Mich.
1988) (concluding that royalty due on the "amount realized at the mouth of the well" for gas
sold off the premises required the proceeds less expenses method of calculating royalties,
even though the gas may have had a determinable market value at the well), with Imperial
Colliery Co. v. OXY USA, Inc., 912 F.2d 696, 699 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that under a market
value clause, royalties are paid based upon the market value of the gas while under a
proceeds royalty clause, royalties are payable upon the amount of money received by the
lessee for the sale of gas). See generally Siefkin, supra note 1, at 211-12. See, e.g., Tara
Petroleum v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
As discussed above, some lessors may prefer a "market value" clause over a "proceeds"
clause out of concern that the lessee may make an imprudent or "sweetheart" sale; however,
lessors, who are familiar with the lessee's implied obligation to obtain the best arm's length
equivalent price for gas, should not balk at the use of a "proceeds" clause. The implied
covenant to market requires the lessee to market the gas for the best available price and
terms at the time gas isdiscovered. See, e.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24,
29 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ granted), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 31
Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140 (Tex. 1987), withdrawn, set aside, dism'd as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (rex. 1988);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Okla. 1981);
Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 570 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Harris, 681 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1984).
Lessors with real bargaining power would want the greater of "gross proceeds,"
including signing bonuses, premiums, refunds, take-or-pay payments, etc., or "market
value" at the point where a prudent operator would actually market production without any
deductions other than those that can be objectively determined, such as the lessor's share of
production taxes.
124. Although the case dealt with overriding royalty, this is the basic holding in Garman
v. Conoco,Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
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view, "production" would end at the point where a first-marketable
product has in fact been obtained, which is not necessarily at the point of
extraction.
Of course, in many instances, gas in fact may be in a firstmarketable condition at the wellhead. In other instances, gas, such as sour
gas, may not be marketable until it is treated. I hesitate to offer a list of
specific examples, because the question of when a product first becomes
marketable is a question of fact, not law. However, I am willing to assume,
based upon current market realities, that neither oil nor casinghead gas is
marketable in fact until the brine has been removed and separate oil and
wet gas streams have exited the separator.'2 If my assumption is correct,
then this initial separation is as much the cost-bearing responsibility of the
lessee as is the physical extraction of the oil and gas from the earth."z And

126. As used here, separation refers to the well site separation of oil, gas and brine in a
metal vessel by using gravity and centrifugal force. NORMAN J. HYNE, DICTIONARY OF
PETROmEUM EXPLORATION, DRILuNG & PRODUCTION 454 (1991).

127. Note that prior to initial separation, a given well may expel a stream of oil,
casinghead gas, and brine. Royalty clauses do not refer to such a stream. They separately
refer to oil and gas, usually in separate paragraphs. They do not mention brine, which is
presumed to be a waste product to be disposed of by injection into a disposal well. At a
minimum, the lessee would seem to be obligated to separate oil and casinghead gas from
each other and from the brine and to dispose of the brine at no cost to the lessor. If this is so,
then the notion that royalty is due at extraction-a property-based principle-falls down like
a house of cards as separation is a post-extraction activity. If this is not so, then the lessor's
royalty share would have to bear its proportionate share of the initial separation costs and
brine disposal costs as both are post-extraction activities even though the lessee is obligated
to separately account for royalty on oil and gas under most modem leases, in contrast to an
accounting for the raw stream of a well.
Two cases are occasionally cited for the proposition that separation costs are deductible
in the calculation of royalty; however, neither case actually deals with the initial wellhead
separation of oil, gas, and brine. In the first, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th
Cir. 1946), the court treats "separation" costs as deductible. However, a careful reading of
the case reveals that the case concerned the extraction ("separation") of gasoline from the
wet natural gas stream at a central processing facility, not the separation of wet gas, i.e., gas
that contains gasoline and other liquid hydrocarbons, from oil and water. Moreover, the
lessor conceded that such costs were deductible under the terms of a "net proceeds" royalty
clause. This case is a classic example of the need to read royalty cases very carefully. Johnson
contains an initial opinion, a dissent, and two rehearing opinions. The key issues in the case
were: (1) a dispute over volumes, (2) the calculationof costs that the lessor conceded were
deductible, (3) the effect of lessee's concealment on the statute of limitations governing the
royalty claims, and (4) the determination of the burden of proof concerning the lessee's duty
to fully account to the lessor for the calculations made.
In the second, Maddox v. Texas Co., 150 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Tex. 1957), the gas royalty clause
expressly provided that the lessor "bear its proportion of any compression, treating, and
other expenses necessary to render the gas merchantable" and the substance at issue was wet
gas. The court held that the lessee, who held title to the entire gas stream, did not have a
duty to run the wet gas through a mechanicalseparator at the well; rather, the lessee was

Summer 1997]

ROYALTY VALUATION- PART TWO

basis of a known and real market. 32 There would be no need to deduct costs
other than transportation because the value of the gas as a first-marketable
product would otherwise be known. In other words, unlike the Piney Woods

125. This approach could also be taken With certain lessor-drafted royalty clauses, such
as the royalty clause at issue in HeritageResources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex
1996). In this case, the royalty clause required payment on the basis of the market value of
gas at the well. Although the court never states the meaning, the court concluded that
.market value at the well" had a commonly accepted meaning in the oil and gas industry,
and then it defined "market value" as "the price a willing seller obtains from a willing
buyer." However, the court then concluded that "market value at the well" could be
calculated by "subtracting reasonable post-production marketing costs from the market
value at the point of sale" and that "[plost-production marketing costs include transporting
the gas to the market and processing the gas to make it marketable." The court seemed
totally unaware of the inherent inconsistency in its definitions. For there to be a willing seller
and willing buyer, there needs to be a marketable product and a market. When you first
have all of these elements, market value will be determined and nothing needs to be
deducted except perhaps freight and the lessor's share of production taxes.
The court reached its conclusion in the face of express lease language which provided that
"there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required
processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to market such
gas." The court ruled that this language was "surplusage as a matter of law." Apart from the
express reference to transportation, which does seem inconsistent with the phrase "at the
well," the no-deduction clause may be "belt and suspenders," but the entire royalty clause
does not mean what the court concludes. Read as a whole, the royalty clause provides that
the lessee may not take any deductions from the market value of the gas. The additional "nodeduction" clause underscores that the lessee must pay royalty on the full market value of
production. And the words "market value" inherently require the existence of a marketable
product. Thus, just as with other "market price," "market value," "proceeds," and "amount
realized" clauses, at a minimum under the NationsBank clause, royalty is payable on a
marketableproduct.
The NationsBank royalty clause further provides that no deductions may be taken for
transportation. This is not surplusage; however, it seems to conflict with the phrase "at the
well." One means of harmonizing this language would be to construe the entire royalty
clause in light of how the phrase "at the well" was defined in Exxon Corp. v.Middleton, 613
S.W.2d. 240,244 (Tex. 1981), wherein the Texas Supreme Court stated that "at the well" was
anywhere on the leased premises. This would mean that the lessor could not be charged
through royalty accounting for any transportation of oil or gas to the boundary of the leased
premises. Another alternative would be to construe "at the well" as anywhere in the vicinity
of the field, as defined in Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d. 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (but later rejected in Middleton).
There is very little question as to what the lessors meant when they drafted the nodeduction clause. They meant that they were to be paid royalty on whatever the lessee
received on the sale of the oil or gas without any deductions, but in any event, never less
than market value at the well. In other words, their intent was to share in all monies received
by the lessee for the sale of oil and gas even beyond the point where the oil and gas became
a first-marketable product. Of course, whether the court should honor the lessors' intent,
given that they retained the "at the well" phrase, is similar to the question of whether lessees
should be allowed to deduct all post-wellhead costs when using phrases like "market value
...at the well."
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this should be true regardless of whether the separator is physically located
on or off the leased premises. Conversely, if wet gas"m is marketable in fact,
the location of a gasoline extraction plant on the leased premises should not
trigger royalty on the gross value of the extracted liquids and residue gas
because gasoline extraction would be beyond the exploration and
production segment of the industry.'2 On the other hand, if separation or
some other process is necessary for that segment of the industry to realize
a marketable product, then that process should be cost-free to the lessor."
In a host of commercial transactions, F.O.B. sales are common
regarding most products in most markets.131 A buyer of a product
customarily pays the freight directly, or it is included in the sales price. For
example, a new automobile is in a marketable condition when it exits the
factory, but freight costs are incurred to get the automobile to a dealer, i.e.,
a marketable location. When the dealer resells the car, a freight charge is an
itemized addition to the retail sales price. The sheet metal that went into
that car was marketable as sheet metal at the steel plant, but freight costs
are incurred to transport the sheet metal to the automobile manufacturer.
The iron ore that was smelted into the steel sheet metal was likely
marketable as iron ore, but freight costs are incurred when the ore was
shipped to the smelter.

permitted to send the wet gas downstream to a gasoline manufacturing facility for
separation, absorption, dehydration, and fractionation by a third-party contractor and to
charge the lessor's royalty share with a proportionate share of those downstream costs.
128. By wet gas, I mean gas that contains gasoline and other liquid hydrocarbons.
129. Cf. Mussellem v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 231 P. 526 (Okla. 1924) (holding that
royalty was payable on gas used on the leased premises for the extraction of gasoline, even
though the royalty clause expressly stated that royalty was owed only on gas used off the
leased premises, because this limitation was intended to clarify that no royalty would be
owed on gas used on the premises in lease operations).
130. Royalty clauses also commonly provide that royalty is payable on oil and gas "when
produced and saved." This phrase should also be construed in light of the rest of the royalty
clause and in light of market realities. In accordance with the Tara view, the value of the gas
subject to the clause is the gas actually produced pursuant to the underlying lease. I submit
that the value of that gas "when produced" is the price for which that gas is sold pursuant
to an arm's length equivalent sales contract and not the spot market for similar gas that is
not being sold pursuant to such a contract. The words "and saved" are intended to clarify
that royalty is payable on gas that is captured and marketed, not on gas that is unavoidably
lost or on gas that is vented or flared due to the lack of a market.
131. F.O.B. ("Free on Board") "means that the seller fulfills his obligation to deliver when
the goods have passed the ship's rail at the named port of shipment." INcOTERMS 38 (1990).
Inthe context of gas, F.O.B. is similar to "free of cost, in the pipeline." In other instances, the
terms of sale may be E.X.W. (Ex Works), where "the seller fulfills his obligation to deliver
when he has made the goods available at his premises.., to the buyer." Id. at 18. In the
context of gas, E.X.W. seems to be similar to "at the well."
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A mineral royalty should be presumed due on the value of the iron
ore as a first-marketable product, F.O.B. the mine, even if the ore has been
transported to a distant first market. This should be so even if the ore has
been extracted by an integrated mining-manufacturing company that mines
the iron ore, smelts it into sheet metal, molds the sheet metal into
automobile frames and bodies, and assembles automobiles for sale directly
to the retail market. Royalty should be presumptively due at the end of the
exploration and mining segment of such an integrated mining and
manufacturing company- the point at which marketable iron ore has been
produced. In the absence of an express royalty provision to the contrary,
and reality should be the presumptive basis for
that commercial fact
1 32
determining royalty.
For another example, consider wheat. Wheat is in a first-marketable
condition when it is harvested. However, the harvested wheat ordinarily
must be transported to a local elevator for actual sale. The farmer pays the
freight cost either by transporting the wheat in his own truck, by paying the
elevator to transport the wheat, or by hiring a third party to do so. The local
elevator will resell the wheat to a regional marketing center. For example,
wheat raised on my family farm in North Dakota is initially sold to local
elevators who resell the wheat to buyers in Duluth or Minneapolis,
Minnesota, or in Portland, Oregon. Needless to say, there are substantial
transportation costs incurred in getting the wheat to these resale markets.
From these markets, the grain may be resold to domestic millers or resold
for export to various countries and transported on cargo ships overseas.
Some of this wheat is milled into flour and then baked into bread. Although
most farmers (and their "crop-share" landlords) would be thrilled by the
prospect of receiving a proportionate share of the retail price of a loaf of
bread (less post-harvesting costs), they are not so lucky. Rather, there is an

132. Compare book royalties with oil and gas royalties: By analogy to the cases that allow
oil and gas lessees to deduct all post-wellhead costs, the book royalty principle should then
be that royalty is due on the manuscript at the time of its delivery to the publisher-where
title passes. In other words, the publisher should be allowed to deduct all costs of preparing
the book for market- editing, type setting, printing, binding, and storage. Yet, this is not the
practice because the publisher implicitly promises to transform the manuscript into a
marketable product. However, publishers usually do not pay royalty on the costs incurred
to transport the finished book to bookstores. This practice reflects the notion that royalty is
logically payable on the finished book F.O.B. the publisher.
A book is a first-marketable product when it is printed, bound, and ready for shipment.
When the books are sold, royalty accrues on the value of the published book; however, most
authors do not receive royalty based upon the downstream retail price because the publisher
first sells the book on the wholesale market. The wholesaler then resells the book to a retail
customer. So it should be with oil and gas. Royalty should be presumed payable on a firstmarketable product, not on the surmised value of an upstream unmarketable raw material,
and not on the price for which oil or gas is sold to a distant retail consumer.
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to account for differences in location, quality, and quantity of marketable
gas.
Based upon minor differences in circumstances, courts are often too
quick to conclude that there are no comparable upstream sales and then opt
for a work-back approach And, by assuming that the appropriate valuation
point for all purposes is at the point of extraction, courts oftentimes resort
to a work-back approach because there are no comparable "wellhead" sales
when gas is not actually marketable at the point of extraction.1' Thus, by
using the work-back approach, courts let "at the well" trump "proceeds,"
"amount realized," "market price," or "market value" even though these
latter words contemplate the actual sale of a product in a real market. Even
working back to an actual marketing point is not appropriate because the
deduction of costs, which can vary from party-to-party and circumstanceto-circumstance, from a downstream sales price bears no relation to a
product's sales price or market value at an upstream point.
Moreover, the determination of such costs is fraught with
variables. 37 While this determination may indicate whether the
downstream sale was more profitable than an upstream sale, this would
only be true if the upstream market value is known and if the costs are
properly calculated. For royalty purposes, if the upstream markit value is
known (as it would be if royalty were due on a first-marketable product),
then a work-back calculation becomes unnecessary, as royalty would be
payable on the known upstream market value.
Again, consider wheat. In any given year, it may cost many farmers
more to raise wheat than they earn from sales. Yet, some farmers may make
a profit in that same year. And, in any given year, it may cost many
ranchers more to raise beef than what they earn from sales. Yet, a few
ranchers may make a profit while many others suffer heavy losses. The
market value and sales price of beef, wheat and other products is

Mich. 1988) (concluding that royalty due on the "amount realized at the mouth of the well"
for gas sold off the premises required the proceeds less expenses method of calculating
royalties, even though the gas may have had a determinable market value at the well).
136. The problem of determining when gas first becomes marketable will be more easily
determined in the near future. A common first market can be identified for nearly all
commodities. Farmers commonly market their wheat at local elevators. Ranchers commonly
market feeder cattle at livestock auction rings. Car manufacturers commonly market their
cars to dealers for resale to consumers. Gas, like nearly all other commodities, will be
marketed in a manner that will become customary in the industry, and lessees will have a
substantial role in establishing that market. When that occurs, a comparable sales approach
to establishing royalty value will be much easier to calculate if courts adopt the firstmarketable product view. If courts in some jurisdictions continue to follow a wellhead
valuation rule, then the preferred comparable-sales approach will continue to give way to
the less-desirable work-back approach.

137.

See generally Anderson, supra note 85.
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established local market and hence, a local market price. That market price
reflects the market value of harvested wheat in the form of grain after
delivery to the local elevator.
Nearly all farmers market their wheat in the form of grain-a firstmarketable product. In North Dakota, under the terms of sharecropping
agreements, it is well understood (whether the landlord takes his share of
the grain in kind or in value) that the tenant farmer is obligated to harvest
grain that is marketable, i.e., grain that is not too immature, that is not too
wet, and that is not allowed to spoil. For example, a tenant farmer would be
obligated to harvest the grain when it is dry enough to prevent spoilage in
the bin or to dry the grain if it is harvested too wet. The landlord is not
commonly responsible for a proportionate share of post-combining
expenses, such as drying or storing the grain in the tenant's bins."s On the
other hand, the tenant farmer is not obligated to account to the landlord for
a share of the crop in the form of bread or based upon the value of a loaf of
bread. Rather, the farm segment of the wheat industry ends when the grain
is harvested and sold at the local elevator.
Unlike wheat, in today's gas markets, gas may be first sold at a
point and in a condition that is well beyond the point and condition where
it becomes a first-marketable product. And the point at which gas becomes
a first-marketable product may also vary from area-to-area and perhaps
from well-to-well. Thus, it may be more difficult to determine when gas first
becomes marketable than when iron ore, automobiles, and wheat first
become marketable. Nevertheless, this question of fact should be easily
resolved by examining actual upstream, arm's length equivalent sales of
similar gas through the use of a comparable sales approach' - the
approach preferred by courts in gas royalty cases where the gas at issue is
sold downstream."~ Where necessary, appropriate adjustments can be made

133. In some crop-share arrangements, a landowner will expressly assume responsibility
for paying a proportionate share of certain expenses, e.g., seed, herbicide, pesticide,
fertilizer, and custom combining. In return, the landowner receives a larger share of the crop,
e.g., 40 to 50% of th,. crop, as opposed to the normal 30%, to one-third).
134. See also Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298,303 (Mont. 1978) (recognizing
seven specific factors to be used in determining the comparability of gas sales: (1) the
location of the leases or acreage involved vis-&-vis the proximity to prospective buyers'
pipelines, (2) the volume available for sale, (3) quality of the gas-sweet or sour, (4) the
delivery point, (5) the heating value of the gas, (6) the deliverability of the well, i.e., the
volume of reserves and (7) the natural pressure at the wellhead, thus limiting compression
costs). See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (using a comparable sales approach).
135. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 463 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Okla.
1978) (stating that optimally market value should be determined by examining comparable
sales of the same product, even though the court resorted to the work-back or net-value
approach). Cf. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 679 F. Supp. 1435 (W.D.
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determined by looking at actual sales in actual markets, not by anecdotal
work-back calculations. Furthermore, on any given day, the major
difference between the value of wheat in a farmer's grain bin and its value
at the local elevator is the cost of freight-the cost of transporting the wheat
from the farmer's grain bin to the local elevator' Likewise, on any given
day, the major difference between the value of feeder cattle in a rancher's
corral and in the auction ring is the cost of the freight.

138. By transportation, I also include: the cost of loading the wheat onto the truck at the
farmer's grain bin via a grain auger, the cost of unloading the truck at the local elevator
through the use of a hoist on the truck, and the cost of fuel consumed in driving the truck
from the farm to the local elevator. One might compare the grain auger, hoist, and fuel to the
compressor used to force the gas into a pipeline. In these circumstances, the auger, hoist,
fuel, and compressor are all part of the transportation function. Yet, in gas royalty cases,
Kansas courts allow deductions for gathering and transportation, but not for compression.
See, e.g., Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that
compression costs are not deductible, but holding that lessee could deduct gathering costs
where royalty was due on 'market price at the well" but not "more than one-eighth (1/8)
of the proceeds received by lessee...').
On the other hand, sometimes wheat is harvested when it is too wet. Due to the danger
of spoilage, a local elevator will not buy the wheat unless it is dried. In other words, wheat
that is too wet is not in a marketable condition in a real established marketplace.
Consequently, the farmer who harvested wheat that is too wet will incur the cost of drying
the wheat to make it marketable in the real market place. Would a landowner who had
sharecropped the land to the farmer be liable for a proportionate cost of drying the wheat?
Certainly not, unless the sharecropping agreement specifically provided otherwise.
So it should be with gas. For example, if, in fact, there is no real market for sour, wet gas
because there are no willing buyers of sour, wet gas in the area. If the gas producer has to
remove these impurities to find willing buyers in an established market, then that gas first
becomes marketable in fact when it is sweetened and dried. On other hand, if there are
willing buyers of sour, wet gas in an established market, then the sour, wet gas is marketable
in fact in its sour, wet condition.
Again, compare wet wheat. Generally, wet wheat cannot be sold to a local elevator
because of concerns over sprouting and spoiling. Thus, it must be dried. What then is the
value of wet wheat? One could construct a fictitious market for wet wheat by surmising that
a third party with a dryer would buy the wheat at a discount, dry it, and then resell it. The
work-back value of the wet wheat would then be the value of dry wheat less the cost of
drying. This value does not reflect market value, market price, proceeds or amount realized.
It is merely an intrinsic value that completely ignores market realities if there are, in fact, no
such third-party buyers of wet wheat. Although a real market for wet wheat might
materialize, wet wheat will not be marketable in fact until such a market actually exists.
One variation on such a market might be that third parties would purchase wet wheat
and pay for it based upon a percentage of the proceeds received for the dry wheat on resale.
This is similar to the gasoline plant that buys wet gas and pays the producer a share of the
resale price of gasoline and residue dry gas. Such a real and established market presumably
makes wet gas marketable in fact even though the purchase price is unknown until the next
sale occurs. The key is that there be a real arms-length equivalent market, not a fictional
market.
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Thus, freight or transportation is the key to determining the
appropriate meaning of "at the well" when these words are used in
conjunction with "market value," "market price," "proceeds," or "amount
realized." This approach harmonizes the typical royalty clause in a way that
reflects its plain meaning-albeit a meaning that is not fully in accord with
the lessee's objective in crafting these royalty clauses. 39
4. Tara Reconsidered
From my criticism of Vela and Piney Woods, it is readily apparent
that I support the holding in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey14° that the
"market value" of gas sold pursuant to a long-term contract is the contract
price where the contract is entered into in good faith to fulfill the lessee's
duty to market gas. The Tara view recognizes the realities of the
marketplace.
I do, however, recognize that Judge Wisdom was technically correct
when he said that, under the express terms of the gas royalty clauses at
issue, the royalty value was determinable when the gas was physically
extracted, not when it was committed to long-term contracts. Nevertheless,
the royalty value of the particular molecules of gas at issue in Piney Woods
should have been based upon the contract price when those molecules were
extracted because those particular molecules had been dedicated to an
arm's-length equivalent long-term contract. Accordingly, these molecules
were not otherwise marketable in fact. In other words, the real market value
or market price of those molecules at the time of their physical extraction
was the contract price because that was the only market available for those
molecules of gas. Of course, if a spot market had existed, these same
molecules may have been worth more or less on the spot market. Although
they would have been worth more on the contemporary contract market at
the time of extraction, the molecules at issue in Piney Woods could not have
been legally sold into other markets because they had been lawfully
committed to another market. Judge Wisdom should have recognized that,

139. "Crafting" is the proper word, because, as Siefkin teaches, the lessees' drafters were
being intentionally vague-not just to hide their objective, but to also have some flexibility
in meeting their royalty obligation. Siefkin, supra note 1, at 215-17.
140. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla: 1981). The Tara view appears to have been adopted by the
Texas legislature:
With respect to oil and/or gas sold in the field where produced or at a
gathering point in the immediate vicinity, the terms "market value,"
"market price," "prevailing price in the field," or other such language,
when used as a basis of valuation in the oil and gas lease, shall be defined
as the amount realized at the mouth of the well by the seller of such
production in an arm's length transaction.
Tsx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.402(i) (West 1993).
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cases as lessees should not have to pay royalty on freight. Moreover, nearly
all cases throughout history have consistently and properly held that
royalty entitlements, either in kind or in value, are determined in the
vicinity of the well and not at some distant point far from the leasehold. 46
Regarding transportation, however, query whether there is a
distinction between clauses that provide that royalty is due "at the well,"
from clauses that traditionally provided for royalty "free of cost, in the
pipeline," or from clauses that were silent on this matter. This is a close
question. Consistent with nearly all case law, the latter provision
contemplates that the lessee must absorb all costs of delivering oil or gas
into a pipeline near the well, but is not obligated to deliver oil or gas to
some distant pipeline or market. 47 Although "at the well" seems to

market less transportation costs); Hemler v. Union Producing Co., 40 F. Supp. 824 (D. La.
1941) (where no market exists at the well, the usual price at the nearest point where a market
exists, less the additional cost of taking the gas or other product to that market, is the
criterion upon which the lessee or purchaser is bound to settle under an instrument
containing the term "market price'); Haynes v. Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011,
1012 (5th Cir. 1941) (stating that in the absence of wellhead sales, city gate prices may be
relevant in determining fair market value, but royalties are due on value "at the well");
Molter v. Lewis, 134 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1943) (holding that lessee can deduct reasonable trucking
costs when calculating oil royalty where royalty was payable "free of cost, in the pipeline");
Kretni Dev. Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497, 500 (10th Cir. 1934) (holding that
lessor was entitled to royalty based on the value of the gas when it entered lessee's 90-mile
pipeline rather than its value at the end of the pipeline); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co.,
152 So. 561, 564 (La. 1934) (holding that royalty should be calculated on the market price of
gas at the well or in the field, and if no field market exists, at the nearest marketing location
less transportation expenses).
But see Robert v. Swanson, 222 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Civ. App.-Eastland 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding that production payment providing for payment of $90,000 from the sale of oil "free
and clear of all cost and expense of whatsoever kind and nature at the pipe line.., or other
delivery point" did not permit the deduction of transportation costs where the oil was
transported by truck rather than by pipeline to the refinery buyer); Schmidt v. Texas
Meridian Resources, Ltd., 1994 WL 728059 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30,1994) (holding that course
of performance by lessee barred successor from deducting transportation charges that
otherwise may have been deductible); Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626
(W. Va. 1962) (holding that royalty "at rate received by lessee' required lessee to pay royalty
on the price it received downstream).
Cf Upham v. Ladd, 95 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936) (stating that "a proceeds"
royalty clause requires payment based upon "amount realized from the sale of [gas],' but
this is not determinative of the issue of whether transportation is deductible because the
contract must be "construed in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
parties when it was made').
146. Among the earliest cases so holding are Rainsv. Kentucky Oil Co., 255 S.W. 121 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1923) and Scott v. Steinberger,213 P. 646 (Kan. 1923).
147. See, e.g., Rains, 255 S.W. 121; Scott, 213 P. 646. "Free of cost, in the pipeline' may
mean that the lessee is obligated to produce gas that is marketable to or via a pipeline. In
other words, this phrase may mean that royalty is owed on gas that a pipeline is willing to
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depending on circumstances, it is readily possible for fungible gas in the
same field to have different market values.'4'
My preference for the Tara view is not without limit. I do accept the
proposition that a lessee is under an implied duty to market the gas in good
faith. Accordingly, the decisions in the Amoco ProductionCo. v. FirstBaptist
Church of Pyote' and Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Harri 43 are sound to the
extent that they require the lessee to seek out the best available market for
gas after discovery.'"
In conclusion, the only justification for the holdings in Vela and
Piney Woods is that they dole out "poetic justice" to lessees who sought to
cleverly secure the right to make post-wellhead deductions without stating
this right clearly and directly. The better answer would have been to
construe the royalty clause as a whole and hold lessees to their traditional
obligation of producing a first-marketable product at the well and to pay a
cost-free royalty on that basis.
C. The Trees Revisited: Various Species of Post-Wellhead Costs
The notion that royalty is payable on the basis of the value of the
raw gas as it emanates from the well owes much of its genesis to a series of
cases that held that a lessee may charge the lessor for a proportionate share
of significant transportation costs.'4 Generally, I have no quarrel with these

141. See also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1944) (regarding
different market values for gas sold to pipelines and gas sold to gasoline plants); Voshell v.
Indian Territory Illuminating Co., 19 P.2d 456, 458 (Kan. 1933) (recognizing that, while one
would ordinarily look to the market price established in the field to determine royalty value,
that is not appropriate where there was no actual field market for the production at issue
because only a small number of producers were "fortunate enough to have pipeline
connections in the field'). See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.
1946) (holding that gas not marketable to pipelines due to market demand could not be
valued at a pipeline price even though some gas produced from the same area was being
marketed to pipelines).
142. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
143. 681 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1984).
144. See also Barby v. Cabot Corp., 550 F. Supp. 188,190 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Harding v.
Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466,470 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (recognizing that lessee has a "a duty to
market the gas produced from a well and obtain the best price and terms available.");
Hutchison v. Atlas Oil Co., 87 So. 265 (La. 1920) (stating that lessee is obliged to produce and
market production to the best advantage of both the lessor and lessee); U.C.C. § 1-203
(providing that "every contract or duty... imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement").
145.
See, e.g., Sartor v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 173 So. 103,108 (La. 1937) (holding
that market royalties were due on prevailing field prices for gas rather than on values
reflecting transportation); Voshell, 19 P.2d 456 (holding that where royalty was payable "free
of cost, in the pipeline," oil royalties were payable at the posted price received at a distant
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contemplate that the lessee may charge the lessor, through royalty
accounting, for a proportionate share of the costs of transporting the gas
from the well site to the pipeline, case law on the precise meaning of "at the
well" is mixed. Indeed, based partly upon arguments offered by lessees,
some courts have defined "at the well" more broadly.
For example, in Butler v. Exxon Corp.," the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals for El Paso held, based upon expert testimony offered by the
lessee, that "at the well" could mean anywhere in the vicinity of the leased
premises.149 This holding essentially treats "at the well" as a synonym for
the way courts have interpreted the phrase "free of cost into the pipeline."
However, in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton,"° the Texas Supreme Court rejected
that definition and defined "at the well" as anywhere on the leased
premises.' 5' Recently, in HeritageResources, Inc. v. NationsBank,15 2 the Texas

purchase or transport. For example, gas might be first marketable (e.g., wet gas to a gasoline
plant) but not be marketable (because of its wetness) to or via a pipeline. Thus, in certain
circumstances, this phrase might be construed as requiring the lessee to enhance gas that is
already in a first marketable condition.
148. 559 S.W.2d. 410,416 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
149. Exxon offered this testimony to support its desire to account to the lessor based
upon the actual proceeds of sale received pursuant to a long-term gas sales contract, which
it could do if the gas was sold "at the well," and avoid having to account for royalty based
upon the current "market value" of gas, which it had to do if the gas was sold "off the
premises."
150. 613 S.W.2d. 240, 244 (Tex. 1981).
151. in Middleton, the court distinguished the phrases "at the well" and "off the
premises" in the same gas royalty provision. Although the Texas Supreme Court
undoubtedly thought that it was narrowing the geographical scope of "at the well," the
scope could be narrower or broader than the Butler scope, depending on the facts. For
example, assume that gas is extracted from a well located at one comer of a 30,000 acre
leasehold and sold at the tailgate of a processing plant located in the opposite comer of the
leasehold but beyond the geographical boundaries and vicinity of the gas field. Under
Middleton, this would be a sale "at the well," but perhaps a sale "off the premises" under
Butler.
For comparison, assume gas is extracted from a town lot leasehold and sold across the
street at the tailgate of a processing plant. Under Middleton, this would be a sale off the
premises, but perhaps a sale at the well under Butler. See also Skaggs v. Heard, 172 F. Supp.
813, 815 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (concluding that the meaning of "at the well" was doubtful, but
when construed in light of other lease provisions and by the parties' conduct, meant on the
leased premises and thus concluding that on-lease compression costs incurred to force the
gas into the pipeline on the lease were not deductible).
152. 939 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Tex. 1996). Although this opinion is reported, it appears
to have little, if any, value as precedent because, on motion for rehearing, one of the justices
who had joined in the majority opinion recused himself; two justices on the majority opinion,
together with two dissenting justices, would have granted rehearing; and another justice
who had previously joined in the majority opinion sided with the concurring justices. This
left only the author of what had been the majority opinion continuing to support that
opinion, along with three concurring justices refusing to grant rehearing, while four justices
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Supreme Court implied that "at the well" meant at the wellhead, at least for
purposes of allowing the lessee to deduct post-wellhead costs.
For the sake of uniformity, courts should decide either that "at the
well" means at the wellhead"s or that it is essentially a synonym for "free
of cost, in the pipeline" and does not add anything to leases that are silent
as to location. Which view is better is debatable. The former view recognizes
a plain meaning difference in these terms regarding transportation expense
and most likely reflects the lessees' intent in using the words "at the well."
The latter view promotes uniformity in the calculation of royalty under
various royalty clauses. In either case, in the absence of an expressly
contrary lease provision,' pipeline transmission costs should be deductible

favored rehearing. Thus, the result in the case stands based upon a I - 3 - 4 deadlock. See
Case. No. 95-0515 (Tex. March 21,1997) (denial of rehearing) (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
153. Note that some leases expressly provide that royalty is due "at the wellhead" or "at
the mouth of the well." The plain meaning of these words would seem to be that royalty is
due at the point where the oil and gas is extracted from the earth, however, when taken in
context with the entire royalty clause, their plain meaning is not quite so plain. Because "oil"
royalty is commonly separately addressed (and often payable in kind) from "gas" royalty,
a court should reasonably conclude that the lessee is necessarily obligated to run raw
production of oil, brine, and casinghead gas through a common well site separator free of
cost to the lessor even where the royalty was due "at the wellhead" or "at the mouth of the
well." Moreover, these phrases are often coupled with the words "market price," "market
value," "proceeds," or "amount realized," all of which contemplate actual sales and thus a
marketable product. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Terra Energy Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (providing for royalty on "the gross proceeds at the wellhead"). Accordingly,
consistent with my view that royalty clauses should be construed as a whole and for the sake
of uniformity, I would not distinguish between the words, "at the well," "at the wellhead,"
or "at the mouth of the well" when used in conjunction with "market price," "market value,"
"proceeds," or "amount realized."
154. Lessors in Texas and elsewhere have issued leases on lessor-oriented forms or have
supplemented a lessee's form with a lessor-oriented amendment. A commonly used royalty
provision provides that "there shall be no deductions from the value of the lessor's royalty
by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation or
other matter to market such gas." In NationsBank, this clause followed a general market value
"at the well" royalty provision. As a result, the Texas Supreme Court essentially construed
the "no-deduction" clause as surplusage in that it merely clarified that the lessee could not
reduce royalties, through the deduction of post-wellhead costs, below the market value of
the gas "at the well." 939 S.W.2d at 122-23.
From the perspective of what the lessors intended, this conclusion is clearly erroneous.
Lessors intended to share in the lessee's gross proceeds, but not less than market value at the
well.
From a plain-meaning perspective, the entire clause is less clear; however, the court could
have reconciled the "at the well" language with the "no deduction" clause by adopting a
"first-marketable product" view. Of course, this would be subject to the criticism that this
too would treat the no-deduction clause as largely surplusage. Or the court could have
limited the no-deduction clause to post-wellhead activities that occur within the vicinity of
the field thereby adopting a more flexible definition of "at the well."
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from royalty, and so should excessive gathering costs incurred to move gas
to a pipeline that is not in the vicinity of the well. The difference in these
definitions really relates to gathering system expenses incurred to move gas
to a pipeline that is nearby.
Cases that deal with post-wellhead deductions other than transportation are another series of cases that, along with the Vela line of cases, have
caused courts to stray from the view that royalty is a share. Even here, not
all cases are troublesome. The cases that hold that a lessee may pay royalty
on the value of wet gas ls prior to the extraction of gasoline, thereby
1
permitting, at least indirectly, the deduction of gasoline extraction costs, 56
can be supported on two grounds. First, wet gas is probably a marketable
In light of the Texas courts' murky treatment of "at the well" in prior cases, this latter
interpretation would mesh nicely with the specific activities mentioned in the no-deduction
clause. For example, the nondeductability of transportation could be limited to gathering
costs in the vicinity of the well, as opposed to pipeline transmission costs and the expenses
associated with an extensive gathering system where the pipeline connection is not in the
vicinity of the well.
155. By wet gas, I am referring to gas that contains valuable liquids, such as gasoline.
156. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 55 F.2d 1066,1068 (5th Cir. 1932) (holding that
lessee properly accounted to lessor for royalty based upon a percentage of the revenues
derived from the extraction of gasoline); Crichton v. Standard Oil Co., 150 So. 668, 669 (La.
1933) (holding that the cost of extracting gasoline is deductible when calculating royalty);
Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 144 So. 737 (La. 1932) (holding that the cost of extracting
gasoline is deductible when calculating royalty); O'Neal v. Union Prod. Co., 153 F.2d 157
(5th Cir. 1946) (holding that, under royalty based upon "net proceeds at prevailing market
price at well," lessor was entitled to market value of wet gas at the well, not to royalty on
the extracted gasoline); Phillips Petroleum v. Record, 146 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1944)
(holding that where royalty is due at the "prevailing market rate," royalty is measured by
market value of gas at the well, not on the value of products manufactured from gas);
Danciger Oil & Refineries, Inc. v. Hamill Drilling Co., 171 S.W.2d 321 (rex. 1943) (holding
that overriding royalty is payable on the market value of the crude gas at the well and not
on the gross value of extracted gasoline); Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 63 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1936)
(holding that where the lessee operates a gasoline plant used exclusively for the manufacture
of gasoline from casinghead gas produced from the lease, "proceeds" royalty may be
established by subtracting the sum of the costs of manufacturing, depletion of the plant, and
marketing costs from the total sales prices of the gasoline and residue gas); McCoy v. United
Gas Pipeline Serv. Co., 57 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. La. 1932); Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431 (rex.
Conu'n App. 1926) (holding that lessor is entitled to a 1/8 royalty on the 25% portion of the.
value of the extracted gasoline remitted to lessee after processing by a third party and not
on the 75% portion retained by the processor).
The cases are not consistent on how the costs of gasoline extraction are to be factored into
the royalty calculation. Cf., Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992,
writ denied). In Carter, the court refused to allow the lessors to prove the fair market value
of gas "at the well" by taking the price received for liquid by-products at the tail gate of a
gas plant (less the costs incurred in manufacturing the gas) on the ground that the leases and
division orders did not allow for such a calculation. Rather the court accepted Exxon's
calculation of royalty by taking the higher of 1/3 of the value of the liquid products sold or
the "interstate value of the gas used to make liquid products." Id. at 397-98.
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product 5 7 Second, the gasoline extraction business is a step beyond the
exploration and production segment of the industry." Moreover, the great
weight of case law has consistently treated gasoline extraction as a postproduction activity."s
I also have no problem with cases that hold that the lessor is
responsible for its proportionate share of production taxes. The
deductibility of such taxes is beyond the scope of this essay because the
issue generally turns on an interpretation of the applicable taxation statute,
rather than on the language of the royalty clause.' 6°

157. In Armstrong, 55 F.2d at 1068, perhaps the earliest of these cases, the court
specifically found that "[hiad the gas been sold to an extraction plant, the lessee, under the
universal custom of the trade, would have received returns identically the same as those
made by appellees."
158. Again, in Armstrong, the court noted that there were third-party extraction plants
that were purchasing wet gas from oil and gas operators. Id.
159. But see Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co, 83 So. 232 (La. 1919).
160. See, e.g., Holbein v. Austral Oil Co., 609 F.2d 206,209 (5th Cir. 1980); Gulf Ref. Co.
v. Stone, 21 So. 2d 19 (Miss. 1945); Canadian River Gas Co. v. Bivins, 153 S.W.2d 432, 433
(Tex. 1941); Sartor v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 173 So. 103 (La. 1937). A few cases do turn
on specific lease language. If the lease specifically provides that royalties are to be paid free
of any tax deduction, the courts generally give such language effect. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Long
Beach, 812 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1987); Tenneco West, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 756 F.2d 769
(10th Cir. 1985) (both characterizing the windfall profits tax as a tax on incremental value
and not a severance tax where leases provided that lessee was to pay all severance taxes).
See, e.g., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, 871,S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (construing a lease that specifically provided that lessee was
to absorb "all taxes of every kind" as requiring lessee to pay lessor's share of windfall profits
tax).
"Post-wellhead costs" can be an issue in production tax cases. For example, in Koch Oil
Co. v. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995), the production tax statute called for production
taxes to be levied on the "gross value at the well." This phrase was interpreted to mean "fair
market value at the well.' The court further held that the Commissioner could calculate the
tax owed by a reasonable method, including the use of the work-back method using
downstream metered volumes rather than lower hand gauged wellhead volumes. The workback method was approved even though there were comparable arm's length wellhead sales.
The court concluded that the wellhead sales did not conclusively determine fair market
value for tax purposes.
In Amerada Hess Corp. v. Conrad,410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987), the court held that "gross
value at the well," as used in the tax statute, meant current fair market value even though
the gas was sold under a long-term contract. In determining the current fair market value,
the Commissioner may begin with the downstream fair market value and work back to the
wellhead value. In this case, the Commissioner conceded that the regulatory vintage of the
gas, i.e., the maximum lawful price, capped the fair market value.
In Dorchester Master Ltd. Partnershipv. Bullock, 794 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied), the producer supplied extra gas to the purchaser (with no increase in contract
price) to make up for the reduced Btu content of residue gas. The court held that the supply
of 'make-up' gas was properly deductible from gross revenue for purposes of determining
the market value of the gas for production tax purposes. See also34 Tax. ADMIN. CoDE § 3.15
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The troublesome cases are those that rely on transportation,
gasoline extraction, and production tax cases to hold that a value-based
royalty obligation should be calculated on some intrinsic wellhead value
even though there is no evidence that the oil or gas was in a marketable
condition at that point.' 61 For the most part, these cases first arise in
California, a jurisdiction where the oil and gas industry has developed
somewhat unique customs, practices, and lease forms and where the courts
have developed a somewhat unique body of oil and gas law. Moreover, the
earliest of these California cases ' ignore royalty history and early case law
that is on point." Instead, they cite and quote, as authority for their
property or severance approach to royalty valuation, Hammett Oil Co. v.
Gypsy Oil Co.," an old Oklahoma case that is not on poin' Thus, these
early California courts reach their conclusions based upon authority that is
not relevant to the issue and ignore (or more likely do not find) the relevant
authority. Unfortunately, courts in other jurisdictions often cite these
California cases when dealing with royalty valuation matters.'"
In Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 67 the California Supreme Court
held that a lessee was not obligated to dehydrate oil, and that when it did
so, it could charge the lessor, through royalty accounting, a proportionate
share of such costs. The lease royalty clause, not commonly encountered in
leases outside of California, required the lessee:
[T]o deliver to the Lessor on said demised premises, as
royalty hereunder, the equal one-sixth (1/6) of all petroleum
oil, asphaltum or other hydro-carbon substances produced
and saved from said demised premises by said Lessee, and
said Lessor shall have the option to take its royalty in kind,
and if it so elects, the same shall be delivered as produced

(West 1996) (allowing the deduction of certain administrative marketing costs charged by
third parties- including marketing affiliates- when calculating severance taxes).
161. See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225,239 (5th Cir.
1984) (dealing with sour unmarketable gas).
162. Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 44 P.2d 573, 576 (Cal. 1935); Vedder Petroleum
Corp., Ltd. v. Lambert Lands Co., 122 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. App. 1942).
163. See Part 1, Section III of this essay. Another early case that takes a property or
severance approach to royalty valuation is Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 563
(La. 1934). The Wall court cites no authority in support of this approach.
164. 218 P. 501,502 (Okla. 1921) (concluding that the term "oil," as commonly used in an
oil and gas lease, means "crude petroleum in its natural state" and does not include
casinghead gasoline).
165. Indeed, Oklahoma has rejected a property or severance approach to royalty
valuation. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners of the Land Office, 903
P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994); Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
166. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Terra Energy Limited, 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
167. 44 P.2d 573,578 (Cal. 1935).
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and saved into tanks or other containers maintained upon
said demised premises by said Lessee for that purpose, and
such royalty oil may be stored without charge in such tanks
or containers for a period of not to exceed thirty days, but at
said Lessor's sole risk. At said Lessor's option, Lessee will
purchase said royalty oil from said Lessor, and shall pay said
Lessor therefor the current price paid by the Lessee for oil of
like grade and gravity at the wells of production in the same
vicinity.
The lessor elected to have the lessee purchase the royalty oil for cash. The
lessee, Shell, purchased the oil on an "observed gravity-net quantity" basis
at the same posted price offered by the Standard Oil Company for oil of
similar grade and gravity.1 The lessee argued that, because the lessor had
the option to take the royalty oil in kind as extracted, the lessor was bound
"to accept its current price in the field for unprocessed oil of like gravity."
The lessor contended that the lessee had a duty to "clean" and "dry" the oil
(by actually or theoretically removing the emulsified base sediment and
water) prior to testing its gravity, thereby giving the oil a higher gravity and
higher value."6 '
The court observed that the lease did not require the lessee to either
deliver or pay for pipeline quality oil. 170 Citing HammetI, the court
concluded that royalty oil meant crude petroleum well fluid as produced
in its natural state less the free water therein, that is, the petroleum fluid
together with such water and other foreign matter as may be emulsified
therein.'7 The court then observed that "[a]ll wet oil must be... processed
before refining can take place,"" thereby leaving the erroneous impression
that wet oil was not marketable. Note, however, that the court said, "before
refining can take place," not "before marketing can take place."
In describing the manner in which the lessee had handled the crude
oil, it noted that the lessee had stored the crude oil in tanks and had drained
off the free water from the tank bottoms before testing the oil for its
gravity.'7' There is no indication that the lessee deducted the costs of these
post-wellhead activities when calculating the royalty.
Although the lessee was allowed to pay royalty on the value of oil
prior to cleaning and dehydration, the crude oil was clearly marketable in

168. Id. at 575. This "netquantity" was estimated by testing samples of the oil; however,
it could also be determined through actual dehydration. Id. at 576.
169. Id. at 575-76.
170. Id. at 576.
171. 218 P. at 502.
172. 44 P.2d at 576.
173. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 576.
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that condition. In fact, the lessee was paying the same price that the
Standard Oil Co. had posted for similar crude oil." Moreover, the court
noted that "[m]any millions of barrels of wet oil were purchased in this
and that the lessee accounted to the lessor "for the full market
manner"
176
price."
Thus, this case supports the proposition that production does not
end until the lessee has produced a first-marketable product free of cost to
the lessor. This case also supports the proposition that the lessee is not
obliged to pay royalty on the gross value of oil that is enhanced beyond the
point where it first becomes marketable. Unfortunately, however, due to the
court's use of imprecise language, this case has been erroneously cited as
authority for allowing the lessee to deduct post-wellhead costs that are
necessarily incurred to make gas into a first-marketable product."
In Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co.,17 a California
appellate court also allowed the lessee to deduct the cost of dehydrating oil.
The royalty clause provided that royalty was owed on "the value of all oil
produced and saved . . . after making customary deductions for

temperature, water and b[asel s[ediment], at the posted available market
price ...

."79 In

this case, the trial court found that the particular crude oil

pipeline purchaser would not accept oil into its pipeline until it had been
dehydrated. However, the trial court also found that the wet oil could be
sold for "twelve cents per barrel less than the price obtained from the
purchasing company after dehydration." ' 80In calculating royalty, the lessee
deducted 6t per barrel to cover the dehydration costs.'8' In other words, the
oil was marketable prior to dehydration, but the lessee chose to dehydrate
the oil and share the additional net income with the lessor. Like Alamitos,
when the facts are considered, this case supports the proposition that
production does not end until the lessee has produced a first-marketable
product free of cost to the lessor. Unfortunately, in justifying its decision,

175. Id. at 575, 577.
176. Id. at 577.
177. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
178. 122 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); accord, Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. &Trust
Co., 206 P.2d 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (adding that lessee was not barred by laches for not
charging lessor for its proportionate share of oil dehydration costs for a period of ten years
during a time when no accurate charge could have been made by the lessee).
179. 122 P.2d at 601-02.
180. Id. at 602.
181. Id. at 601.
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the court cited Hammett s2 and stated that royalty was due on "the value of
the crude oil as it was produced from the mouth of the wells. " ss
When Alamitos and Vedder are compared, the question arises: Must
the lessee account to the lessor for the value of oil or gas as a firstmarketable product or must the lessee account to the lessor for a share of
the ultimate proceeds of sale, less post-marketable-product costs? In
Alamitos, the lessee was permitted to pay royalty on the price paid for nondehydrated crude oil by third-party purchasers. In the initial Vedder
opinion, the court found that the dehydrated oil sold for 12C per barrel

182. Hammett Oil Co. v. Gypsy Oil Co., 218 P. 501 (Okla. 1921).
183. 122 P.2d at 604. A subsequent opinion concerning this same dispute, Vedder
Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 169 P.2d 435 (Cal.Ct. App. 1946), held that the lessee's
deduction of 6: per barrel was excessive. In this latter case, the court found that the lessee
had changed the classification of employees who were working on the lease from "pumpers"
or "firemen" to "dehydrator operators" with 'little change in their duties." Id. at 437.
Moreover, there was little evidence that the lessee had separately accounted for the
dehydration costs on its books or that those in charge of the field operations could accurately
and separately assess the costs of dehydration. Id. at 437-38. The lessee calculated the 6
per barrel deduction as follows:
[Tihe lessee took about 80% of all costs of its operation and production on
this lease and of its general expense in this field, including all of the
expense of heating and shipping and many other matters which would
have been necessary without dehydration, and including many items such
as taxes, repairs, and depreciation on articles which either had nothing to
do with dehydration or were only partly used therein. About 50% of the
overhead expense in the Los Angeles office, including salaries, attorney's
fees and donations, was then added to the cost of dehydration. Among
other such items was about $85,000 a year paid as salaries to the Ring
brothers, who owned all of the stock of the lessee. About these proportions
of the respective items were charged as the cost of dehydration in spite of
all of the other operations of the lessee, and without any evidence showing
what part of the expense of the various items included was properly
attributable to dehydration, as distinguished from other necessary
operations in the production and shipping of oil, including the heating of
the oil which would have been necessary in any event.
Id. at 438. The "padding" of post-production expenses by lessees when accounting for
royalties presents a serious policing problem for courts. See generallyAnderson, supranote
85.
In this subsequent opinion the court made several references to the fact that the lessee had
improperly included costs of heating the oil as an expense of dehydration, noting that
"heating would have been necessary in the absence of dehydration." 169 P.2d at 438. This
suggests that heating, a post-wellhead activity, was necessary for the oil to be a firstmarketable product and was not a deductible expense. The court also makes a similar
reference to shipping expense; however, this discussion seems to concern costs incurred in
readying the oil for shipment, not the actual transportation expense itself. Id. Accordingly,
this second opinion also supports the proposition that production does not end until a firstmarketable product has been obtained.
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more than non-dehydrated oil.'" Yet, the court and the lessee appeared to
accept the proposition that it must share the additional profit (which was
more than 6C of the 12C difference) derived from the sale of the oil after
dehydration.'" ' Could the lessee in Vedder have properly accounted to the
lessor for the value of the oil in its apparently marketable non-dehydrated
state?186 I will further address this question in my conclusion.
In the more recent case of Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 87 the
California Court of Appeals held that royalty was due on the value of crude
oil or gas in its natural state at the mouth of the well. The lessee, Atlantic
Richfield, held leases to tidal and submerged lands belonging to the State
of California. These leaseholds initially produced sweet oil and gas,
requiring "very little processing to make it marketable."'" ' The total
marketing costs were $450 per month and the lessee did not deduct this
sum when accounting to the state for royalty.' Later, the lessee discovered
sour oil and gas, containing "significant quantities of sulphur compounds,
notably hydrogen sulfide."' The facts further stated that " [slour gas cannot
be used for commercial or domestic purposes unless the sulphur compounds
are removed. " " The lessee decided to construct its own treating facilities
"ratherthan sell the sour wet gas to an independent processor at a substantial
discount."192 The cost of constructing these treating facilities was substantial
and projected to be "about 70% of the price it would receive from the sale
of the processed products." However, "the actual costs [$525,000 per
month) ... consumed a larger share, sometimes equaling or exceeding 100
percent of the sales price of the processed products.""'

184. 122 P.2d at 602.
185. Id. at 601.
186. In Haynes v. Southwest NaturalGas Co., 123 F.2d 1011,1012 (5th Cir. 1941), the lessor

was entitled to royalty on "market value at the well.' The lessee accounted to the lessor for
royalty calculated on a 6C per Mcf value, the price that the lessee paid other producers for
gas at their wells, rather than on 75t per Mcf, the price that the lessee received for the gas
in neighboring towns, less costs. Inrejecting lessors' contentions, the court held that the
price received by the lessee in neighboring towns was not relevant to the determination of
the royalty payable at the well in view of the comparable "at the well" sales made by other
producers to the lessee. This case implicitly stands for the proposition that the lessee's sole

obligation is to pay the lessor for a product's market value at the well with no obligation to
share any profits incurred from a downstream sale.
187. 262 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

188. Id.at 686.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 686-87 (emphasis added).
Id. at 687.
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Litigation ensued when the lessee sought to deduct these costs
when accounting to the state for royalties.'" In ruling for the lessee, the
court stated that "'at the well,' when used with reference to oil and gas
royalty valuation, is commonly understood to mean that the oil and gas is
to be valued in its unprocessed state as it comes to the surface at the mouth
of the well."" The court then stated that when "at the well" is used in
connection with "market price," "the rule in California [is] that unless there
is clear language to the contrary, the lessor of an oil and gas lease... bears
its proportionate share of processing costs incurred downstream of the
well."' " The court also stated that "'market price at the well' is often
determined by working back from the price at the point of sale, deducting
the cost of processing and transportation to the wellhead, to determine
'market value at the wellhead."" The court further supported its view by
concluding that the legislature must have known what "at the well" meant
when it used this phrase in establishing the royalty obligation for stateissued leases.'"
The facts of this case indicate: (1) that the sour gas could not be
"used for commercial or domestic purposes" without processing and (2) that
the lessee chose to build processing facilities "rather than sell the sour wet gas
...
at a substantial discount."'" Accordingly, this case could be viewed as
supporting the proposition that production does not end until a firstmarketable product has been obtained. A more plausible reading, however,
is that this case supports the proposition that where royalty is payable "at
the well," royalty should be calculated on the value of the raw oil and gas
as it comes from the mouth of the well. In other words, production occurs
and is completed when oil or gas is severed from the earth.
Like Piney Woods,7 ° the case on which the Atlantic Richfield court
relies, the court ignores the fact that "market price" means a real price that
actual willing buyers, not forced to buy, would pay actual willing sellers,
not forced to sell, for a real product in a real market. There is no evidence

194. The gas royalty provision specified:
[A] royalty of 15% ...on dry gas, natural gasoline, and other products
extracted and saved from the gas produced under such lease .... Such
royalties shall be paid in kind or as a percentage of the current market price
at the well of, and of any premium or bonus paid on, the production
removed or sold from the leased land.
Id.
195. Id. at 688 (citing Piney Woods Country Ufe Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 240
(5th Cir. 1984)).
196. Id. (citing Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 44 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1935)).
197. Id. (citing Siefkin, supra note 1).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 686-87.
200. 726 F.2d at 239.
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that an actual market existed for similar sour gas in that area of California.

If one did exist, the court would presumably have looked to the price paid
for comparable sour gas, rather than resort to a work-back approach.'
Thus, this case is similar to Piney Woods. However, in Atlantic Richfield, the
lessor, State of California, was responsible for both the lease and the
underlying legislation that used the phrase "at the well." Accordingly, it
was proper to construe the lease in Atlantic Richfield against the lessor,

whereas the lease in Piney Woods should have been construed against the
lessee.

Another interesting aspect of Atlantic Richfield is that it is the mirror
image of Vedder on the calculation of royalty. In Vedder, the lessee
apparently gave its lessor a proportionate share of the profits derived from
downstream marketing."2 In Atlantic Richfield, the lessee, through royalty
accounting, was allowed to pass on to the lessor a proportionate share of the
losses incurred from its downstream marketing.' In contrast, in Alamitos,
the lessee was allowed to calculate royalty on the posted price for wet oil,
rather than having to account for profits (or losses) resulting from
downstream marketing.'
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court, in HeritageResources, Inc.
v. NationsBank, followed the California approach and held that
transportation costs were properly deducted by the lessee.' While I have

201. Cf., Alamitos, 44 P.2d at 575 (indicating that royalty was paid based upon a
comparable wellhead sale); Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 122 P.2d 600,602
(Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (indicating that the lessee must share downstream profits through a
work-back accounting method). The comparable sales approach has consistently been
viewed as the preferred method of determining value for royalty purposes. See, e.g., Piney
Woods, 726 F.2d at 239; Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 604 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Tex. 1985);
Haynes v. Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1941); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 463 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613
S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298,303 (Mont. 1978).
202. 122 P.2d at 601-02.
203. 262 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
204. 44 P.2d at 575, 577.
205. 939 S.W.2d 118 (rex. 1996); accord,Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133
(Tex. 1996) (regarding compression costs-companion case to NationsBank that also deals
with division orders).
206. The court reached this holding even though the three leases at issue contained a "nodeduction" provision that the court treated as surplusage. One lease provided for royalty
to be paid:
[O]n gas... sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline
or other products therefrom, the market value at the well of 1/5 of the gas
so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be
1/5 of the amount realized from such sale, however, that there shall be no
deductions from the value of the Lessor's royalty by reason of any required
processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation or other
matter to market such gas.
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no quarrel with the deduction of transportation costs as a general rule, the
court supported its decision with sweeping generalities, including the
following: "Royalty is commonly defined as the landowner's share of
production, free of expenses of production .... Although it is not is not
subject to the costs of production, royalty is usually subject to postproduction costs, including taxes, treatment costs to render it marketable,
and transportation costs."
As further support for its decision, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that the "terms 'royalty' and 'market value at the well' have well accepted
meanings in the oil and gas industry." Yet, the court failed to specifically

939 S.W.2d at 120-21. The second lease provided that the lessor was to be paid as royalty
on:
1/4 of the market value at the well for all gas... produced from the leased
premises; provided, however, that there shall be no deductions from the
value of the Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such
gas.
Id. The third lease provided that the lessor was to be paid royalty on:
1/4 of the market. value at the well for all gas... produced from the leased
premises and sold by the Lessee or used off the leased premises ...
provided, however, that there shall be no deductions from the value of the
Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration,
compression, transportation or other matter to market such gas.
Id.
207. Id. at 122-23. This view has also been followed by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in interpreting North Dakota law, where royalties are payable on "the market value
at the well." Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995) (relying on the
North Dakota Supreme Court's application of the work-back method in determining the
value of gas for production tax purposes). The court distinguished West v. Alpar Resources,
Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980) on the ground that the lease in question required royalty
to be paid on "proceeds" with no indication that royalty was to be calculated at the
wellhead. 69 F.3d at 285.
The NationsBank court cited a federal case in support of its view that all post-wellhead
costs are deductible when calculating royalty. Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406,1410 (N.D.
Tex. 1983). Martin held that compression charges are deductible in the calculation of royalty
payable on "net proceeds at the well" and defining "at the well" as 'at the mouth of the
well"). However, the NationsBankcourt ignores language in several other Texas cases that
implies that royalty is payable on the first-marketable product. See, e.g., Winterman v.
McDonald, 102 S.W.2d 167, 173 (Tex. 1937) (stating that the "term 'free royalty' . . . must
mean that the interest... must not bear any part of the expense of the production, sale, or
delivery thereof"); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 396 S.W.2d 519,
524- 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1965, writ dism'd) (citing the Merrill view that the lessee
bears the sole costs of preparing oil and gas for market if it is unmerchantable in its natural
form and noting the "well-adjudicated and accepted legal principle that royalty interests are
not chargeable with the expenses of production, preparation, marketing, etc." but
recognizing the deductibility of transportation costs); Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250, 256
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, no writ) (noting that royalty is "free of cost of producing,
saving, and preparing for marker).
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state what those meanings are.2m In fact, an examination of prior Texas case
law reveals that the court has refused to define these words in accordance
with the oil and gas industry's view.
In Exxon Cop. v. Middleton,"9 the court rejected Exxon's argument
that "market value" of gas "produced... sold or used off the premises"
meant the market value of the production when the subject gas was first
committed to a long-term gas sales contract. Instead, the court held that this
phrase meant the current value of gas when it was actually produced and
delivered to market." The Middleton court also rejected Exxon's argument
that a sale "at the well" should be construed to include a sale within the
field?' It did so even though it had previously found no reversible error in
the decision rendered in Butler v. Exxon Corp., decided in favor of Exxon,
that "at the well" as "so understood in the industry... means gas delivery
which occurs anywhere in the vicinity of the field." 212 In Middleton, the
Texas Supreme Court rejected Butler and defined "premises," as used in the
phrase "off the premises," as "the land described in the lease agreement,"
and defined "sold at the wells" as "sold at the wells within the lease, and
not sold at the wells within the field."2" Thus, the Texas Supreme Court's
sudden reliance on the "well accepted meanings [of lease terms] in the oil
and gas industry"214 is curious for two reasons. First, the court has paid little
attention to such arguments in the past." Second, based upon Exxon's
arguments in Middleton and Butler, the phrase "market value at the well"
seems to have a different meaning in the industry (at least from Exxon's
perspective) than the definition implicitly adopted by the court."1 6

208. 939 S.W.2d at 122.
209. 613 S.W.2d 240,244-45 (Tex. 1981).
210. Id. at 245.
211. Id.at 247.
212. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. 613 S.W.2d at 244 (and disapproving that aspect of Butler which the court had
previously found contained "no reversible error").
214. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118,122 (Tex. 1996).
215. See also Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). In Vela, the gas
royalty clause granted "pay to lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where gas only is
found, while the same is being sold or used off of the premises, one-eighth of the market
price at the wells of the amount so sold or used." Id. at 868. The lessee calculated royalty in
accord with the price it received for gas resulting from its dedication of the lease acreage to
a gas sales contract in 1935 at a sales price of 2.34 per Mcf "for the life of the lease." Id. In
holding that royalty was due on current market values and not the long-term contract price,
the court rejected the lessee's argument that the royalty provision should be construed in
light of "the practicalities of the gas industry [which] require that gas be sold under longterm contracts ...

."

Id. at 870.

216. Although the decision governs the dispute of the parties, the opinion in NationsBank
has little value as precedent due to the court's deadlock on the motion for rehearing. The
original five-justice majority opinion became a one-justice opinion when Justice Enoch
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In Schroeder v. Terra Energy Limited,21 7 the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that costs incurred by the lessee in transporting, treating, and
"marketing" were deductible from royalty payable on "gross proceeds at
the wellhead." The case is noteworthy because the court likens "at the
wellhead" to selling goods "F.O.B. the seller's place of production .... 2' 8
Unfortunately, the court applies this analogy to all post wellhead expenses,
not just transportation, thereby failing to recognize that F.O.B. speaks only
to the location of goods, not their condition. In reaching its decision, the
court cited the California decision in Atlantic Richfield Co.- v. State.2 9 The
court did question why the lease did not expressly allocate such costs, but
concluded that the language used was "sufficiently unambiguous."2 ° In a
footnote,
the court noted that its construction "has the virtue of
establishing a uniform location for ascertaining the value of the gas, namely
its value at the wellhead. " ' The court commented that this was preferable
to establishing the valuation point at "whatever location . . . the gas
ultimately becomes marketable, thereby resulting in potentially different
valuations for the product of the same well." '
While other courts have probably thought likewise, this reasoning
is flawed. The marketplace can better and more consistently measure values
by establishing the point where production first becomes marketable. In
contrast, under Schroeder,courts will often be forced to establish a wellhead
valuation through use of a work-back approach. Use of the work-back
approach can lead to litigation over cost calculation and therefore, great
inconsistency. 4
At the opposite end of the spectrum are a series of cases from
Kansas and Oklahoma that purport to adopt the general principle that
royalties are due on a marketable product. While perhaps not intending to
do so, these courts seem to treat marketability as a question of law,2 rather

recused himself, Justice Phillips joined two concurring justices, and Justices Cornyn and
Spector joined the two dissenting justices in voting for rehearing. See supra note 152.
217. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
218. Id. at 892.
.219. 262 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
220. For a discussion of why lessees used this language, see my discussion in Section
I.B.2.
221. 565 N.W.2d at 897 n.5.
222. Id.

223. Id.
224. See generally, Anderson, supranote 85.
225. Two states, Wyoming and Nevada, define marketability by statute. NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 522.115(b) (Michie Supp. 1995). The Wyoming statute specifies that, in the absence
of specific contrary language:
"Royalty" means the mineral owner's share of production, free of the costs
of production. . . . "Costs of production" means all costs incurred for
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than recognizing that, in the real marketplace, marketability is necessarily
a question of fact.
For example, in Wood v. TXO Production Co., 226 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court responded to a certified question on whether compression
costs may be deducted from royalty payable "at the market price at the
well. " ' The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted the marketableproduct rulez but it summarily concluded, without considering whether
the gas was in fact unmarketable without compression, that compression
costs could not be deducted from the lessor's royalty.' In a subsequent
decision, TXO Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners of the Land
Office," the court stated: "[W]e find the post-production costs for
compression, dehydration and gathering were not chargeable to [the
lessors]."' This "finding" was based in part on the lessor-drafted royalty

exploration, development, primary or enhanced recovery and
abandonment operations including but not limited to lease acquisition,
drilling and completion, pumping or lifting, recycling, gathering,
compressing, pressurizing, heater treating, dehydrating, separating, storing
or transporting the oil to the storage tanks or the gas into the market
pipeline. "Costs of production" does not include the reasonable an actual
direct costs associated with transporting the oil from the storage tanks to
market or the gas from the point of entry into the market pipeline or the
processing of gas in a processing plant.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(vi) - (vii) (Michie 1995 Supp.). Nevada law provides that:
[AIlI costs incurred for the exploration and development of, primary or
enhanced recovery of oil or gas from, and operations associated with the
abandonment of, an oil and gas well, including the costs associated with
the:
(a) Acquisition of an oil and gas lease;
(b) Drilling and completion of a well;
(c) Pumping or lifting, recycling, gathering compressing, pressurizing,
heater treating, dehydrating, separating and storing oil or gas; and
(d) Transporting of oil to storage tanks, or gas into the pipeline for delivery.
This term does not include the reasonable and actual direct costs associated with
transporting oil from storage tanks to the market or the processing of gas in a
processing plant.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522.118 (Michie Supp. 1996).
226. 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 882. The court viewed this rule as part of the lessee's implied duty to market:
"In our view, the implied duty to market means a duty to get the product to the place of sale
in marketable form." Id.
229. Id. at 880.
230. 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994).
231. Id. at 260. The court clarified on rehearing that it was not disturbing its prior
decision in Johnson v. Jernigan,475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970), that held that lessor was to bear,
through royalty accounting, its proportionate share of "transportation costs" when the sale
of gas occurs off the premises.
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clause in question, 2 which, as interpreted by the court, required the
remittance of royalty, whether in kind or in value, to be "without cost into
the pipeline."
In addition, however, the court noted that its decision was "further
supported by and seen in this Court's approach to the implied covenant to
market... as explained in Wood... ."' Indeed, the court concluded that
"under our pronouncement in Wood the costs of compression, dehydration
and gathering are not chargeable to [lessors) ...
because such processes are
necessary to make the product marketable under the implied covenant to
market."' Again, this conclusion was reached without a factual inquiry
into the question of when the gas at issue first became a marketable
product.' In other words, the court is essentially saying that compression,
dehydration, and gathering are necessary to make gas marketable as a
matter of law.
The Kansas case of Sternbergerv. MarathonOil Co.' involved a class
action suit by lessors and overriding royalty owners under leases owned
and operated by TXO Production Company, which was merged into
Marathon Oil Company. These leases involved lands located in Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Texas. At issue were deductions for gathering line
amortization charges taken by TXO through royalty accounting. 7 The
parties stipulated that the rights of all parties should be construed in accord
with the following royalty clause found in a lease issued by Sternberger, a
member of the plaintiff class:
To pay lessor for gas of whatsoever nature or kind produced
and sold, or used off the premises, or used in the manufacture

232.

The royalty clause provided as follows:
The lessee hereby agrees to deliver or cause to be delivered to the...
[lessor], without cost into pipelines, a royalty of one-eighth (1/8) part of the
oil or gas produced from the leased premises ... , or in lieu thereof, pay to
lessor the market value thereof, as the [lessor]... may elect.
903 P.2d 260.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 263.
235. The court noted that TXO had conceded that its dehydration, compression and
gathering costs were incurred "to make the gas 'marketable." Id. at 262. The court then
stated: "Under these concessions alone we could hold that the processes were not chargeable

to [lessors] ...because those processes were necessary for TXO to obtain a "marketable
product." ... Yet, we deem it instructive to discuss dehydration and gathering separately

to determine whether such costs are chargeable to [lessors]...' Id. The court then concluded
that "dehydration' was not "chargeable against [lessors] . . . under Wood," and that
"gathering" was "not a deductible expense under the teaching of Wood." Id. at 262-63.
236. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
237. Initially, the class sought to also include TXO leases in Colorado, Louisiana, and
Utah.
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of any products therefrom, one-eighth (1/8) at the market
price at the well, (but as to gas sold by lessee, in no event
more than one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds received by lessee
from such sales), for the gas sold, used off thepremises, or in
the manufacture of products therefrom ....
Apparently, the parties also stipulated that the class action should
be resolved based upon the manner in which the gas extracted from the
Sternberger leasehold was marketed. The Sternberger gas was sold to a
purchaser after transporting it through a transmission pipeline.2 9 In dispute
was a 12t per Mcf "gathering" charge that the lessee deducted to recover
the costs of the gathering system the lessee had constructed at its own
expense.24 The court took note of what were apparently stipulated facts or
fact findings that "[t]here was no market for the gas at the wellhead" and
that "[h]istorically, about 85% of all gas purchasers paid the cost and built
the lines necessary to gather and transport the gas to market." 241
Citing prior Kansas case law, the court concluded that "the lessor
must bear a proportionate share of the expenses of transporting the gas or
oil to a distant market" where royalty is payable "at the well."24 In reaching

238. 894 P.2d at 792.
239. Id. TXO sold the gas downstream and made arrangements with a pipeline company
to transport the gas for delivery to the purchaser. The pipeline company charged the lessee
a transportation fee. In calculating royalty, the lessee deducted a proportionate share of the
pipeline transmission fee. This deduction was not disputed by the plaintiff class. Id.
240. Id. The amount of this deduction was determined by amortizing the cost of the line
over 12 months. However, the pipeline company discounted its transportation charge by an
average of 12€ per Mcf "[i]n exchange for [lessee] laying the [gathering] pipeline to connect
the wells to the [pipeline company's] transmission system." Id. at 793. The transmission
pipeline charges deducted from royalty continued to reflect this 12t per Mcf transmission
discount after the gathering system was fully amortized. Without explanation, the court
stated that the lessee had "recovered 12% of its cost in constructing the line from... royalty
interest[s] connected with that line." Id.
In some of the other instances, TXO's amortization charge was designed to be recovered
over the life of the lease. Id. In still other instances, the gathering line was so small that the
accounting system necessary to justify the amortization deductions was considered too
costly to set up. Id. Finally, when TXO was merged into Marathon Oil Company in 1990, all
deductions ceased because "the Marathon accounting system was incapable of making
deductions." Id. From this latter statement, there apparently is no universal custom and
practice to deduct gathering line costs in royalty accounting.
241. Id. at 792.
242. Id. at 796 (relying on Molter v. Lewis, 134 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1943); Voshell v. Indian
Territory Illuminating Co., 19 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1933); Scott v. Steinberger, 213 P. 646 (Kan.
1923)). The court also relied on Matzen v. Hugoton ProductionCo., 321 P.2d 576 (Kan. 1958),
noting that the Matzen court agreed with the parties that "the lessee's duty to find a market
... did not extend to providing a gathering system to transport and process the gas off the
leases at a large capital outlay with attending financial hazards in order to obtain a market
at which the gas might be sold." Id. at 578, quoted in 894 P.2d at 797.
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its decision, the court distinguished prior cases wherein Kansas courts had
denied deductions from royalty for compression' and certain administrative and management expenses incurred in marketing gas." The court
emphasized that compression and administrative costs are simply
marketing costs that the lessee must absorb without charge to the lessor.2*
Later, however, the court noted that there was "no evidence... that the gas
was not marketable at the mouth of the well other than the lack of a
purchaser at that location."'
Thus, in Kansas, compression, a means by which gas is moved
through gathering and transmission lines," 7 is not deductible essentially as
a matter of law, but other gathering costs are deductible.2' In Oklahoma,
compression, dehydration, and gathering are not deductible essentially as
a matter of law. These cases are wide of the mark because they fail to
recognize that marketability is necessarily a question of fact in a free market
economy. Willing sellers and willing buyers, not courts, should determine
whether a particular commodity is marketable. Moreover, distinguishing
compression, which is ordinarily part of the transportation function, as a
separate expense that the lessee must absorb seems to be little more than a

The court later reiterated that "Scott, Voshell, Molter, and Matzen all stand for the
proposition that reasonable transportation expenses are shared by the lessor and the lessee
where royalties are paid (in oil or gas or money) 'at the weli' but there is no market at the
well." 894 P.2d at 797. The court noted that a federal court in Kansas allowed a lessee to
recover from royalty the lessor's proportionate share of a "long and costly gathering system
to transport gas to the nearest commercial market.' Id. (quoting Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Staats, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 571, 575 (D. Kan. 1967)).
243. Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., 394 P.2d I (Kan. 1964); Gilmore v. Superior Oil
Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
244. Sterling v. Marathon Oil Co., 576 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1978).
245. 894 P.2d at 798.
246, Id.at 799. The court distinguished Prayv. PremierPetroleum Inc., 662 P.2d 255 (Kan.
1983), wherein the court held that the expenses of building a pipeline were treated as part
of the costs of drilling and equipping a well (as opposed to day-to-day operating expenses)
for the purpose of determining whether a lease was producing "in paying quantities."
Although the court acknowledged that allowing a lessee to deduct pipeline costs from
royalty appeared as though the court was letting "the lessee have its cake and eat it too, it
has a valid public purpose of encouraging maximum use of the oil and gas by keeping lowproducing and stripper wells producing." 894 P.2d at 799.
247. Compression can be used to provide a vacuum to lift gas from a wellbore. When
used for this purpose, the lessee must absorb all compression costs without charge to the
lessor. Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
248. A similar view is implicit in Skaggs v. Heard,172 F. Supp. 813, 815 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
In Skaggs, the court held that compression costs incurred to force gas into a pipeline
connection on the leased premises were not deductible. The court reasoned that, based upon
a construction of the entire lease and upon the conduct of the parties, "at the well," the point
where royalty on the "amount received" by the lessee was payable, meant on the leased
premises.
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Solomon approach to allocating post-wellhead costs. A more logical
approach is that compression necessary to move gas away from the well, as
opposed to compression necessary to pull gas up the wellbore, should be
deductible as part of any transportation cost that is otherwise deductible.
D. The Forest Revisited: Garman
A third view, which comes closest to the proper view of the issue
of post-wellhead costs, is Garman v. Conoco, Inc.2"9 In Garman, the Colorado
Supreme Court answered a certified question as follows:
In our view the implied covenant to market obligates the
lessee to incur those post-production costs necessary to place
[Rjoyalty interest
gas in a condition acceptable for market ....
owners are not obligated to share in these costs ....Our
answer is limited to those post-production costs required to
transform raw gas into a marketable product ....Upon
obtaining a marketable product, any additional costs incurred
to enhance the value of the marketable gas . . . may be
charged against the nonworking interest owners. To the
extent that certain processing costs enhance the value of an
already marketable product the burden should be placed
upon the lessee to show that such costs are reasonable, and
that actual royalty revenues increase in proportion with the
costs assessed against the nonworking interest ....[Olur
answer ... is that, absent an assignment provision to the
contrary,.. . royalty interest owners are not obligated to bear
any share of post-production expenses ...undertaken to
transform raw gas produced at the surface into a marketable
product.?
In this case, the court rejected Conoco's argument that all "costs
incurred after gas is severed from the ground and reduced to possession
should be borne proportionately by royalty, overriding royalty, and
working interest owners." z1 The court also addressed Conoco's argument
that it was comnon industry custom and practice to deduct the costs at
issue.' 2 The court responded that before a royalty owner "could be bound
249.

886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).

250. Id. at 659-62. The interest at issue was actually an overriding royalty carved from
the working interest in a federal oil and gas lease. The exact language of the overriding
royalty interest was not set forth in the opinion.
251. Id. at 656.
252. The opinion specifically mentions compression, transportation, and processing. Id.
at 661. By transportation, the court was referring to gathering the gas for delivery to the
lessee's processing plant. Id. at 655. By processing, the court was referring to a plant
operated by the lessee for the extraction of by-products, not the treating of sour gas. Id. The
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by industry custom, 'he must know of it or it must be so universal and wellestablished that he is presumed to have knowledge of its existence."''
Although the general principles enunciated in Garman are sound,
there are a few problems. First, Garman dealt with an overriding royalty
carved from a federal oil and gas lease. The court could have more
narrowly decided that the reservation of a non-specific overriding royalty
provision' should be construed consistent with the royalty provision in the
underlying federal oil and gas lease, under which some of the costs at issue
would not have been deductible.' Moreover, the court rules, with little
discussion, that the implied covenant to market should apply to overriding
royalty interests in the same manner as to lessor's royalty interest.' Further
discussion of the fact that overriding royalties were at issue in Garman is
beyond the scope of this essay because I have limited my discussion to fee
lease royalty clauses.
Second, although the court recognized that the royalty clause may
expressly override the general first-marketable product rule, 7 the majority
opinion did not rely on, nor even quote, the precise language of the
overriding royalty reservation or quote the royalty clause from the
underlying lease. Rather, the court relies on the implied covenant to market
as the cornerstone of its opinion, but in so doing, the court cites the late
Professor Kuntz, not the late Professor Merrill.' While Professor Merrill
reached the first-marketable product view through the implied covenant to
market,' Professor Kuntz did not. Professor Kuntz concluded that the
lessee is obligated to produce a first-marketable product based upon the
plain meaning of "production" and "produced" as used in an oil and gas
lease.m Under Professor Kuntz's view, it is essential to consider the express
language of the royalty clause.2'

lessors conceded that the lessee could deduct the reasonable cost of transporting the gas
from the tailgate of the plant to the point of sale. Id. n.8.
253. Id. at 660 (citing Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379,1384-85 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1986)). Observe that the Sternberger court noted that Marathon Oil Company, the
successor in interest to TXO, did not have a practice of deducting such costs. Sternberger v.
Marathon Oil Co. 894 P.2d 788, 793 (Kan. 1995).
254. The majority opinion does not expressly quote the royalty provision; however, the
concurring opinion states that the override was payable on "all oil, gas and casinghead gas
produced ...

.

886 P.2d at 661- 62.

255. Federal oil and gas leases are beyond the scope of this essay.
256. 886 P.2d at 659-60.
257. Id. at 661.
258. Id. at 657 n.12, 659, and 661 n.27.
259. MERRILL, supra note 5,§ 85.
260. 3 KUNTZ, supra note in1; § 40.5.
261. Id.
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Third, the court stated that "[tothe extent that certain processing
costs enhance the value of an already marketable product the burden
should be placed upon the lessee to show that such costs are reasonable,
and that actual royalty revenues increase in proportionwith the costs assessed
against the nonworking interest."' What does this mean? If the product is
already truly marketable, then its value should be known and royalty
should be due on that basis. The court is suggesting a work-back approach
when none should be necessary, unless the court is implying that the lessee
must share with the lessor any additional downstream profits derived from
its enhancement of an already marketable product. In other words, does the
court mean that the lessee must pay the lessor royalty on the greater of the
value of the gas in its first-marketable condition or on proceeds received
less post-marketable costs? Case law on this question is mixed.
26 the court held that a lessee fulfills its
In Rains v. Kentucky Oil Co.,
duty to market "if he sells the gas at a reasonable price at the well side."'
In other words, the lessee does not have a duty to transport marketable gas
to a distant market to obtain a higher price. In Warfield NaturalGas Co. v.
Allen,' the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed the lessee to calculate the
royalty at 1/8 of 12c, "the maximum price paid for gas in the field," even
though it apparently sold the gas away from the field at a higher price.'
However, in Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier the lessee transported
the gas for sale and distribution to end users for 10€/Mcf, incurring
transportation and distribution costs of 3.5c/Mcf. The Arkansas Supreme
Court concluded that royalty was owed on the difference, 6.5c, rejecting the
lessee's argument that royalty was owed on 2.5c, the apparent price of gas
in the field.2
Most courts, however, state that the best evidence of royalty value
is a comparable sale of gas at the well.' Where the preferred comparable-

262.
263.
264.
265.

886 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added).
255 S.W. 121 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923).
Id.
88 S.W.2d 989 (Ky. 1935).

266. Id.
267. 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924).
268. See also Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lampbert Lands Co., 122 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct. App.
1942); cf., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(implying, based upon the fact that downstream costs sometimes exceed total gas revenues,
that lessors may be entitled to no royalty in such instances). If so, query whether lessees can
carry forward such losses and deduct them from royalty due on future profitable
production.
269. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 463 P. Supp. 619 (N.D. Okla.
1978) (stating that, optimally, market value should be determined by examining comparable
sales of the same product, even though the court resorted to the work-back or net-value
approach).
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sales approach is used, royalty would not be owed on any downstream
profits that a particular lessee might incur. By the same token, however, if
the lessee's downstream sale happens to be less profitable than a sale in the
field, presumably the lessee would be obliged to pay royalty on the value
of the gas in the field using the preferred comparable-sales approach.'
Fourth, the Garman court's reliance on the implied covenant to
market leads it to suggest a whole new issue for possible future litigation.
Can the implied covenant to market "be limited when compliance would
be uneconomical or unreasonable"?' Does this simply mean that the lessee
has no duty to market gas if the day-to-day operating and marketing costs
exceed the revenues derived? If so, then the court should have stated that
the lessee has no duty to continue to market gas if it cannot be produced
and marketed "in paying quantities." m On the other hand, does this mean
that the lessee may start charging the lessor for post-wellhead costs if such
costs exceed revenues? If so, then new issues arise. For example, how are
the costs and revenues used to determine the economics of marketing to be
calculated? Well by well? Lease by lease? Field by field? Lessee by lessee?
What are the relevant costs? Downhole costs? Lifting costs? Or are these
costs confined to post-wellhead, post-lease, or post-field costs? What
elements go into the cost calculation? Overhead? Interest? Depreciation?
Rate of return?
Fifth, the court's concluding paragraph is a bit confusing. The court
states that "overriding royalty owners are not obligated to bear any share
of post-production expenses, such as compressing, transporting and
processing, undertaken to transform raw gas produced at the surface into
a marketable product."' If read out of context with the preceding
paragraph, quoted above, this statement could be construed as a conclusion
of law regarding compression, gathering and processing. Again, the
question of when gas first becomes marketable should be a question of fact,
not law.2 4

270. 1will comment further on this matter in my conclusion, infra Section IIl
271. 463 F. Supp. at 660.
272. Courts have long held that lessees have no duty to market gas at a loss. See, e.g.,
Jams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 45 A. 54 (Pa. 1899).
273. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652,661 (Colo. 1994).
274. See, e.g. Order of Judge Timothy A. Patalan at 5, Parry v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
September 3,1996 (denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because the issues of
whether certain post-wellhead activities are necessary to make a product marketable are
questions of fact).
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E. "Net Proceeds," "Proceeds" and "Gross Proceeds" Trees: Are They
Different Species?

One of the more difficult royalty construction problems concerns
the distinction, if any, between royalty due on "net proceeds," "proceeds,"
and "gross proceeds." Although it may seem reasonable to argue that "net

proceeds" means that the lessee can deduct all costs of producing gas,
including the day-to-day cost of operating the well and perhaps drilling and
completion costs, no court has so ruled in the context of a lease "royalty"
provision.27

In Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co.,' a lease royalty of 12.5% was
payable on "the net returns from the sales of all petroleum, asphaltum, oil,
and other minerals which may be discovered, produced, and saved from
said land. " 'n The lessors also had, but did not exercise, the option to take
their royalty in kind. The only issue in the case concerned the deductibility of production taxes.tm Finding that the word "'net' showed an

275. But see Poterie Gas Co. v. Poterie, 36 A. 232 (Pa. 1897). Here the lease made no
express reference to "royalty." Rather, the lessor retained "one-third of all the profits realized
from oil or gas found on said" leased premises. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). The court
affirmed the master's findings that the lessor was not entitled to receive one-third of the
gross profits, but was rather entitled to one-third of the net profits, if any, after deducting
the costs of drilling, completing, and marketing the gas production. Id. at 236. The court
expressly rejected the lessor's argument that the expense of drilling the gas well should be
excluded in calculating any net profit. Id. In so ruling, the court relied on the common
definition of "profit" in commercial dealings: "that gain made by a sale of produce or
manufacture, after deducting the value of the labor, materials, rents, and all expenses,
together with the interest of the capital employed." Thus, in this early case, a lessor's
retained interest was found to be a net-profits interest, not a cost-free interest in severed gas.
Although there is no indication that the fraction reserved influenced the court's decision,
query whether the court would have reached the same conclusion if the fraction had been
1/8, rather than 1/3.
In Texas Sulphur Co. v. GuarantyB. & T. Co., 4 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1925), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals defined royalty as "[a) share of the product or profits reserved by the
owner for permitting another to use or develop his property."
276. 269 P. 43 (Wyo. 1928).
277. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
278. Id.
279. Many cases have considered the issue of whether taxes are deductible from royalty.
These cases are largely beyond the scope of this essay because, for the most part, they turn
on an interpretation of the applicable taxation statute and not solely on the royalty clause.
A few cases, however, do turn on specific lease language. If the lease specifically provides
that royalties are to be paid free of any tax deduction, the courts generally give such
language effect. See, e.g., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, 871 S.W.2d 842
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that lessee was required to pay
lessor's share of windfall profits tax where lease specifically provided that lessee was to
absorb "all taxes of every kind"). Accord, Santa Fe Energy Co. v. Baxter, 783 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1989, writ denied); cf., Exxon Corp. v. Long Beach, 812 F.2d 1256
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intention to deduct something from the 'gross' returns,"' ° and noting the
lessor's option to take in kind, the court held that the lessor was liable for
its proportionate share of production taxes.'
Generally, courts have historically tended to construe all royalty
clauses as being payable on some gross sum, rather than on net profits, but
not necessarily on total gross proceeds. For example, where gas royalty was
payable "at the rate of one-eighth of income dollars per year," the court
held that "income" meant "gross income" not net profits.3 2 In Upham v.
Ladd,1 3 royalty was due on "proceeds" and the dispute was over the
deductibility of pipeline transportation costs to move gas into another
county. The court held that the clause presented a prima facie question as
to whether such costs could be deducted, noting that the precise meaning
of the clause must be construed at trial "in the light of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the parties when it was made."" In Hanna Oil
& Gas Co. v. Taylor," the court found that "proceeds," for royalty purposes,
generally means total proceeds and held that the lessee could not deduct
compression costs.
In West v. Alpar,2' the North Dakota Supreme Court construed a
royalty clause calling for royalty due on "proceeds from the sale of gas."
The court construed the clause against the lessee and held that royalty must
be paid without deducting the costs of treating the gas for the removal of
hydrogen sulfide or "any other cost ....
,27 In contrast, in Roye Realty &
Developing, Inc. v. Watson,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
royalties were not owed on "take or pay" settlements under a gross
proceeds royalty clause; however, that decision turned on the court's

(9th Cir. 1987); Tenneco West, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 756 F.2d 769 (10th Cir.1985) (both
characterizing the windfall profits tax as a tax on incremental value and not a severance tax
where leases provided that lessee was to pay all severance taxes).
280. 269 P. at 45.
281. Id.
282. Busbey v. Russell, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 12,17,10 Ohio C. D. 23 (Ohio 1899).
283. 95 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. 1936).
284. Id. at 366.
285. 759 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Ark. 1988).
286. 298 N.W.2d 484, 491 (N.D. 1980).
287. Id. However, in Sondrol v.Placid Oil Co., 23 F.3d 1341 (8th Cir. 1994), the court
distinguished West where royalty was to be paid on "proceeds received." Here the lessee sold
gas to a third-party processor who processed the gas and resold it to a pipeline-utility. The
processor paid the lessee 75% of the proceeds received on resale to the pipeline-utility, less
processing and fuel fees. The lessee paid royalty on this net amount. The court held that
royalty was properly paid. Note that the unprocessed gas was marketed to a third party and
the lessee paid royalty on the total amount that it received from the third party.
288. No. 76,848 (Okla. Sept. 10, 1996) (distinguishing the "amount realized" clauses in
Frey and Klein and holding that "a royalty owner, absent clear language to the contrary in
the lease, is not entitled to share in take-or-pay settlements").
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conclusion that royalty was owed only on actual production. 9 And in
Schroeder v. Terra Energy Limited, the court held that the lessee could deduct
post-production costs where royalty was payable on "the gross proceeds at
the wellhead."m
In Martin v. Glassj where royalty was payable on "net proceeds
at the well," the court allowed the lessee to deduct compression as a
marketing cost, but the court stated in dicta that royalty was nevertheless
a cost-free interest in production.' On the other hand, in Gilmore v.Superior
Oil Co.,M royalty was payable on the "net proceeds at the mouth of the
well." Here the court refused to allow the lessee to deduct compression
costs, stating that the lessee must bear the expense of preparing the gas for
market.2" Martin and Gilmore reflect two distinct views on when production
ends: Martin stands for the proposition that production ends when the oil
or gas is extracted from the earth, while Gilmore stands for the proposition
that production implicitly requires marketing.2 Neither case turns on the

289. Id., slip op. at 16-17.
290. 765 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
291. 571 F. Supp. 1406,1410 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
292. Cf., Skaggs v. Heard, 172 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Tex. 1959). In Skaggs, royalty was due
on the "amount received... at the well." Id. at 815. The court stated that this meant that the
lessee was obligated to pay royalty on "proceeds." Id. at 817. The court held that the lessee
could not deduct costs of an on-lease compressor used to deliver gas into the purchaser's
pipeline because the meaning of "at the well," as determined by construction of the entire
lease and by the conduct of the parties, meant on the lease. Id.
See also O'Neal v. Union Prod. Co., 153 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1946) (holding that, under
royalty based upon "net proceeds at prevailing market price at well," lessor was not entitled
to royalty on the value of extracted gasoline). Cf., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1946) (involving a royalty accounting dispute where the lessor conceded that
costs incurred in extracting gasoline at a central processing facility were deductible where
royalty was due on the "net proceeds at the mouth of the well").
293. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
294. See also Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1,5 (Kan. 1964).
295. The duty to absorb all marketing costs, however, does not include a duty to absorb
all transportation costs. In Johnson v. Jernigan,475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970), gas was sold
several miles away from the wellhead and royalty was due on "gross proceeds at the
prevailing market rate." The court concluded that the lessee was obligated to produce the
gas and make it available for market in the vicinity of the well, but the lessee was not
required to absorb all costs of transportation to a distant market. See also Sternberger v.
Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that compression costs are not
deductible, but holding that lessee could deduct gathering costs where royalty was due on
"market price at the well" but not "more than one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds received by
lessee... "); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Staats, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 571, 576 (D. Kan. 1967)
(dealing with various 'proceeds" and "gross proceeds" clauses and holding that lessee was
not liable to account to lessors for payments received from gas purchaser as compensation
for delivering the gas to the purchaser through its own 153-mile pipeline); LaFitte Co. v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 284 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding that royalty due on "gross income
received by the lessee" nevertheless assumed that the gas would be sold near the well).
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specific lease language.
In the absence of clarifying language, it is respectfully submitted
that courts should not make distinctions between "net proceeds,"
"proceeds," and "gross proceeds" clauses. Each should be construed as
meaning the total amount realized from the sale of gas as a first-marketable
product. Moreover, courts should presume that the parties reasonably
expect that the proceeds are to be derived from a sale of marketable gas in
the vicinity of the well and not at some distant market.2' In other words,
without clarifying language, these terms should not be viewed as having
any meaning other than restating the common royalty obligation.
iI. THE ECONOMIST PONDERS THE FOREST1"
To an economist, royalty is simply a form of payment to a lessor.
But why does it exist, and why is it most commonly expressed as a cost-free
interest in production? While custom may provide part of the answer,
custom does not explain its origin or its persistence as a material part of the
consideration for a lease in addition to the lease bonus. The answer is:
because of uncertainty. Leases are most often acquired before oil and gas
are discovered on property. Commonly, at the time of lease acquisition, the
parties are uncertain about the presence of oil or gas beneath the property,
and if present, about the cost of developing the property, and about the
long-term value of the reserves. Given this uncertainty, prospective lessees
cannot calculate the pure rent that may accrue -what competing bidders
would be willing to pay for the lease. Generally, the prospective lessor has
even less knowledge than the prospective lessee and is fearful that the
prospective lessee has better knowledge about the potential of the property.
Under these circumstances, the prospective lessor is not willing to accept
only a lump-sum bonus for development rights because of the fear of being
cheated.' The reserved royalty is the commonly selected means for sharing
these uncertainties.
Although economists recognize the importance of royalty as a
means of addressing uncertainty, looked at ex post, the royalty arrangement
appears inefficient in that it acts as an excise tax. Royalty and production
taxes contribute to early abandonment of a field and a lower ultimate
296. See, e.g., Scott v. Steinberger, 213 P. 646 (Kan. 1923).
297. I have developed this portion of the essay based upon a correspondence and
telephone conversations with Dr. Stephen L McDonald, Professor Emeritus, The University
of Texas at Austin, one of the nation's leading authorities on petroleum economics. I express
my deepest appreciation for his mentoring.
298. The lessor would, however, insist on an up-front bonus payment (perhaps
supplemented by annual rentals) that is sufficient to compensate for being unable to lease
the acreage to others during the primary term of the lease and as compensation for the
exploration right.
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recovery (i.e., underground waste), and oil and gas production is commonly
burdened by both royalty and production taxes. Specifically, as gross
burdens, they can force a lessee to shut in or to plug and abandon a well
that would still be capable of production in paying quantities, but for
royalty and tax burdens. For this reason, as a matter of public policy,
perhaps the royalty obligation should be narrowly construed.2 An up-front
lump-sum payment, discounted to the same present value, would have
been more efficient because, as a sunk cost, it would not lessen ultimate
recovery.
Nevertheless, looked at ex ante, the royalty arrangement is quite
rational and perhaps the most efficient contract that can be made. Without
royalty, many lessors would refuse to lease, and those that did lease
without retaining a royalty would demand higher bonus payments,
meaning that more capital would be invested in leases that would prove to
be unproductive and that less capital would be available for exploration,
drilling and development. Hence, fewer discoveries would be made, and
more underground waste would occur. Moreover, if royalty was highly
inefficient, one would expect the overriding royalty, often negotiated by

299. If courts are to adopt this approach, however, they should be honest enough to say
so directly. Most courts state that they construe lease provisions against the lessee because
they typically propose the form. See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Ufe Sch, v. Shell Oil Co., 726
F.2d 225,235 (5th Cir. 1984).
Recall that in Sternberger,894 P.2d 788, the court allowed the lessee to deduct gathering
costs in calculating royalty. In reaching this decision, the court distinguished Prayv. Premier
Petroleum Inc., 662 P.2d 255 (Kan. 1983), a case concerning whether a lease was producing in
"paying quantities." In Pray, the court held that for "paying quantities" purposes the
expense incurred in building a pipeline should be treated the same as the costs of drilling
and equipping a well (not as day-to-day operating expense). In Sternberger, the court
acknowledged that allowing a lessee to deduct gathering costs from royalty appeared as
though the court was letting 'the lessee have its cake and eat it too .... " 894 P.2d at 799. The
court, however, concluded that this distinction serves the valid public purpose of
encouraging maximum use of the oil and gas by maintaining the production of marginal and
stripper wells. Id.
I agree that a valid public purpose is served. Moreover, the test for whether a lease is
producing in "paying quantities" is for the purpose of determining whether or not the lease
has terminated. Giving the lessee the benefit of the doubt in a "paying quantities case is
appropriate in light of the consequences of lease termination and the abandonment of a
producing well. Royalty obligations are not subject to a "paying quantities" test. Royalty is
due on all production, whether paying or not.
Surely, for example, a lessor should be entitled to claim royalties on any oil or gas
produced, whether or not production was in paying quantities. If this were not so, on the
ground that the lease had expired, then a lessee who, in good faith, produced in non-paying
quantities would be liable in conversion for net profits, and there would be no net profits!
Thus, courts should draw a distinction between production in 'paying quantities" and
production for "royalty purposes."
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two sophisticated parties, to pass-into the pages of oil and gas history. Thus,
on balance, royalty should be regarded as efficient.'
The lessor would balk at alternatives, such as a net-profits interest,
because the typical lessor has little, if any, knowledge about oil and gas
operations and no control over the efficiency with which development and
extraction are carried out by the lessee. Moreover, it is much easier for the
lessor to monitor how much is extracted and its sales price than it is to
monitor the full accounts of the lessee to assure that "net income" is
appropriately measured and fully reported. Thus, most lessors would want
to avoid allowing the lessee to make any type of work-back or net-profits
calculation. Whether the costs are down-hole or downstream from the
wellhead, any work-back that is not objectively and easily determined (such
as the deduction of state or local production taxes) should be troublesome
to the typical lessor. Thus, a gross royalty burden is favored to address the
uncertainties inherent in oil and gas exploration and production.
If no oil or gas is discovered during the primary term of the lease,
the lessee's costs are limited to lease bonus, rentals, and any exploration
costs. Of course, mere exploration may provide the lessee with some
valuable information, such as useful seismic data, that may be sold or used
in the future. Meanwhile, however, the landowner has received
compensation for the loss of alternative income.
If oil or gas is discovered, the landowner is entitled to share in the
value of the discovery, either in cash or in kind, based on a contractual
fraction or percentage of the resulting production. The lessee must derive
any profit from the remainder. While the actual profit may greatly exceed
what is necessary to yield the minimum acceptable rate of return on the
development investment, it must, at the outset, have the potential to be at
least that large. Otherwise, the lease bargain would never be consummated
in the first place.
Because royalty is a share of the product or its value, both the lessor
and the lessee share a price risk.' They take other risks as well, but the
risks are not the same. When the lease is issued, the lessor risks the possible

30. Where both the prospective lessor and lessee have more reliable information,
however, a lump sum payment or net-profits arrangement may be feasible and more
efficient. For example, if a discovery has been made in the vicinity, both parties may be able
to determine, with reasonable certainty, the value of the property for oil and gas
exploitation. Under these circumstances, the parties might agree on a larger bonus and a
smaller royalty or a net-profits sharing arrangement. A large and wealthy land-owner can
employ consulting geologists, petroleum engineers, accountants and drilling contractors to
acquire information needed to bargain more equally with prospective lessees.
301. Of course, depending on the lease language and the jurisdiction, the price risk that
is shared is not necessarily identical for the lessor and the lessee. See discussion supra,
Section L.A.
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loss of the property's speculative value for oil and gas development. If the
lessee drills several dry holes on the property and discovers no oil or gas,
the property's future lease bonus value declines. The lessor, who owns the
surface of the leasehold, also risks the possible discovery of small reserves
that, over time, will generate insufficient royalty income to offset the loss of
income and loss of value resulting from the lessee's surface use and
occupancy. Even a severed mineral owner may suffer a loss of income
resulting from the lessee's prior right to the quiet enjoyment of its oil and
gas operations in the face of another prospective lessee who wishes to mine
coal. The lessor also risks the possibility of legal expense because the lessee
or assignee who develops the premises may be a negligent or dishonest
operator. Nevertheless, the landowner makes no out-of-pocket expenditures
that directly relate to the development of the property, and, as a practical
matter, these risks are necessary if the possible bounty of large oil and gas
reserves is ever to be realized.
While the lessor's potential royalty income depends on whether the
lessee is able to produce oil or gas in paying quantities, the fraction or
percentage of royalty does not rise in proportion if the lessee's profits are
greater than what the lessee anticipated when the lease was acquired' If
the lessee is forced to abandon the lease due to its own inefficiency, rather
than due to a price decline, the landowner can enter into a new lease with
a different lessee. Thus, the lessor suffers no permanent loss because the
underground asset that could be profitably extracted by an efficient
operator is still there. Although the lessor also risks a potential decline in
the value of each unit of production, this risk could be eliminated by selling
the royalty interest at a time when prices are high. In doing so, however, the
lessor then takes a risk that prices will rise even higher.
Although unanticipated events may arise, the lessee controls, vis-&vis the lessor, development outlays and hence the production costs
associated with the intensity of development. The lessee bears the burden
of drilling, completion, operating, and production losses, but enjoys the
benefit of exceptional profits if large reserves are discovered. And the lessee
risks the possibility of unanticipated legal expense brought on by
unwarranted litigation commenced by the lessor. But what about marketing
risks?
For example, suppose the lessee discovers a large reserve of sour
gas that has to be sweetened to pipeline quality before buyers will purchase
it. If the gas is sweetened, it will have no greater value to a buyer than gas
that is naturally sweet when extracted from the ground if a nearby property
happens to have reserves of sweet gas for sale. Accordingly, the wellhead

302. An exception might be where the lessor reserves a sliding scale royalty that
increases in fraction or percentage with the volume of production.
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value of sour gas is less than naturally sweet gas by the cost of sweetening.
If royalty were owed only on the value of the sour gas at the wellhead, the
lessee would not incur additional royalty expense by electing to sweeten the
gas. Thus, the lessee would be proportionately better off with this lesser
royalty obligation than if royalty were owed on sweetened gas.
Nevertheless, suppose that the lessee decided against development
on the grounds of prospective unprofitability and abandoned the lease. The
lessor could then issue a new lease. However, unless a new lessee could
either extract the gas or sweeten it at a lower cost than the original lessee,
the value of the sour gas to the new lessee would be the same as to the old
lessee. In other words, a new lessee would not accept a lower rate of return
on extraction of the gas and on construction and operation of a treating
plant than the original lessee. Thus, the landowner would receive no bids
if the winning lessee had to pay the same royalty rate on the same base. The
only way for the lessor to realize any income from the sour gas reserves
would be to accept a lower royalty rate-which he might have negotiated
with the original lessee. Presumably, a single lessor would do this if he
could be compensated for the loss of alternative income. With multiple
lessors, however, transaction costs and strategic behavior would most likely
prevent such a deal.
If the original lease contract had specified a royalty payable at the
point of sale by the lessee, in this case, after sweetening, the likelihood of
lease abandonment would be even greater. And in the pursuit of a new
lessee, the lessor would have to either lower the royalty rate even more to
realize any income from the sour gas reserves or move the royalty valuation
point to the wellhead.
But now suppose that, in bidding for the original lease and before
any discovery was made, prospective lessees made allowance for the
possibility that sour gas might be discovered based upon their experience
in the region. In that case, the bonus bid or royalty rate or both would
already have been adjusted downward to reflect the likelihood of
sweetening costs. Thus, in either case, a portion of the cost of sweetening
will fall on the lessor.
If the terms of royalty valuation have not been clearly specified in
the royalty clause, litigation is likely and the cost of sweetening will fall on
the losing party. This failure to clarify the royalty provision can be
compounded by the additional failure to specify rights and procedures in
the event of a disagreement. The task then falls on the courts to resolve this
dispute through externally defined rules. At the outset, however, it is likely
that the lessee has the upper hand. So long as production continues, lessors
generally have no right to terminate or suspend leases. And lessees,
however, generally have more technical knowledge than lessors, more
knowledge of costs and their nature, and more financial resources to hire
experts and lawyers. In any event, the question is whether there are any
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principles of economics available to guide the courts in resolving the
dispute.
A possible starting point is the proposition stated at the outset: that
royalty arises out of uncertainty at the time of leasing. Royalty is an attempt
to share the burden of uncertainty. Without royalty, lessors would not lease
and fewer oil and gas deposits would be pursued, discovered, and
developed for the benefit of the parties and for society as a whole. Thus, in
a dispute involving uncertainty as to the meaning of a contract provision,
the principle of sharing in uncertainties might be extended. For example, if
neither party foresaw the possibility that sour gas would be discovered and
thus failed to address this possibility in the contract, perhaps the two parties
should share the burden of these unforeseen costs so that the sour gas
reserves will not be abandoned by the lessee. To be feasible, the burden on
the lessee must not be so great as to force the rate of return on the
incremental investment below a reasonable one. And the burden on the
lessor must not be so great that the return realized by the lessor is below the
level of compensation obtainable for alternative uses of the property. If a
solution within this range is not possible, then the whole project should be
abandoned as socially unprofitable.
Bear in mind that only the lessee's incremental cost associated with
purifying the gas is relevant. The assignment of some general overhead cost
not created by the purifying investment would be illegitimate. Likewise,
any rate of return on the incremental investment should reflect the risk of
that project alone, and not the risk of finding, developing and extracting
new deposits. Regarding the lessor, any income in excess of that required
to compensate for foregone alternative land uses is pure rent, an unearned
income not required to provide an incentive to lease.
There would be no problem if an arm's-length third party were
buying sour gas at the wellhead for treatment and resale to downstream
users. Without these third parties, however, the vertically integrated lessee
is motivated to push some cost back upstream to the wellhead in the form
of a lower purchase price or royalty liability. For example, suppose the
vertically integrated lessee applies a proportional profits method using a
rate of discount (rate of return) in valuing the treating function that equals
the rate of discount employed in exploration, development and extraction.
This would be excessive because the treating plant does not carry the
degree of risk or uncertainty carried by exploration and drilling. If the
appropriate rate of discount can be established, a work-back approach
would be preferable. However, if the lease contract is vague on how these
sweetening costs are to be shared, without independent third parties
purchasing wellhead gas, the lessee has the knowledge of the accounting
methodology and full control of the accounting itself. This invites the lessee
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to minimize royalty obligations beyond what the lessor would have allowed
if the lessor had known this information when the lease was negotiated.'
Accordingly, the appropriate view is that royalty should be
calculated at the point where gas first becomes marketable. This point is
where the exploration and production segment of the industry logically
ends, and is therefore also the point where the lessee's obligation to produce
should logically end. Although, under this view, the lessee would bear the
risk of discovering potentially unmarketable sour gas, 3°4 necessitating the
expense of treatment, this seems no different (if anything, less serious) than
the many risks already borne by the lessee: the risk of drilling several dry
holes; the risk of discovering marginal reserves; the risk of drilling a well
that encounters formations that are difficult and more costly to drill; the risk
that a well will need a frac job or reworking; the risk of discovering heavy,
rather than light, oil; the risk of discovering low pressure gas; the risk of
having to engage in costly enhanced recovery operations; and the risk that
the investment in wells will fail to be profitable due to decreasing oil and
gas prices.
The costs associated with all of these latter risks are fully borne by
lessees engaged in exploration and production operations. Indeed, the risk
of discovering sour gas that can be treated and still sold for a profit seems
comparatively small. All of these risks are necessary to fulfill the production
objective of the lease arrangement. To fulfill the objective, the lessee uses its
expertise to explore and drill properties having an acceptable potential, to
complete and produce wells capable of production in paying quantities, and
to market that production. The lessee should then compensate the lessor
with a share of the gross returns on that first-marketable product.
Once that first-marketable product has been obtained, its value is
readily determinable because third parties are buying the production in
arm's length equivalent transactions. There is no need for work-back
calculations, and there is no need for the lessee to proportion-ately share
any additional profits (or losses) from further post-marketable downstream
activities. In other words, the need to obtain a marketable product is simply
one of the many uncertainties that give rise to the reservation of a gross
royalty in the first place. Thus, in the absence of express language to the
contrary, the uncertainty of whether the raw extracted oil or gas will be
marketable is a risk that should rest with the lessee along with the many
other risks associated with oil and gas exploitation.

303. See generally, Mark Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 997
(1992) (urging courts, from a law and economics perspective, to closely scrutinize long-term
relational contracts and contracts containing open terms when the self interest of the
controlling party conflicts with the parties' mutual interests).
304. l am assuming, for purposes of discussion, that sour gas is not marketable infact.
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CONCLUSION

Oil and gas lease royalty clauses should be construed as a whole in
light of the following factors: royalty clauses provide the major
consideration for a productive lease; they are anticipatory in nature; they
call for a sharing; they govern royalty payments for so long as there is
production, which is often a very long time through what may be a period
of significant changes in the marketplace; the lease, including the royalty
obligation, is freely assignable; and due to the large number of productive
leases in a typical lessee's portfolio, they cannot be easily honored if each
distinctive clause is narrowly and strictly construed. Unfortunately, many
courts tend to over-interpret royalty clauses. Depending upon the specific
issue, they often emphasize a single word or phrase: e.g., "produced and
sold or used," "off the premises," "at the well," "amount realized,"
"proceeds," or "market value." This is typical of cases such as Vela,
Middleton, Piney Woods, and Nationsbank.
When the typical royalty clause is considered as a whole in light of
what the parties may have mutually and reasonably intended, the clause
contemplates actual commercial sales of a product in a real marketplace
regardless of whether that sale occurs at the well or off the premises. Both
"amount realized" and "market value" contemplate real and willing buyers
buying a real product from real and willing sellers in a real market. This is
the basic approach of Garman. And a real sale cannot occur without a real
sales contract. Thus, the Tara approach, which similarly construes market
value, market price, proceeds and amount realized, is preferable to the Vela
and Piney Woods approach.
Specifically in the absence of an express lease provision to the
contrary, lessees should not have to pay royalty on any value added to
production by reason of "post-production" activities. However, in accord
with the teaching of the late Professor Kuntzm s "production" should not be
regarded as having been completed until a first-marketable product has
been obtained. Thus, the basic royalty obligation should be to pay royalty
based upon the price that the lessee obtained, or could have obtained, upon
the sale of gas as a first-marketable product in the vicinity of the well."(
Although express lease language may alter this basic obligation,
most of the commonly encountered lease royalty clauses in fee leases
offered by lessees should not be so construed. Accordingly, whether royalty
is due on "market value," "market price," "amount realized," "proceeds,"
"net proceeds," or "gross proceeds" and whether the royalty is described

305.
306.

3 KuNTz, supra note 111, § 40.
This is the basic conclusion in Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
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as being due "at the well," "at the wellhead," "at the mouth of the well,"
"free of cost, in the pipeline," or at an unspecified location, royalty should
be paid on the value of gas as a first-marketable product in the vicinity of
the well. 31 In other words, production is not complete until a firstmarketable product has been obtained, and none of the above royalty
provisions should be construed as negating this basic principle.3
There is no need to resort to the implied covenant to market to
reach this conclusion. Courts need only consider the object of the lease in
light of its purpose:m the production of hydrocarbons that generate

307. As stated previously, supra note 147, however, courts may choose to distinguish
royalties payable "at the well" from royalties payable "free of cost, in the pipeline." The
distinction, if made, concerns gathering expenses and, in specific situations, perhaps a
different type of marketable product. Under the latter, the lessee should be obligated to
gather the gas and deliver it into a pipeline in the vicinity of the well. Under the former,
perhaps the lessee should be allowed to charge the lessor, through royalty accounting, for
a proportionate share of any gathering expenses. Under either clause, however, the lessee
should be allowed to charge the lessor, through royalty accounting, for a proportionate share
of expenses incurred to gather gas and move it to a distant pipeline or distant sales point
beyond the vicinity of the well. See In hi Roberts Mining & Milling Co., 35 F. Supp. 678 (D.C.
Nev. 1940) (holding that where lessee was bound to deliver ore to a smelter, the lessee
properly accounted to lessor by not paying royalty on rail shipping costs incurred in
delivering ore to a distant smelter, but lessee conceded that it had wrongly deducted
trucking charges to the rail point).
As to the second distinction, gas could be a first marketable product (such as wet gas
marketable to a gasoline plant) and yet not be marketable to or via a pipeline. Accordingly,
a court might view royalty due "at the well'as owed on wet gas as a first marketable
product, but view royalty due "free of cost, in the pipeline" as owed on dehydrated gas that
is marketable in fact to or via a pipeline, even though the wet gas in question was otherwise
marketable.
308. 3 KUNTZ, supra note 111, § 40.5. As Professor Merrill stated:
Too much dependence is placed upon the language of a printed form, in the
preparation of which at least one party has had no part and to the selection
of which the other frequently has given no consideration, if upon a variance
of that language a difference is established in a duty not specifically
referred to.
MERRILL, supra note 5. And as the court stated in Maloney v. Love, 52 P. 1029 (Colo. Ct. App.
1898), royalty rights "must be determined, not by isolating certain words from the
connection in which they occur, and putting an interpretation upon them without regard to
their relative situation, but by considering all the language of which the words form a part."
Id.
309. Courts have often construed oil and gas lease clauses in light of their intended
purpose, rather than in strict accordance with the lease language. Consider the following
examples:
(a) In Mussellem v. MagnoliaPetroleum Co., 231 P. 526 (Okla. 1924), the royalty clause was
properly construed in light of its purpose. The royalty clause at issue expressly provided
that royalty was due only on gas "used off the leased premises." The lessee used the gas on
the leased premises in a gasoline extraction plant. The court held that royalty was owed on
such gas because the phrase, "used off the leased premises," merely gave the lessee the free
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use of gas for developing the leased premises for oil and gas production. "Off the premises"
did not refer to the physical place where the gas was used; rather it referred to a use that was
"foreign to the development of the premises.' Id. at 531.
(b) Many lease granting clauses contain what is know as a "Mother Hubbard" or "coverall"
provision: "This lease also covers and includes any and all lands owned or claimed by the
Lessor adjacent or contiguous to the land described hereinabove .... " Professor Lowe
analyzes this clause as follows:
[S]uppose that 0, the owner in fee simple absolute of Blackacre, a 640 acre
section, grants a lease containing Mother Hubbard language to A,
describing specifically the east 320 acres of the section ....
If given literal effect, the Mother Hubbard language quoted would
subject the full 640 acres to the lease; the west half of the section is "adjacent
or contiguous" to the east half. If the purpose of the language were taken
into account, however, the lease would be limited to the 320 acres described
plus any small tracts that are physically a part of that land but not
specifically described in the legal description.
JOHNS. LowE, OIL AND GAS IN A NurSHELL,

170- 72 (3d ed. 1995). Like Lowe, most courts

construe the Mother Hubbard clause in light of its purpose-even Texas courts, so often
prone to dissect language to absurd conclusions. See, e.g., Smith v. Allison, 301 S.W.2d 308
(Tex. 1956).
(c) The typical lease granting clause gives the lessee the right to use the surface of the
leased premises to explore for and develop oil and gas. Yet courts have commonly limited
the lessee's right of surface use by:
[a]t least five countervailing principles. The lessee's use must be (1)
reasonable use, (2) in accord with the accommodation doctrine, (3) for the
benefit of the minerals under the land leased, (4) in accord with the terms
of the lease, and (5) in accord with applicable statutes, ordinances, rules
and regulations.
LOwE, supra, at 173.
(d) Many leases specifically allow the lessee to use water in lease operations "except water
from lessor's wells." Looking to the purpose of this exception (to not interfere with the
lessor's established water facilities), courts have prohibited lessees from using water from
artificial stock ponds or tanks established by the lessor. See, e.g., Mohawk Drilling Co. v.
Wolf, 262 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1953); Arnold v. Adams, 294 P. 142 (Okla. 1930). And in Vogel v.
Cobb, 141 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1943), the court prohibited the lessee from supplying water

produced from the leased premises to employees living off of the leased premises even
though those employees worked on lease operations on the leased premises.
(e) Historically, many leases allowed the lessor to take gas from gas wells located on the
leased premises. Courts have construed this right in light of what the parties to the lease

would have reasonably intended and expected-that the lessor's use be personal and
reasonable:
(1)The lessor is not entitled to an unreasonable amount of free gas. See, e.g.,
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Small, 138 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1940) (lessor "is not
entitled to an unlimited amount, or to determine arbitrarily what he will
take, or to permit gross extravagance [sic] or waste"); Sanford v.
Witherspoon, 15 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1940) (lessor is entitled only to an amount of
gas that is customary and reasonable and may not arbitrarily determine the
amount).

(2) The free gas clause is ordinarily intended to be a covenant running with
the surface estate. See, e.g., Warfield, 138 S.W.2d 488 (where the surface and
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income to the lessee and a cost-free royalty share to the lessor. To fulfill this
objective, the lessee must have a product to market and must market that
product (or pay the lessor for its value in the vicinity of the well) without
cost to the lessor.31° Under this approach, the lessee would not be obliged
to move the gas further downstream to a secondary or tertiary market and,
if the lessee did so, the lessee would not be obliged to share any generated
profits with, or permitted to pass on any losses to, the lessor. In other
words, all lessees would be treated alike, whether vertically integrated or
not.
Although the implied marketing covenant is not needed to establish
the lessee's obligation to produce a marketable product, the lessee's duty of
good faith and fair dealing would require that the first market be real,
existing, and substantial, and not a market created in bad faith to limit the

mineral estates are severed, the free-gas rights remain with the surface
because the purpose of the free gas clause is to furnish gas for use on the
surface of the leased premises).
(3) The lessor is not entitled to furnish gas to additional dwellings
constructed after the execution of the lease or to non-domestic buildings.
See e.g., Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Moore, 136 S.W.2d 1086 (Ky. 1940)
(parties to lease did not intend that free gas be furnished to subsequently
erected buildings); Sanford v. Witherspoon, 15 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1940) (free gas
cannot be used in dairy barn or garage); Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v.
Clemens, 123 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, no writ) (free gas
cannot be used in a pressing shop boiler or filling station); Scurry Area
Canyon Reef Operators Corp. v. Popnoe, 283 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1955, no writ) (free gas cannot be used to power an
irrigation pump).
310. Recall basic contract doctrine, noted in Part 1, Section III.D. text at note 251: If a
party to a contract owes a particular duty of performance, such as the duty to market
production, that party has the obligation to absorb the costs of performance in absence of an
express agreement to the contrary. This principle is so fundamental that contracts scholars
only discuss it in the context of whether unforeseen costs may excuse performance under the
doctrines of impossibility and impracticability. There is never a suggestion that the other
party to the contract is charged with these costs.
For example, Professor Farnsworth notes that "courts have only occasionally held that a
duty is discharged on the ground of mere increase in the expense of performing it. They have
generally concluded that the additional expense, even if traceable to an identifiable
supervening event, does not rise to the level of impracticability." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 9.6 (2d ed. 1990); see also 18 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACrS §
1963 (3d ed. 1978) ("The fact that by supervening circumstances, performance of a promise
is made more difficult and expensive ... will not excuse the promisor.'); ARTHUR LNTON

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1333 (1962) ("A supervening discovery of facts that make
the promised performance more difficult or expensive..., if they are such as are commonly
foreseeable and in contemplation, has almost always been held not to discharge the
contractor from his duty.") Of course, under the implied covenant to market, there is no duty
to market if the oil or gas cannot be marketed profitably. See, e.g., lams v. Carnegie Natural
Gas Co., 45 A. 54 (Pa. 1899).
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royalty obligation?" In other words, there would have to be real buyers in
a substantial market buying production in arm's length equivalent
transactions. This first market would have to be one that a reasonable and
prudent operator would use, bearing in mind the lessee's desire to market
at a profit and its duty of good faith and fair dealing to compensate the
lessor fairly for a productive lease." 2 This gives the lessee substantial, but
not unwarranted, control in establishing the first market. The lessee's duty
of good faith and fair dealing would require the lessee to sell in a
substantial and prudent market, and the necessity of arm's length
equivalent buyers would assure that the marketplace was real, rather than
contrived? 3
I realize that some commentators have advocated an approach that
would require the lessee to share proportionately all downstream profits
with the lessor while subtracting from those profits a proportionate share
of all post-wellhead costs.3 14 In my view, this should not be required under
most royalty clauses315 in states that adopt a first-marketable product
311. In other words, a wellhead sale would not conclusively establish the wellhead as a
first market where such a market was created in bad faith to minimize royalty obligations.
The presence of substantial arm's-length equivalent wellhead sales, however, would
demonstrate a legitimate first market. Cf, Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24,
29 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ granted), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 31
Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140 (Tex. 1987), withdrawn, set aside, dism'd as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988)
(stating that, in marketing gas to an affiliate, lessee owes lessor a duty of good faith).
Although discussion of whether royalty is due on "take-or-pay" payments and
settlements is beyond the scope of this essay, I submit that an appropriate similar inquiry
should be made: whether the take-or-pay payments or settlements or other supplemental
payments have effectively lowered the price of produced gas.
312. See, e.g., Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 41 S.W.2d 414,417 (Tex.
1931) (stating that the marketing covenant arises from the royalty clause of the lease which
furnishes the primary consideration to the lessor).
313. In Martin v. Amis,288 S.W.431 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926), the court held that, subject
to the limits of the marketplace and the lessee's obligation to the lessor to act in good faith
and reasonably and prudently for their mutual benefit, lessees can establish the point at
which gas first becomes a marketable product and, hence, the point where royalty is
payable.
314. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculationin a Restructured Gas Market, 13 E. MIN.
L.FOuND. PRoc. 18-1 (1992).
315. Thus, as between Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v.Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924)
(requiring lessee to share downstream profits with the lessor), and Warfield Natural Gas Co.
v. Allen, 88 S.W.2d 989 (Ky. 1935) (holding that lessee may pay royalty on the price for which
gas was actually marketed by other producers in the vicinity of the well and not on the
profits derived from a sale further downstream), I agree with Warfield. See also Haynes v.
Southwest Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011,1012 (5th Cir. 1941); Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell
Oil Co., 44 P.2d 573,578 (Cal. 1935); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561,564-65
(La. 1934). But see Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 169 P.2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App.
1946).
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approach.3 "6 Likewise, lessees should not be allowed to pass on to the lessor
a proportionate share of losses resulting from a downstream sale.1 7 My
reasoning stems from the fact that the modem oil and gas lease may be
freely assigned, and upon assignment, the assignor is expressly relieved of
responsibility for subsequent royalty payments and other obligations. 318 The
lease can be assigned to any type of operator-from a small independent
who engages in salvage operations, to a vertically integrated company that
has its own gas transmission pipeline and a portfolio of end-user buyers of
gas. Thus, the lessee's royalty obligation is not one of personal service, and
the royalty owed is not dependent upon the particular marketing skills or
clout of the initial lessee.
To require the lessee to share downstream profits with the lessor
would essentially create another gambler's contract for the lessor. If the
lease happened to be assigned to a highly efficient vertically integrated
company with its own pipeline and distribution system and portfolio of

I would not decide this question by splitting hairs over the wording of common royalty
clauses. In Part 1, Section III.C. of this essay I pointed out that if one considers the language
of the royalty clauses in Clear Creek and Warfield, the results are counterintuitive anyway.
Thus, I also do not subscribe to Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Production Co., 679 F.
Supp. 1435 (W.D. Mich. 1988), where the court held that where royalty was due on the
"amount realized at the mouth of the well," the lessee must pay royalty on the basis of
proceeds received less expenses, even though the gas may have had an established market
value at the well.
316. In jurisdictions that allow lessees to calculate royalties by working back to the
wellhead, the sharing of profits seems necessary to prevent the lessee from zeroing out
royalties by padding expenses. See generally Anderson, supra note 85 (offering some advice
to courts on how they should treat the deduction of costs in the event they continue to
require the use of a work-back approach).
Nevertheless, even those jurisdictions that have authorized use of the work-back
approach have stated that the preferred valuation method is the comparable-sales approach.
See, e.g., Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 239 (5th Cir. 1984);
Sowell v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 604 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Haynes v. Southwest
Natural Gas Co., 123 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1941); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
463 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Okla. 1978); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981);
Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298,303 (Mont. 1978). Under this approach, lessees
pay royalties on the basis of comparable wellhead sales, which obviously requires
marketable wellhead gas. Thus, this approach would not take into account downstream
profits earned by a particular lessee who elects to market the gas further downstream.
317. Nearly all lessee-drafted leases contain the following or similar provision regarding
assignments:
The rights of each party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part ....
In the event of assignment hereof in whole or in part, liability for breach of
any obligation issued hereunder shall rest exclusively upon the owner of
this Lease, or portion thereof, who commits such breach.
American Association of Petroleum Landmen, A.A.P.L. Form 675, Oil and Gas Lease.
318. Thus, I disagree with AtlanticRichfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rprt. 683 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) discussed supra, notes 187-204."
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end-user buyers, the lessor might reap huge and unanticipated profits
arising from sales to end users. On the other hand, other lessors in the same
field with identical leases developed by small independent operators might
receive much lower royalty payments. And if the lessee sold gas to an
affiliate, a court might decide to follow the gas further downstream and
require royalty on profits,3 9 even though an independent selling at arm's
length near the well in the same field would not be subject to a similar suit.
Moreover, a marketable-product approach would help resolve the
problem of accounting for royalty where the lessee makes a series of
different types of sales to different buyers under different circumstances
without dedicating any particular gas from a particular leasehold to the
sale. To calculate royalty, one would look to the market value of the gas as
a first-marketable product in the vicinity of the well. While there might be
more than one first market, the problem of accounting for royalty where the
lessee makes a variety of sales would be eased considerably by confining
royalty valuation accounting to these first markets. 3 In selecting the
appropriate first market, a court should focus on whether that market was
available to the lessee for the particular production at issue, and whether a
lessee, acting in good faith, would have used that market.'
The marketable-product approach separates the exploration and
production segment of the industry from downstream segments based upon
a factual inquiry into commercial realities. I submit that this is far preferable
to an arbitrary separation of these segments after extraction, after
compression, after gathering, etc., as a matter of law.' Both lessors and
lessees, in the absence of clarifying lease language, should reasonably
expect that production be shared on a first-marketable-product basis. A
lessor who may take production in kind would reasonably expect to receive
the royalty share in a marketable condition near the well, and where royalty
is taken in value, that expectation should not change.
On the other hand, a lessor should not expect to receive royalty on
the value of production after it has passed beyond the exploration and
319. See, e.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24,29 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1984, writ granted), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140 (Tex.
1987), withdrawn, set aside, dism'd as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).

320. For further discussion of the problems of royalty accounting in a multiple-market
scenario see Pierce, supranote 315.
321. This latter inquiry addresses whether this first market was a real gas market, and
not one that was simply contrived for purposes of limiting royalty obligations.
322. Note also that under my approach the location of true post-wellhead activities
would not matter. For example, if treating were necessary to make gas marketable in fact,
the location of the treating plant off the leased premises would not make the plant a
deductible expense. Conversely, the location of a gasoline plant on the leased premises
would not prevent the lessee from calculating royalty on wet gas that was marketable in fact
prior to liquids processing.
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production segment of the industry. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
explained this succinctly in Rains v. Kentucky Oil Co.32 The lessee sold gas
for 6C/Mcf. The buyer transported the gas through a pipeline to a town and
resold the gas, under franchise, for 42€/Mcf.324 The lease stated that royalty
was payable on "the product of each well while the same is being used off the
premises... ."' In light of this express language, the lessor argued that it
was entitled to royalty on 42c, the downstream price where the gas was
"being used off the premises." The court, however, properly rejected this
argument as follows:
It is the custom to pay one-eighth of the oil in the pipe line,
but there is a wide difference between the delivery of oil in
the pipe line, and the delivery and marketing of gas to the
individual consumers in a city. The latter is generally
conducted as an independent business, and is attended by a
very large expense in the obtention of the franchise
distribution of the gas. While the lessee may be under the
duty of using reasonable effort to market the gas, we are not
inclined to the view that this duty, in the absence of a contract
to that effect, is so exacting as to require him to market the
gas by obtaining a franchise from some town or city and
distributing the gas to the inhabitants thereof. On the
contrary, he fully complies with his duty if he sells the gas at
a reasonable price at the well side to another who is willing to
undergo the risk of expending a large amount of money for
the purpose of distributing the gas to the ultimate consumers.
We are therefore constrained to the view that under the
contract in question appellant was entitled to... one-eighth
of the fair market price of the gas at the well side.'
Note that the gas was clearly marketable near the well because it
was actually sold for 6¢/Mcf. Moreover, the court noted the custom of
paying oil royalty "in the pipeline," a point where the oil is free of water
and base sediment. The removal of this water and base sediment is a postwellhead activity performed to make the oil marketable in fact. Thus,
royalty should be presumptively owed on oil and gas that are firstmarketable as a matter of fact, and not owed at the wellhead (if there is no
actual market at that point) or at a subsequent market downstream.
Under the first-marketable product approach, all lessees are treated
the same regardless of their size, and generally the same regardless of their
circumstance. Of course, because some lessees may have available first

323.

255 S.W. 121 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923).

324. Id.
325. Id.
(emphasis added).
326. Id. Accord Stranahan v. Independent Natural Gas Co., 41 P.2d 39 (Mont. 1935).
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markets that are not available to others, there could still be some difference
in treatment due to circumstance. The key, however, would be the
identification of the first real and substantial market (or markets) that marks
the end of the exploration and production segment of the industry. This
may be at the wellhead, or it may be at some post-wellhead point, such as
the tailgate of a treating or dehydration plant, depending upon
3 the facts.
And again, these are and should be questions of fact, not law. 2
Transportation costs, apart from delivery of gas in the vicinity of
the well, should be proportionately charged to lessors through royalty
accounting, because royalty should not be payable on transportation.
Transportation costs would ordinarily include compression costs incurred
to deliver gas into extensive gathering lines or transmission pipelines.
Allowing the deduction of these transportation costs is important to assure
that royalty law does not skew the lessee's determination of the best market

327. Critics of my approach may charge that a marketability in fact approach is too
uncertain, and that in the interest of certainty it would be better to arbitrarily define
production as having occurred at the mouth of the well or at some other fixed point
downstream- essentially as a matter of law. My response is that those other approaches
have led to great uncertainty in several respects.
First, as I illustrated supra Part 1, Section I, there is great disagreement as to when
production occurs among the various jurisdictions. Even jurisdictions that say that all postwellhead costs are deductible have never expressly sanctioned the deduction of the initial
cost of separating the brine, oil, and casinghead gas. And those that push the production
point downstream do so inconsistently. Indeed, Kansas, which allows a deduction for
transportation costs, nevertheless disallows a deduction for compression even though
compression ordinarily serves a transportation function.
Thus, a matter-of-law approach has not promoted uniformity among identical lease
clauses, let alone among similar clauses, on a state-by-state basis. I am suggesting a uniform
approach that would construe most commonly encountered lease royalty clauses as being
alike and an approach that can be adopted in most jurisdictions without the necessity of
overruling prior case law.
Second, courts have offered little guidance concerning the proper calculation of postproduction costs. And the little guidance offered varies greatly from state-to-state, case-tocase, and lease-to-lease. Moreover, different lessees calculate post-production costs
differently, and lessees have no real incentive to do so fairly because the likelihood of an
effective challenge is minimal, the applicable statutes of limitation are short, the cost of
royalty litigation is high and unpredictable for lessors, and many lessors are likely to accept
whatever the lessee offers. Instead, the incentive is to maximize deductions so as to minimize
royalty payments. See generally Anderson, supra note 85.
Third, any problems encountered in deciding when gas is first-marketable in fact will be
short term because gas, like all commodities, is destined for a common market. Current
variations in marketing gas are due to the recent restructuring of the entire gas industry.
Marketing will become much more standardized in the future, and when it does, my
approach will be preferable because, other than 'freight' and production taxes, there will
be no further need to calculate and then deduct a variety of post-wellhead costs. And lessees,
subject to their obligation to be reasonable and prudent operators and to act in good faith,
will have substantial influence over the establishment of a common market.
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location. Under modem gas marketing scenarios, many producers may
choose to operate extensive transportation networks. Royalty law should
not "artificially" discourage this choice. Likewise, because wet gas' is
generally marketable to gasoline plant operators, the lessor would be
entitled to the value of the wet gas, assuming that wet gas remains
marketable in fact.
What, then, is the bottom line? Under my proposal, some lessors
may gain additional royalty income because some courts have erroneously
ruled that royalty should be calculated, for all purposes, at the mouth of the
well regardless of whether the gas was marketable at that point.3 Other
lessors may lose royalty income because some courts have erroneously
ruled that royalty must be calculated on the value of gas after compression,
processing or gathering, even though the gas was marketable in fact prior
to undergoing some or all of those activities. Nevertheless, lessees, whether
vertically integrated or not, will be treated largely the same, and royalty
clauses will be interpreted largely the same. While this may make the
certification of royalty class actions more likely on a field-wide basis,
controversies that lead to class actions are less likely to arise, and state-wide
and multi-state class actions should be less likely due to the necessity of
making specific fact findings regarding first markets. Under my approach,
lessees would owe royalty on the gross sales price of gas as a firstmarketable product, less only readily determinable deductions mandated
by law (such as severance taxes) and less any transportation costs incurred
in delivering gas to a first market that is located beyond the vicinity of the
well.
Addendum
While this essay was in press, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
rendered its answer to certified questions in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals,
Inc., No. 84,977 (January 20, 1998). In a split decision, the majority
attempted to clarify its prior views on the issue of post-production costs by
adopting the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court in Garman v. Conoco,
Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). The majority also stated that it regarded
Kansas case law, Sternbergerv. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995),

328. By wet gas, I mean gas that is saturated with gasoline and other liquid
hydrocarbons.
329. One should not assume that a marketable-product rule will always lead to a higher
royalty than a work-back-to-wellhead rule. For example, if, in making a work-back
calculation, a court permits the lessee to deduct only 754 from a $3.00 downstream price, and
the value of the gas is $2.00 as a first-marketable product, the lessor would lose royalty
income under my approach.
330. While disputes over the calculation of transportation costs could arise, lessees
should be limited to a deduction of reasonable, not to exceed actual, costs. See generally,
Anderson supranote 85.
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as being consistent with Garman. The lease at issue provided that royalty
was to be paid on "the gross proceeds received for the gas sold." The costs
at issue were transportation, compression, dehydration, and "blending."
Following Garman, the Mittelstaedt majority answered that, absent specific
lease language, "the lessor must bear a proportionate share of such costs if
the lessee can show (1) that the costs enhanced the value of an already
marketable product, (2) that such costs are reasonable, and (3) that actual
royalty revenues increased in proportion with the costs assessed against the
nonworking interest."
Thus, the court wisely retreated from the impression left in its prior
opinions that marketability is to be determined as a matter of law.
However, like the Garman court, the Mittelstaedt majority fails to explain
why a work-back calculation is necessary where the sale of gas occurs
downstream of the first market. See discussion, supra, at text accompanying
notes 262-70.
Perhaps the work-back portion of the Mittelstaedt and Garman
*holdings is relevant only where the lessee actually uses the work-back
method to determine the royalty payable. In other words, in accordance
with the views expressed in this essay, perhaps a lessee who sells
downstream can elect to pay royalty on the actual value of production at the
first market. If so, this troublesome aspect of Garman may have little
practical significance.
Justice Opala, joined by Justice Watt, dissented in part. Citing and
agreeing with the views expressed in a draft of this essay, Justice Opala
retreated from his prior view that royalty is to be determined upon the
physical severance of oil and gas at the wellhead.

